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This thesis consists of three essays that investigate corporate defaults connected to 
corporate governance, default correlations and capital structure adjustment. 
Granting a loan requires mutual trust between lenders and borrower and depends 
on the flow of information. The relevance and the accuracy of the information are 
necessary to ensure the best judgement about the creditworthiness of borrowers. 
However, information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender is the main 
hurdle for any judgement about the borrower. Although default prediction has 
commanded the attention of researchers over many years, there is still an important 
gap in the literature on the selection of the suitable default predictor information for 
improved borrower evaluation.  
To broaden the understanding of the information content of default predictor 
variables, the first essay addresses and tests the impact of corporate governance on 
default prediction. It examines several testable hypotheses regarding the relations 
between corporate governance and default prediction, building on the Standard and 
Poor (2002) corporate governance framework proposed by Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006). The research employs the conventional logistic regression to provide 
empirical evidence from U.S. default data over the period of 2000 to 2015. 
Empirical results are consistent with the following notions: First, default firms are 
associated with high ownership concentration, low shareholder rights, low financial 
transparency and disclosures, and less board effectiveness.  
Second, in-sample and out-of-sample tests support the incremental contribution of 
corporate governance information on default prediction, when compared with the 
models involving just financial information.  
In addition to the analyses on the U.S. data, this thesis conducts a comparative study 
using the data of Sri Lanka, which serves as a representative emerging market. This 
study argues that emerging markets are important because they present several 
institutional differences that cannot be examined in the developed markets. The 
rapid evolvement of these markets provides excellent experimental grounds for 
studying many financial issues. The empirical results show that whilst an integrated 
model provides overall stronger predictive value; financial information is more 
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relevant for USA firms. Corporate governance appears more relevant in emerging 
markets than in mature markets, but the effectiveness of the individual corporate 
governance practices differs between countries.  
The second essay discusses the impact of corporate governance on the correlation 
in corporate defaults. This essay investigates for the first time the effect of firm-
specific corporate governance on default correlation as an extension to the 
contagion and cyclical effect proposed by Das et al. (2007) as the sources of default 
correlation. It hypothesizes that the degree of default correlations could increase 
disproportionally for firms with weak corporate governance in terms of high 
ownership concentration, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency, and 
higher shareholder rights. This study employs Lucas’s (1995) method to provide 
empirical evidence based on the historical default data from the United States from 
2000 to 2015. The empirical results imply that corporate governance is essential for 
credit risk management because poor corporate governance may increase not only 
individual default risk but also the domino effect of credit defaults. Moreover, the 
impact of corporate governance on the correlation in corporate defaults is more 
pronounced in the financial crisis. 
The third essay examines the heterogeneity of the speed of capital structure 
adjustment in firms. In contrast to previously documented contemporaneous results, 
it tests the issue through distinguishing two types of the firms (default and non-
default firms), and two measures of the speed of adjustment (cumulative versus 
marginal). The empirical results show that the speed of adjustment is non-uniform 
across firms and over time. In particular, default firms are associated with a higher 
speed of adjustment than non-default firms. The completion of leverage adjustment 
takes multiple periods. The marginal speed of adjustment accelerates from the 
beginning period to the end period, which is consistent with the anchoring and 
adjustment bias heuristic. The empirical results are robust using a book/market 
leverage and a two/one-step estimation approach. In addition to the tests on the 
speed of capital structure adjustment, this essay also examines the effect of leverage 
deviation on measuring firms’ default risk. The in-sample and out-of-sample tests 
suggest that taking into account leverage deviation enhances the capacity of 
measuring corporate borrowers’ default risk. Additionally, such benefit is persistent 
over various time horizons. Overall, the empirical findings provide important policy 
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implications for banks before granting loans to corporate customers. This work fills 
crucial gaps in the credit risk literature.  
Keywords: Default prediction, corporate governance, accounting information, 
share market information, emerging and mature market, default correlation, credit 
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1.1.  Background of the thesis 
This thesis investigates three crucial issues on corporate defaults. These are 
corporate governance and default prediction; corporate governance and default 
correlation; and, capital structure adjustment and default prediction.  
The prediction of corporate default1 has been of momentous interest among 
the practitioners and academics over the last four decades in credit risk research.  
Due to the dynamic nature of default firms and the changes of the regulatory 
environment, the practitioners and academics strive to develop improved credit risk 
prediction models. More importantly, following the financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
significant attention is given to credit risk assessment at the micro level i.e., 
measuring credit risk at an individual firm level. Credit risk calculated at the 
individual firm level from a default prediction model is called the ‘Probability of 
Default’. Financial institutions need reliable default prediction models to make 
appropriate lending decisions and to reduce economic losses resulting from firm 
defaults. Financial institutions require timely and accurate information to build 
customized default prediction models depending on the appropriateness of the 
information relating to such as the economy, ownership, and the industry of the 
firms being evaluated.  
The present thesis is structured into three essays and these three essays 
contribute to knowledge in several ways through empirically testing previously 
untested research hypotheses relating to corporate defaults. The novelty of this 
thesis is that, unlike the previous works, the default prediction model tested uses a 
combination of accounting, share market and corporate governance information in 
                                                 
1 In this thesis the terms financial distress, default, failure, bankruptcy and liquidation are used 









a single predictor model. The effect of the comprehensive application of corporate 
governance information on corporate default prediction is also investigated. 
Moreover, this thesis compares the value relevance of the predictor information 
(accounting, share market and corporate governance) for predicting corporate 
defaults between emerging and mature markets.  
Furthermore, this thesis examines the default risk at portfolio level by giving 
special consideration to corporate governance. It pioneers research into the effect 
of corporate governance on default correlation. From the results, the thesis provides 
direction for financial institutions and corporate managers to explore the behaviour 
of capital structure adjustments. The results from fault firms are compared to those 
from non-default firms over different time periods. Finally, the thesis examines the 
effect of leverage dynamics on default prediction models.  
The following sections (1.2 to 1.4) provide an overview of the three essays 
comprising the body of this thesis. 
 
1.2.  Corporate governance and default prediction 
The first essay focuses on corporate governance and corporate defaults, drawn from 
two research papers. The first paper tests the relative significance of the application 
of comprehensive corporate governance information in a corporate default 
prediction model. The second paper compares the effectiveness of different 
predictor information from mature markets with that from emerging markets. 
Prior default prediction models give primary attention to testing different 
default predictor information with the aim of improving default probability 
predictions. Financial data based on accounting and share market information 
receives substantial attention. The importance of including corporate governance 
variables into credit risk modelling is also emphasised (Altman, 2006; Platt and 
Platt, 2012). Some researchers argue that if corporate governance affects company 
performance then the attributes of corporate governance also ensure the survival of 
a company (e.g., Goktan, Kieschnick, and Moussawi, 2006). Although some studies 
test the effect of corporate governance on bankruptcy prediction (e.g., Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Gales and Kesner, 1994; Simpon and Gleason, 1998; 
Elloumi and Gueylé, 2001; Parker et al., 2002), these works are restricted to a few 
  




governance variables, such as board characteristics and ownership concentration. 
This thesis tests and shows other variables are also important determinants of 
default prediction.  
In this first essay, binary logistic regression is used for U.S. default data over 
the period of 2000 to 2015 to examine the effect of corporate governance on default 
prediction. Standard & Poor’s (2002) governance framework is considered to be a 
comprehensive analysis of corporate governance information, pertaining to the 
corporate governance literature. Accordingly, the governance information is 
identified into four major dimensions: ownership structure and influence, 
shareholder rights and relations, financial transparency and disclosures and board 
structure and effectiveness.  
For the first time, this research tests the incremental contribution of non-
financial corporate governance information in addition to financial information, 
using a default prediction approach. This research emphasizes the importance of 
integrating these two forms of information as they are not mutually exclusive.  
Research on default prediction starts by using accounting information (e.g., 
Beaver, 1966; Altman, 1968) and then shifts to using market-based information (e.g, 
Merton, 1974; Black and Scholes, 1973). However, researchers deem financial 
ratios as a backward-looking (e.g., Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie, 2005) and not 
highly relevant to making predictions about the future. To address the accounting 
information problems, researchers apply market information (e.g., Beaver, 1966; 
Beaver et al., 2005; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). However, market-information-
based models remain valid only in an efficient market. Furthermore, market-based-
information is subject to manipulation through insider dealings, and this behaviour 
is a distinct challenge in the capital market. Subsequently, researchers criticise 
models based purely on financial information (i.e., accounting and market 
information).  
Few studies use qualitative information and quantitative information 
together to improve default probability. An emergent question in the literature is 
about the effects of incorporating corporate governance into default prediction 
models. Few studies have tested the ability of corporate governance variables to 
predict corporate defaults and variables of the board characteristics and ownership 
concentration are mainly considered (e.g., Daily and Dalton, 1994a, 1994b; Gales 
  




and Kesner, 1994; Simpon and Gleason, 1998; Elloumi and Gueylé, 2001; Parker 
et al., 2002). This essay tests the incremental contribution of the integrated 
accounting, share market and corporate governance information compared to 
models with single piece of financial and nonfinancial information. The prediction 
performances are evaluated by using the accuracy ratios under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristics and Cumulative Accuracy Profile curves.  
The essay also identifies how the applicability of the integrated information 
models individually and collectively differs between an emerging and a mature 
market. The research on a mature market is based on companies in the US. For an 
emerging market, the study employs data of Sri Lanka. The rationale for such 
comparison between US and Sri Lanka follows.  
The literature on corporate governance divides the governance system into 
two groups i.e., the Anglo-American and the Continental European/Japanese 
(Aguilera, Williams, Conley, & Rupp, 2006). The US belongs to the Anglo-
American group, whereas Sri Lanka belongs to the European and Asian group. The 
practices of the European and Asian are categorised as the insider model, wherein 
ownership is highly concentrated, and both the transparency of market information 
and the standard of disclosures are low. The US is deemed to be market-oriented 
and tend to have diffused ownership- an outsider model. In the outsider model, there 
are well-governed regulations and laws, high standard disclosures, and high market 
transparency. Institutional investor ownership by entities such as banks, trust funds, 
insurance companies, investment advisory companies, pension funds, and 
investment companies is high in the US. There are, therefore, clear differences 
between the US and Sri Lanka in terms of their different market conditions and 
corporate governance practices. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that 
default prediction information applies differently within the two countries.  
 
1.3.  Corporate governance and default correlation  
The second essay examines the effect of corporate governance on default 
correlation. This study presents convincing reasons for using all four areas of 
corporate governance in default correlation.  
Financial institutions use internal credit rating models to assess the default 
probability of individual borrowers. However, a credit portfolio manager is 
  




concerned about not only the defaults of the individual borrowers but also the 
possible correlation among multiple default events in a credit portfolio. Default 
correlation implies the relationship between individual default probabilities and 
joint default probabilities among firms.  
Researchers continuously explore the culprits behind the joint default 
probabilities of firms. Thus, the extant literature on default correlation shows there 
are three main reasons for joint default risk, namely, cyclical correlation, (Duffie, 
1998; Keenan, Hamilton & Berthault, 2000; and Duffie, Saita & Wang, 2007), 
contagion effect (Aharony and Swary, 1983; Lang and Stulz, 1992; and Giesecke, 
2004), and learning from defaults (Jarrow and Yu, 2001). Researchers test several 
proxies for the above main three reasons, for example, parent-subsidiary 
relationship under the contagion effect. More recently Li and Chen (2018) test the 
default correlation due to liquidity, systematic risk, and size as an extension to the 
three primary sources of default correlation proposed by Das, Duffie, Kapadia and 
Saita (2007).  
However, the reasons behind the joint default probabilities among firms 
remain elusive and results of are inconclusive. This thesis extends the primary 
sources of default correlation suggested by Das et al. (2007) by considering firms’ 
corporate governance practices. Thus, this thesis makes contributions by testing the 
impact of corporate governance on corporate default correlation for the first time.  
Corporate governance is the mechanism to monitor managers and to reduce 
agency problem which arises due to the separation of ownership from management. 
There are two types of agency conflicts: the conflicts between managers and 
stakeholders (including shareholders and debtholders), and the conflicts between 
shareholders and debtholders. The role of corporate governance is highly valued in 
the US market where the ownership is widely dispersed. Thus, a strong corporate 
governance system could guarantee that there is no vacuum for managerial 
opportunism. The second conflict of interest arises between shareholders and 
debtholders, which creates the agency cost of debt. Generally, shareholders would 
like to pursue risky investments and the success of the projects yields the benefits 
to the shareholders; however, the failure of those investments affects firm’s cash 
flows and causes reduction of the value of collateralization. Thus, the risk-shifting 
behaviour from shareholders to debtholders arises. Given such, these two kinds of 
  




agency problems reduce the value of firms and increases default risk either via 
managerialism or by risk-shifting behaviours.  
Thus, this essay focuses on examining the effect of the corporate 
governance mechanism on default correlation by linking the firm’s specific 
governance attributes to the main sources of default correlation. The literature 
explicitly affirms that corporate governance affects default risk. Moreover, the 
literature establishes that default firms are associated with different levels of 
corporate governance practices in terms of board characteristics (e.g., Daily and 
Dalton, 1994a), and ownership characteristics (e.g., Elloumi and Gueyie, 2001). 
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003). Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find firms with a 
stronger governance mechanism enjoy higher credit ratings and lower default risk.  
However, the literature on corporate governance suggests that the reaction 
of corporate governance practices is different due to the changes of macroeconomic 
conditions. Evidence of this is provided by, for example, Erkens, Mingyi, and 
Matos (2012)2. Further, Hutchinson and Gul (2004) argue that specific industries 
adopt similar corporate governance practices3. Thus, it is expected that firms with 
similar governance practices behave similarly due to industries and economic 
changes. The essay examines how the similar corporate governance practices of 
firms, in particular, weak corporate governance, affect default correlation due to 
cyclical and contagion effect. The essay considers four important attributes of 
governance mechanism, that is, ownership structure and influence, board 
effectiveness, financial transparency and shareholder rights. It is assumed that 
governance mechanism reduces the two kinds of agency conflicts and ensures an 
independent monitoring of the management to avoid managerial opportunism and 
the risk-shifting problem. Thus, the essay explores the effect of governance 
mechanism on default correlation due to the cyclical and contagion effect.  
 
                                                 
2 They find that firms with higher institutional ownership take high risk prior to the crisis and create more losses 
to the large shareholders and firms with more independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis. 
3  They find that corporate governance practices affect the firm performances and the linkage of the 
organizational environment.  
  




1.4.  Capital structure adjustments and corporate defaults 
The third essay focuses on the capital structure and corporate defaults.  The essay 
examines (i) the heterogeneity of capital structure adjustment among default and 
non-default firms and over different time horizons, and (ii) the effect of leverage 
dynamics for default prediction.   
The speed of capital structure adjustments varies mainly due to transaction 
cost and other reasons. For example, financial constraints4 significantly affect the 
speed of capital structure adjustment (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Byoun, 2008; 
Dang et al., 2012). These studies consider the changes in the financial conditions in 
the short term by using the cash flow identity. However, in finance, there are two 
types of credit risk, default risk and risk of downgrading. Nevertheless, the risk 
investors should be focused on is that if they invest in a business, it might suffer 
financial distress and eventually go bankrupt, which will cause a permanent loss for 
the investors. Such risk is default risk. In other words, default is defined as the event 
that firms have gone through the bankruptcy or liquidation process. This essay fills 
a gap in the capital structure literature and finds heterogeneity of the adjustment 
speed among default and healthy firms.  
Furthermore, this essay argues that the leverage adjustment behaviour of 
firms varies over time. Most of the extant literature on the issue of speed of capital 
structure adjustment focuses on the contemporaneous adjustment speed. It is 
posited that the studies based on the contemporaneous analysis are unable to capture 
the long-run financial behaviour of the firms (Leary and Roberts, 2005).  It is also 
suggested that capital structure is formed as a result of the cumulative outcomes of 
the historical reactions to market changes (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Further, 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) find that a firm accomplishes about one-third of its 
target leverage each year. Therefore, it is vital to examine the degrees of the speed 
of adjustments over multiple time horizons as the firms’ histories influence the 
capital structure.  
To fill this gap, this essay examines the heterogeneity of leverage 
adjustment speed over various time horizons and it addresses two types of speed of 
                                                 
4 Different terms have been used in the literature for defining financial issues such as, financial deficit, and 
financial imbalances.  
  




adjustments: cumulative and marginal. Very few studies addressed the issue on 
speed of adjustment over long-time horizons. An exception is Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) who examine the effect of the long-time horizon on the changes of capital 
structure decisions. The contribution from this essay is that it extends the literature 
by examining the SOA over various time horizons and using the two measurements 
of leverage adjustment speed (cumulative and marginal).  
Finally, the essay focuses on the effect of capital structure dynamics on 
default prediction. Traditional capital structure theories hold that firms pursue target 
leverage by considering the trade-off between the cost and benefits of debt 
financing. Thus, it is posited that when the firms strive to focus only on the benefits 
of debt financing they will face the risk of financial distress or bankruptcy. However, 
dynamic capital structure models suggest that firms actively rebalance their 
leverage towards the target leverage with varying degrees. Löffler, and Maurer 
(2011) argue that if firms chase for the target leverage, the future leverage ratio is 
predictable. They show that leverage forecasts increase the discriminatory power 
of default prediction based on a hazard model.  
Several studies have empirically incorporated capital structure dynamics 
into credit risk measurements. In particular, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), 
Dangl and Zechner (2004), and Hui et al. (2007) use mean-reverting leverage ratio 
as a determinant of structural credit risk modelling to measure the default 
probabilities of corporate bonds.  
Throughout this essay, comprehensive application of default predictor 
information is deemed necessary for correct classification between default and non-
default firms. Even though previous studies have assessed default risk using capital 
structure dynamics, none were found to empirically examine the ability of leverage 
dynamics to predict default under a comprehensive default predictor environment. 
It appears that the combination of financial information (i.e., accounting and share 
market information), and non-financial information (i.e., corporate governance 
information), provides better credit risk assessments. This essay argues that the 
integration of leverage deviation with accounting, share market and governance 








1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized in five chapters. A brief overview of each 
chapter is given below. The thesis covers five peer-reviewed papers being 
summarised into three essays, and these articles have been either published or 
submitted in academic journals at the time of thesis submission. Chapter one 
provides an overview of the thesis. Chapter two includes two research papers 
entitled, “Corporate governance and default prediction: a reality test” and 
“Financial versus non-financial information for default prediction: evidence from 
Sri Lanka and the USA”. Chapter three presents the paper entitled, “Corporate 
governance and default prediction”. Chapter four shares two research papers 
entitled, “Heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment revisited: default versus 
non-default firms and short versus long time horizon” and “Do leverage dynamics 
strengthen bankruptcy prediction? A comprehensive test”.  Chapter two to four are 
structured with an abstract, introduction, review of the literature, research 
methodology, conclusion, and references. Chapter five concludes with a summary 
of the thesis’s findings together with research contributions, limitations and 
suggestions for future research directions.  
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Corporate governance and default prediction 
 
Chapter two consists of two research papers to address and test the impact of 
corporate governance on default prediction. The title of the first paper is “Corporate 
governance and default prediction: A reality test.” This paper has been published in 
Applied Economics (SSCI and ABDC ranking = A) in 2019. This paper addresses 
several testable hypotheses concerning the relations between corporate governance 
and default prediction, building on the Standard and Poor’s (2002) corporate 
governance framework. The conventional logistic regression is employed to 
provide empirical evidence from U.S. default data over the period of 2000 to 2015. 
It finds that default firms are associated with concentrated ownership, low 
shareholder rights, low financial transparency and low effectiveness of the board. 
It also finds that corporate governance information provides a positive contribution 
to financial information for default prediction models.  
The title of the second paper is “Financial versus non-financial information for 
default prediction: Evidence from Sri Lanka and the USA.” The paper has been 
published online by Emerging Markets Finance and Trade (SSCI and ABDC 
ranking = B) in 2019. This paper contains the results of a comparative study using 
the data of Sri Lanka, which serves a representative emerging market. It argues that 
emerging markets are important because they present several institutional 
differences that cannot be examined in the developed markets. The rapid 
evolvement of these markets provides excellent experimental grounds for studying 
many financial issues. The empirical results show that whilst an integrated model 
provides overall stronger predictive value, financial information is more relevant 
for USA firms than for Sri Lankan firms. Corporate governance appears more 
relevant in emerging markets than in mature markets. Further, the effectiveness of 
the individual corporate governance differs between the two countries. 
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ABSTRACT
Default prediction has commanded the attention of researchers for at least 50 years. This paper
addresses several testable hypotheses regarding the relations between corporate governance
and default prediction. We employ the conventional logistic regression to provide empirical
evidence from U.S. default data over the period of 2000 to 2015. Empirical results are consistent
with the following notions: First, default firms are associated with high ownership concentration,
low shareholder rights, low financial transparency and disclosures, and less board effectiveness.
Second, in-sample and out-of-sample tests support the incremental contribution of corporate
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I. Introduction
Managing and measuring credit risk is a core
activity for banks. The key parameter to quantify
credit risk is default probability.1 However, default
probability is difficult to estimate because defaults
occur relatively infrequently. The difficulty in pre-
dicting corporate failure has posed a long-standing
problem in credit risk research. The importance of
financial information for estimating default prob-
ability has been well documented in the literature.
Recent studies pay attention to non-financial
information, such as corporate governance, and
point out non-financial information may improve
accuracy of default probability estimation.
Financial information for estimating default
probability could be grouped into two categories:
accounting information suggested by Altman’s
(1968) model: and market information involved
in Merton’s (1974) model. The former seeks to
estimate default probability of corporate bor-
rowers based on their accounting-based informa-
tion (e.g. Beaver 1966; Altman, 1968; Ohlson
1980). The latter predicts corporate failure
based on the information of their equity prices
(e.g. Vassalou and Xing 2004; Hillegeist et al.
2004; Du and Suo 2007; Bharath and Shumway
2008; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi 2008).
Each type of financial information has limita-
tions. The past performance reported in a firm’s
accounting reports may not be informative for
predicting the future. Moreover, accounting
manipulation behaviours by managers may
damage financial reporting quality (Agarwal and
Taffler 2008). Market information may show up-
to-date information about the company which
are not yet reflected in the accounting ratios,
but only if markets are efficient. Accordingly,
recent studies stress the importance of corporate
governance and consider it as an alternative non-
financial information source for bankruptcy
prediction.
Extensive studies document that corporate gov-
ernance is a key factor for corporate management
decisions and thus influences corporate perfor-
mance. Goktan, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2006)
argue if corporate governance affects company per-
formance, the attributes of corporate governance
also ensure the survival of the company. Although
some studies have tested the effect of corporate
governance on bankruptcy prediction (e.g. Daily
and Dalton 1994a, 1994b; Gales and Kesner 1994;
Simpon and Gleason, 1999, 1998; Elloumi and
CONTACT Leon Li leonli@waikato.ac.nz Subject Convenor, Finance, Waikato Management School, University of Waikato, New Zealand
1Under the Basel requirements, banks need to link the capital requirements of the bank to the individual level of credit risk.
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Gueylé, 2001; Parker, Peters, and Turetsky 2002),
they are restricted to a limited set of governance
variables, such as board characteristics and owner-
ship concentration.
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006)
adopt the framework2 developed by Standard &
Poor’s (2002) to systematically assess firms’ cor-
porate governance and to test the effect of corpo-
rate governance on credit ratings. While the study
of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006)
may relate to credit losses due to downgrades (i.e.
from high to low ratings), it is unable to measure
credit losses due to defaults. To fill the gap, we
follow the framework of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins,
and LaFond (2006) to adopt several testable cor-
porate governance proxies for four major dimen-
sions of governance: ownership structure and
influence; shareholder rights and relations; finan-
cial transparency and disclosures; and board struc-
ture and effectiveness. Additionally, we test how
the integration of governance information with
financial information enhance the bankruptcy pre-
dictions using the historical default data.
In this paper, we introduce several research
hypotheses to test the relation between corporate
governance and default prediction for firms.
Specifically, we argue that default firms are asso-
ciated with high ownership concentration, low
shareholder rights, low audit committee quality,
poor auditor opinions, small board size, CEO
duality, and low numbers of independent and out-
side directors on the board. We extend the frame-
work of Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond
(2006) by proposing several additional testable
hypotheses regarding the impact of corporate gov-
ernance on corporate bankruptcy.3 Further, we
examine how the combination of corporate gov-
ernance information with financial information
could enhance the default probability using histor-
ical realized default data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews the literature and develops
research hypotheses. Section 3 presents the
research methodology. Section 4 discusses the
empirical results. The conclusion and the future
research directions are presented in Section 5.
II. Literature review and research hypotheses
Studies on financial information for bankruptcy
prediction
Research has extensively tested accounting and
market information for default prediction. The
initial default prediction studies are mainly based
on accounting information e.g. Beaver (1966),
Altman (1968), and Ohlson (1980). Altman (1968)
developed the Z-Score model based on five
accounting ratios. The model is a significant land-
mark in the field of credit risk modelling. Many
other researchers also apply accounting informa-
tion as the sole predictor in credit risk modelling
e.g. Deakin (1972); Altman, Haldeman, and
Narayanan (1977), Casey and Bartczak (1985).
Later, researchers used cash flow based ratios
deviating from accrual-based accounting, e.g.
Beaver (1966), Ohlson (1980), Aziz and Lawson
(1989), Westgaard and Wijest (2001). However,
accounting information-based models forecast the
financial condition of a firm on the basis of going
concern whereas bankruptcy violates this key con-
cept of accounting (Hillegeist et al. 2004). Emel
et al. (2003) also criticise the use of accounting
ratios on the basis that significant ratios differ
from industry to industry, and macroeconomic
factors affect balance sheet items.
Agarwal and Taffler (2008) point out the impor-
tance of market-based information in default pre-
diction. Market information is backed by sound
theoretical underpinnings and is free from account-
ing accrual adjustments. However, the market-based
information is valid only in an efficient market. For
example, insider dealings could invalidate a market-
based model. Therefore, researchers have combined
accounting and market information into their
default prediction models (See, e.g. Atiya 2001;
Shumway 2001; Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi
2008, Li and Miu 2010).
2We consider this as the compressive analysis of corporate governance information pertaining to the corporate governance literature. The framework
includes four dimensions assumed to be necessary to reduce management opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry.
3In this paper the terms financial distress, failure, bankruptcy and liquidation are used interchangeably as each represents the situation where a firm is
placed in default and investors suffer credit loss.
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Studies on corporate governance for bankruptcy
prediction
Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985) pioneer
examining differences in corporate governance
between failed and non-failed firms, by consider-
ing three board characteristics. Daily and Dalton
(1994a, 1994b) test the effect of board structure,
ownership concentration, and board quality on
bankruptcy. Gales and Kesner (1994) investigate
board size and composition of failed firms. They
find a decline in outside directors when the com-
pany is close to bankruptcy. Simpson and Gleason
(1998) adopt two ownership structure variables
and three board structure variables to predict
financial distress of financial firms in the banking
industry. Their results indicate that only CEO
duality is significant for bankruptcy prediction.
Parker, Peters, and Turetsky (2002) investigate
the effect of corporate governance on corporate
failures based on three governance indicators:
insider turnover, creditor involvement and own-
ership structure. The insider turnover in their
study covers the board structure, whereas owner-
ship structure includes block-holder and insider
ownership. However, they establish creditor invol-
vement measures are not significant in predicting
failure. Patt and Platt (2012) examine the relation-
ship between corporate board attributes and bank-
ruptcy, focusing on board attributes. They suggest
five board composition and nine board character-
istics as proxies.
Some researchers examine the impact of corporate
governance on bankruptcy using non-U.S. data. The
main variable of interest of Elloumi and Gueyie’s
study in 2001 are outside directors and CEO duality.
However, they have use audit committee composition
and block holdings as control variables to predict
financial distress of Canadian firms. They find
board composition information, in addition to the
financial information, contributes to predicting finan-
cial distress. Lee and Yeh (2004) examine the effect of
ownership structure and board structure on financial
distress prediction. They ascertain board structure
has significant effect on explaining financial distress
of the Taiwanese companies.
Lakshan and Wijekoon (2012) use the data in
Sri Lanka to test the effect of corporate govern-
ance on failure prediction by using board
characteristics under the governance information.
Ciampi (2015) uses data of small and medium-
sized enterprises in Italy to examine the impact of
corporate governance on bankruptcy prediction,
including board size, CEO duality, ownership con-
centration, and board independence. Wang and
Deng (2006) predict financial distress of Chinese
companies based on three corporate governance
dimensions; Ownership structure, board composi-
tion and structure, and managerial agency costs.
Liang et al. (2016) examine the effect of board
structure, ownership structure, cash flow rights
and key person retention, on company failure
using the data from Taiwanese companies.
Table 1 summarizes the empirical results in the
related literature over the past three decades. As
seen in Table 1, we find that most of the studies are
limited to a set of corporate governance variables,
and focus on board structure composition and
ownership structure. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins,
and LaFond (2006) use Standard and Poor’s gov-
ernance framework (2002) to test a comprehensive
set of corporate governance information in which
four dimensions of corporate governance are con-
sidered: (i) ownership structure and influences,
(ii) shareholder rights and relations, (iii) financial
transparency and disclosures, and (iv) board struc-
ture and process. Although their study may capture
the credit loss due to downgrade, as credit rating
moves up and down frequently, it is not that short-
term risk investors should focus on. We argue that
the more relevant risk is the chance that we are
going to lose our money – that there is going to be
a permanent loss. The risk is default risk or bank-
ruptcy risk. Accordingly, we extend Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al.’s (2006) study via examining the effect
of corporate governance on corporate defaults.
Methods for default prediction
Bankruptcy prediction studies have mainly uti-
lized three methods: Multiple discriminant analy-
sis (MDA), binary response models (logit or
probit) and neural network (NN) (Bellovary,
Giacomino, and Akers 2007). The MDA was pio-
neered by Altman (1968). He develops the Z-score
model by using MDA and derives a combination
of weighted ratios which provides a single Z score
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Table 1. Overview of previous studies on corporate governance and default prediction.
Study Research design Corporate governance variables Findings




analysis, 21 failed and 31
non-failed firms in the
retailing industry.
Board size, outsiders on the board, multiple
offices (CEO duality).
Non failed companies tend to have a larger
board. Outside directors and multiple
offices held by CEO are not significant
among the failed and non-failed firms.
Daily and Danton (1994a) USA, in 1990, logistic
regression, 50 bankrupt and
50 non-bankrupt
companies.
CEO Duality, proportion of independent
directors, absolute number of independent
directors.
Three governance variables improved the
default probability.
Daily and Danton (1994b) USA, 1972–1982, Logistic
regression-on, 57 bankrupt
companies and 57 non-
bankrupt companies.
Board composition, CEO-board chairperson
structure, composition -structure
interaction, Control variables; ownership
structure indicators and board quality
indicators.
Prediction improved due to governance
variables. Duality, the structure
composition interaction term are
significant. Bankrupt firms have affiliated
directors.
Gales and Kesner (1994) USA, 1978–1985, 127
bankrupt firms, match
paired t-Test and logistic
regression.
Board size preceding bankruptcy, board size
after declaration of bankruptcy, board size
after two years after filing for bankruptcy,
smaller board at the time of bankruptcy,
outside directors, change in board
membership.
Firms leading to bankruptcy show
a declining of outside directors and the
board size. Bankrupt firms have different




USA, 1989, 300 Banking firms,
ordered logistic regression.
Management and board member equity
ownership, board size, insiders on the
board, CEO duality, CEO equity ownership.
CEO duality, management and board
member equity ownership negatively




46 distress firms and 46
distress firms.
Board composition, board size, ratio of
outsiders to total members of the board,
CEO-based chair duality, blockholdership,
and audit committee composition.
Outside directors’ ownership and







firms and 176 non-distress
firms.
1. CG-insider turnover; insider replacement
CEO, outsider replacement CEO, board
outsiders, board size, board turnover. 2.
Creditor involvement; creditor ownership,
total debt restructuring. 3. Ownership
structure; blockholder ownership, insider
ownership.
Corporate governance impact on the
likelihood of survival.
Lee and Yeh (2004) Taiwan, 1996–1999, logistic
regression, 88 distress firms
and 88 non-distress firms.
Control rights and cash flow rights, stock
pledge ratio, adjusted control rights,
shareholding of the second largest
shareholder and institutional shareholders,
the ratio of board seats held by the largest
shareholders, the ratio of board seats held
by non-large shareholders, management
participation, founder participation.
Control rights and cash flow rights, stock
pledge ratio and percentage of directors
occupied by the controlling shareholder
are positively related to financial distress.
Wang and Deng (2006) China, 2002–2003, Logistic
regression, 96 distress firms
and 96 non-distress firms.
Largest shareholders’ percentage, managerial
ownership, top five shareholders’
ownership, degree of ownership balance,
board size, CEO duality, independent
directors, administrative expenses ratio.
Ownership concentration are negatively and
significantly associated financial distress
whereas managerial agency costs has




Sri Lanka, 2002–2008, Logistic
Regression, 70 distress and
70 non-distress companies
listed in CES.
Outside directors, CEO duality, outsider
ownership, audit opinion, remuneration of
directors, presence of an audit committee,
board size.
Outside director ratio, CEO duality,
remuneration of board of directors and
company audit committee are the only
significant variables in predicting financial
distress.
Ciampi (2015) Italy, Logistic regression. 1605
defaulting and 1605 non-
defaulting Italian small
enterprises.
CEO Duality, board independence: outside
directors, board size, ownership
concentration.
Combination of economic-financial and
governance variables improves SE default
accuracy rates of SE.
Platt and Platt (2012) USA, 1998–2007, Mean
comparison, 695
companies.
Inside directors, Outside directors,
Independent directors, gray directors, Board
size, Percentage interlocking directors, Firm
CEO age, Average age of directors, Number
on Board who are CEOs from outside,
Number of boards held by firm CEO,
Average% stock owned by independent
directors. Average% stock owned by
outside directors, Percentage with classified
boards, Audit committee, Nomination
committee, compensation committee
composition.
Non-bankrupt firms have large, older board,
more independent directors, more sitting
CEOs, and less directorship than bankrupt
companies.
Liang, Lu, Tsai and Shin
(2016)
Taiwan, 1999–2009, 239
bankrupt and 239 non-
bankrupt
Corporate governance covering the areas of
board structure, ownership structure, cash
flow rights and key personal retention and
accounting ratios covering solvency, capital
structure, profitability, turnover, cash flows
and growth.
Board structure and ownership structure are
the most important corporate governance
indicators in predicting bankruptcy.
Solvency and profitability are the key
indicators under accounting information.
(Continued )
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component. In the main, his model comprises the
five most essential accounting-based ratios:
Working capital to total assets, retained earnings
to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to
total assets, market value of equity to book value
of total debt and sales to total assets. The primary
quality that the data should possess is the normal
distribution of the variables. Altman argues that
the advantage of MDA lies in its ability to create
a standard profile with interrelated firm character-
istics. The original Z-Score model was revised in
1983 and again in 1993. In the first revision, the
ratio of market value of equity to book value of
total debt is replaced by the book value of equity
to book value of total debt when applied to private
companies, and the ratio of sales to total asset was
dropped in the second version when applied to
manufacturing companies.
However, there are limitations with MDA.
According to Altman and Sabato (2007), MDA is
restricted in default prediction since it violates the
two critical assumptions behind MDA. The
assumptions are (i) independent variables are
multivariate and normally distributed, and (ii)
the dispersion of both categories of the sample
are equal. However, these assumptions could be
different for default and non-default firms.
Further, the coefficients obtained from the model
cannot be interpreted as in regression analysis.
In the 1970s the application of logit and probit
regression have received more attention. However,
the popularity of these models began in the 1980s.
Ohlson (1980) applies logit regression in default
prediction for the first time. The advantage of the
application of binary response models arises as it
is easy to examine the underlying structure of the
prediction (i.e. what are the essential predictors),
whereas the emphasis with MDA is on grouping
the results. The main difference between logit and
probit regression is based on the distribution
assumption of the function; the logit model
requires logistic distribution whereas the probit
model requires standard normal distribution.
Further, the logit model does not demand multi-
variate normality as in MDA.
In 1990’s studies began to apply NN. This
method uses inputs to search a pattern and
develop models for decision-making (Bellovary,
Giacomino, and Akers 2007). Many studies use
financial ratios as the inputs to generate the pre-
dictions (see Lee, Han, and Kwon 1996) under
NN. The research hypothesis corresponding to
each corporate governance category is discussed
in the next section.
Development of research hypotheses
This section develops research hypotheses based on
the corporate governance framework proposed by
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006).
Higher ownership concentration can have
a positive impact to the organisation (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Since block-holders and institu-
tional investors have financial interest and indepen-
dent views, they are expected to influence governing
practices, depending on the share percentage held.
Therefore, it is necessary to analyse the ownership
concentration to identify the influence on governing
practices. Generally, shareholders expect that the
governing body of the organisation will act in the
interest of the shareholders. While Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), Bhojaraj and Sengupta (2003) and
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) dis-
cover a higher ownership concentration can be det-
rimental to the minority shareholders since the
block-holders or institutional shareholders can
Table 1. (Continued).
Study Research design Corporate governance variables Findings
Panel B: Corporate governance and credit ratings
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins,
and LaFond (2006)
USA, 2002, logistic regression,
894 firms.
Blockholders, % institutional shareownership,
% of shares held by directors and officers,
G_Score, working capital accruals,
timeliness, audit fee, % audit committee
independence, financial expertise, % board
independents, CEO power, % of
independent directors that hold seats on
other firms, governance policy, % of
directors that own stocks in the firm.
Blockholders, G-Score, working capital
accruals, timeliness, % board
independents, CEO power, % of
independent directors that hold seats on
other firms and % of directors that own
stocks in the firm are significant in the
integrated model.
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exercise undue influence on management decisions.
Zeitun and Tian (2007) establish higher ownership
concentration increases the probability of defaults.
Jensen (1993) shows Allocating a considerable num-
ber of shares to outside directors enhances the effec-
tive monitoring of the firm’s management and helps
to weaken the likelihood of financial fraud (Beaver
1966). Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H1: Defaults firms are associated with higher own-
ership concentration.
Shareholder rights and relations help to identify
the power balance between shareholders and man-
agers (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 2006).
To eventually protect their interest and avoid any
detrimental decisions made by managers, share-
holders should possess a certain degree of power in
decision-making. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find
that relaxing shareholder rights increases their
power to monitor management’s actions and reduces
a bias in financial reporting. Shareholder rights are
also necessary to reduce the agency cost. Even though
this category is an important part of corporate gov-
ernance, application of this variable in the literature is
very limited. Therefore, we measure the shareholder
rights and relations by using two dummy variables
viz., whether shareholders approve the remuneration
of the board of directors and officers, and whether
shareholders appoint the external auditor.
We assume that remuneration4 of the board
of directors should be approved by the share-
holders because shareholders should decide
whether the board of directors and officers get
fair remuneration as the agents of the company.
Further, the power on appointing external
auditor5 may influences on company internal
control process, auditing process and audit com-
mittee functions. Therefore, we assume ratifica-
tion or endorsement of these two decisions by the
shareholders enhance the transparency of the
functions of the remuneration and audit commit-
tee as part of corporate governance. Thus, two
variables indicate the level of shareholder control
over management opportunism. Consequently,
we hypothesize:
H2: Defaults firms are associated with lower share-
holder rights and relations.
Transparency and disclosures are important to
reduce information asymmetry and to ensure that
managers are accountable to the shareholders
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 2006).
Therefore, timely and adequate information helps
shareholders, investors and debtholders to make
appropriate financing decisions. The audit com-
mittee which is an important subcommittee of the
board has the responsibility of reporting financial
progress to the board members (Klein 2002).
The financial reporting quality is affected by the
quality of the audit committee (Rainsbury,
Bradbury, and Cahan 2009). The quality of the
audit committee reduces fraudulent financial report-
ing, accounting irregularities (Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney 1996), and overstatement of earnings
(Klein 2002). According to DeAngelo (1981), audit
committee independence is necessary to create dis-
tance between the audit firm and client firm.
Additionally, the auditor’s opinion is an important
variable for measuring the transparency and disclo-
sures of the accounting information. Studies show
firms that receive a qualified audit opinion tend to
have higher accruals (e.g. Francis and Krishnan
1999; Bradshaw, Richardson, and Sloan 2001).
Proponents of efficient earnings management
claim that managers use discretionary accruals to
improve the quality of reported earnings by com-
municating proprietary information to market par-
ticipants (e.g. Dechow 1994; Subramanyam 1996).
Accordingly, accruals are positively priced by mar-
kets (e.g. Beaver et al. 1989; Wahlen 1994). In this
study, we employ auditor opinion as a variable for
bankruptcy prediction, and hypothesize that firms
receiving qualified auditor opinion are associated
with less likelihood to default.6
4Even though there are provisions on executive remuneration we have considered the shareholder rights to approve remuneration because the act has
implemented in 2010 (say-on-pay provision under Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumption act 2010), however, our sample period convers 2000
to 2015.
5There are no such legislative requirements for the appointment of external auditor in US context.
6Altman and McGough (1974) ascertain companies had received a going-concern modified opinion before bankruptcy occurred. Lensberg, Eilifsen, and
McKee (2006) find the most significant variable in their final model of bankruptcy prediction was the auditor’s opinion. Unmodified opinion (qualified and
unqualified with explanatory language) shows a negative effect on bankruptcy prediction in Lensberg and others’ study (2006).
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H3: Defaults firms are associated with lower finan-
cial transparency and disclosure.
The board structure is important since the Board
provides an independent view on management per-
formance and are responsible for effective govern-
ance of the company (Simpson and Gleason 1999).
Under agency theory, Chaganti, Mahajan, and
Sharma (1985) argue a larger board creates issues
for coordination and increases managers’ freedom
in decision-making. By contrast, resources depen-
dency theory states a larger board has the advan-
tage of diversified skills and wider linkages to the
external environment (Pearce and Zahra 1992).
Simpson and Gleason (1999) propose having one
person in the position of CEO and board chair
could reduce the risk of the company by better
monitoring the board and management through
proper and up-to-date knowledge. Generally,
board of directors could be categorized as inside,
outside and independent directors. Inside directors
are employees of the company. Outside directors
are not employed by the company, but are not
independent because of prior employment by the
company or by providing consultancy services to
the company. Independent directors do not have
any material relationships with the company. We
use these definitions for independent and outside
directors in our study.
In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)
requires companies to increase the number of
independent directors as the lack of independence
of the board was a major issue behind many
corporate scandals (Platt and Platt 2012). Bhojraj
and Sengupta (2003) state that a higher proportion
of outside directors has a significant positive effect
on effective monitoring of management, whereas
Elloumi et al. (2001), Wang and Deng (2006) and
Platt and Platt (2012) establish independent direc-
tors are significant in bankruptcy prediction. We
hypothesise:
H4: Defaults firms are associated with less effective
board structure and effectiveness.
As stated in 2.1, due to the limitations of using
accounting and market information for bankruptcy
prediction, researchers support testing nonfinancial
information for bankruptcy prediction (e.g. Grunert,
Norden, and Weber 2005,; Bhimani, Gulamhussen,
and Lopes 2013, Parnes 2010). Many studies con-
sider corporate governance as the key to predict
bankruptcy (e.g. Elloumi and Gueyie 2001, Lee and
Yeh 2004, Ciampi 2015) as non-financial informa-
tion, because it ensures the confidence, transparency,
and fairness of firm information. Due to the limita-
tions of financial information and the importance of
the corporate governance, we combine both vari-
ables to find if non-financial governance informa-
tion enhances default prediction. We hypothesise:
H5: In addition to financial information, non-




This study employs the conventional binary logis-
tic regression to conduct empirical tests. The bin-
ary logistic model is presented as follows:
yitþ1 ¼ cont: þ βxit þ eitþ1; eitþ1,ð0; σÞ ; (1)
where the explained variable, y∗it+1, i= 1, 2, …,
N and t = 1, 2, …, T, represents the credit quality
of firms, where the subscript i denotes the ith firm
and t + 1 denotes the t + 1th period. The xit
variables are the explanatory variables for firm’s
credit quality and eit denotes the error term.
Notably, y∗it+1 is an unobservable latent variable.
What we observe is a dummy variable yit+1,
defined as yit+1 = 1 if yit+1∗ > 0 (i.e. company
i defaults at time t + 1); otherwise, yit+1 = 0 (i.e.
company i does not default at time t + 1).
Subsequently, if the cumulative distribution of eit
is logistic, we have what is known as a logistic
model and the default probability becomes






We consider the three types of information to
establish the default prediction approach.
Specifically, the credit quality of the firm is devel-
oped as follows:
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yitþ1 ¼ cont: þ β1ACCit þ β2MKTit
þ β3GOVit þ eitþ1; eitþ1,ð0; σÞ : (3)
ACC denotes accounting information, MKT
denotes market information, and GOV denotes
corporate governance information. To test H5 we
develop five empirical models using various types
of information:
● Model 1 is an accounting-based approach in
which only accounting information is incorpo-
rated (i.e. β2 = β3 = 0).
● Model 2 is a market-based approach using the
restriction of β1 = β3 = 0.
● Model 3 is a corporate governance-based
approach in which only GOV variables are
adopted (i.e. β1 = β2 = 0).
● Model 4 captures both accounting and market
variables. (i.e. β3 = 0).
● Model 5 integrates all three types of information.
Measurements of variables
To establish the accounting-based bankruptcy pre-
diction approach, we employ five accounting ratio-
based variables used in Altman’s Z-score function:
working capital to total assets (WCTA), sales to total
assets (STA), retained earnings to total assets
(RETA), earnings before interest and tax to total
assets (EBITTA), and market value of equity to
book value of total debt (MVEBTD). Moreover, we
adopt cash to market value of total assets
(CASHMTA) as an additional accounting variables.7
To measure market information, we use equity
price to develop four market-based variables. We
use natural log values of equity prices (SHARE
PRICE), standard deviation of quarterly equality
prices (STOCK_VOL), the ratio of company market
capitalization to market capitalization of S&P 500
(RELATIVE SIZE), and excess stock return (EXCESS
RETURN). Panel A of Table 2 presents detailed
definitions of accounting and market variables.
We follow the Standard & Poor’s (2002) corpo-
rate governance framework as used by Ashbaugh-
Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) to test corporate
governance effect on credit rating. We select four
proxies for ownership structure and influence: per-
centage of the company’s shares held by institu-
tions (INST%), percentage of shares held by
directors and officers (DIRECTOR%), number of
owners who hold at least 5% of the shares
(NUM_SHARE) and a dummy variable to recog-
nize share ownership of more than 20% by a single
shareholder (BLOCK). For the shareholder rights
and relation dimension, we develop two dummy
variables to represent shareholders appointment
of the external auditor (EXT_AUD) and approval
of the remuneration of the management
(REM_MAG). We measure financial transparency
via audit committee quality (AUDCOM_QUA) and
auditor opinion (AUD_OP). Two dummy variables
represent whether the audit committee is chaired
by an independent director, and whether the firm
has a qualified auditor opinion.8 We adopt four
proxies to measure the effect of board structure
and process: number of board members in the
board (BOARD SIZE), a dummy variable to mea-
sure CEO duality (CEO DUALITY), number of
independent directors (IND_DIRE), and number
of outside directors (OUT_DIRE).9 Panel B of
Table 2 presents detailed definitions of the corpo-
rate governance variables. We also tested principal
component analysis (PCA) to check the consistency
of the governance variable categorization.10
IV. Empirical results
Data
Firms encountering bankruptcy or liquidation
events, as defined by the Compustat database over
the period 2000–2015, are selected as default firms
7The ratio working capital to total assets and cash to market value of total assets are measures for liquidity. Profitability is measured by using three variables;
sales to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and tax to total assets. Market value of equity to book value of total debt is
a proxy for the leverage.
8Qualified includes qualified (scope limitation and different from GAAP) and unqualified opinion with explanatory language.
9We define outside directors those who are not employed by the company. But they are not independent because outside directors might be prior
employees of the company or may provide consultancy services to the company and independent directors as those who have no any material
relationships with the company.
10PCA provides five components; two components for ownership concentration with other three dimensions (board effectiveness, shareholder rights and
financial transparency). However, we limit to four dimensions based on the S&P (2002) identification.
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in this study. Next, we use the match sample design
to select non-default firms.11 For each default firm,
we select a firm of similar size (defined by the value
of total assets) in the same industry-defined by the
four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code-as the non-default firm sample. The selection
of comparable non-default firm effectively mitigates
imbalance problems (see Liang et al. 2016).12 Most
bankruptcy prediction studies use matched samples
(see Altman 1968, Daily and Danton, 1994a, Gales
and Kesner 1994, Elloumi and Gueyie 2001, Parker,
Peters, and Turetsky 2002, Lee and Yeh 2004). For
purpose of prediction, the explanatory variables for
credit quality of firms are collected as panel data
over five-year on a quarterly basis.13 Panel data
mitigates the time-varying risk of the variables
(Tinoco and Wilson 2013; Altman, Sabato, and
Wilson 2010; Shunway, 2001).
We obtain accounting variables from the
Compustat database. The information of equity
prices for market variables is obtained from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database. Corporate governance variables are col-
lected through company proxy statements. To
avoid biased results due to outliers, we winsorize
accounting and market variables.14 Accordingly,
we collect 3280 firm-quarter observations for
default and non-default firms.
Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of the pre-
dictor variables for firm credit quality. First, we
Table 2. Variable definitions.
Variable Definition
Panel A: Definition of financial variables
Accounting information
WCTA Working capital to total assets
CASHMTA Cash/market value of total assets
MVEBTD Market value of equity to book value of total debt
STA Sales to total assets
RETA Retained earnings to total assets
EBITTA Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
Market information
SHARE PRICE Log price
STOCK_VOL Stock’s volatility for the present quarter; is computed as the sample standard
deviation using the last three quarter market prices
RELATIVE SIZE Logarithm of each firm’s equity value divided by the total market equity value of
S&P 500
EXCESS RETURN quarterly return on the firm minus the market return based on S&P 500 (EXCESS
RETURNit = log(1 + Rit) – log(1 + RS&P500it))
Panel B: Definition of corporate governance variables
Ownership structure and influence
INST (%) Percentage of share ownership by institutions
DIRECTOR (%) Percentage of share ownership of directors and officers
NUM_SHARE Number of shareholders hold more than 5% shares
BLOCK 1 = if at least one shareholder has more than 20% shares, 0 = otherwise
Shareholder rights and relations
EXT_AUD 1 = if shareholders appoint the external auditor, 0 = otherwise
REM_MAG 1 = if shareholders approve the remuneration of management, 0 = otherwise
Financial transparency and disclosures
AUDCOM_QUA 1 = if the audit committee chair is an independent director, 0 = otherwise
AUD_OP 1 = if the opinion is qualified, 0 = otherwise`
Board structure and effectiveness
BOARD SIZE Number of board members in the board
CEO DUALITY 1 = if CEO and Chair are same person, 0 = otherwise
IND_DIRE Number of independent directors
OUT_DIRE Number of outside directors
11Matched pairs design has been used by more than 70% of the studies in this area (Zmijewski 1984).
12The bankruptcy prediction results generally used to find the effect of selected variables on default likelihood of the companies which may go bankrupt, but
not to generalize to the entire population (Ciampi 2015).
13We assume five-year observations are necessary to find the signal of default risk among default and non-default companies and banks generally conduct 3
to 5 year analysis of their borrowers. Li and Miu (2010) used 10 year quarterly data for their analysis based on the USA.
14As a solution to the outliers founded after applying the median absolute deviation (MAD). After detecting outliers, we use trimming (Taffler 1983; Barnes
1987) to avoid false positive results. For trimming, we apply winsorizing, which means changing an outlier’s value into the value of the closest non-outlier
(Barnes 1987).
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examine ownership structure and influence, the first
category of corporate governance. Institutional own-
ership (INST%) in default firms is higher than that in
the non-default counterpart (i.e. 32.17% versus
26.43%).15 The average number of shareholders
who hold more than 5% of shares (NUM_SHARE)
for default firms is higher than that for non-default
firms (i.e. 3.974 versus 3.524). Moreover, block-
holdings (BLOCK) for default firms is higher than
that for non-default firms (0.335 versus 0.305).
Overall, these results indicate that the higher the
ownership concentration, the higher the risk of com-
pany being default. However, the percentage of
share ownership of directors and officers
(DIRECTOR%) for default firms is lower than
that for the non-default firms (i.e. 19.924 versus
20.771) but the difference is insignificant
(t-Statistic = −1.200).16
Next, we investigate shareholder rights and
relations, the second category of corporate govern-
ance. First, the value of the EXT_AUD and
REM_MAG variables for default firms is signifi-
cantly lower than non-default firms (0.624 versus
0.841 and 0.905 versus 0.990, respectively). These
results indicate shareholders in default firms have
less rights to appoint external auditor and approve
remuneration of the management than default
firms.17 For the third category of corporate gov-
ernance, financial transparency and disclosures,
the value of AUDCOM_QUA for default firms is
lower than non-default firms (0.971 versus 0.973).
The result indicates that the audit committee qual-
ity in default firms is lower than that in non-
default firms.18 Next, the value of AUD_OP for
default firms is 0.009, which is lower than that for
non-default firms (0.012).
The fourth category of corporate governance,
board structure and effectiveness, shows the
board size of the default firms is lower than non-
default firms (6.946 versus 7.254). Moreover,
default firms have a higher portion of CEO duality
than non-default firms (0.539 versus 0.520).
Table 3. Descriptive analysis and t-Test.
Category Variables
Default Firms Non-default firms
t-StatisticsMean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Ownership structure and influence
Corporate governance information INST (%) 32.174 20.839 26.430 19.130 8.269***
DIRECTOR (%) 19.924 21.185 20.771 19.407 −1.200
NUM_SHARE 3.974 2.208 3.524 1.956 5.884***
BLOCK .335 .472 .305 .460 1.777*
Shareholder rights and relations
EXT_AUD .624 .484 .841 .365 −14.171***
REM_MAG .905 .293 .990 .098 −11.063***
Financial transparency and disclosures
AUDCOM_QUA .971 .169 .973 .162 −.417
AUD_OP .009 .0920 .012 .110 −2.271**
Board structure and effectiveness
BOARD SIZE 6.946 1.954 7.254 2.141 −4.196***
CEO DUALITY .539 .499 .520 .500 1.149
IND_DIRE 4.980 1.926 5.412 2.214 −5.942***
OUT_DIRE 4.951 2.172 5.551 2.333 −7.509***
Accounting information WCTA .176 .371 .483 .385 −24.007***
MVEBTD 3.980 7.569 5.499 8.202 −6.088***
STA .293 .261 .347 .261 −7.581***
RETA −2.518 4.901 −.788 3.302 −13.854***
EBITTA −.194 .380 .024 .257 −21.393***
CASHMTA −.053 .221 .137 .164 −26.552***
Market information SHARE PRICE .254 .812 .878 .648 −26.548***
STOCK_VOL .436 .373 .243 .210 18.808***
RELATIVE SIZE .242 .127 .304 .148 −14.615***
EXCESS RETURN −.069 .250 −.002 .138 −10.072***
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the predictor information for matched pair sample. Followed matched sample design, the sample represents
3280 firm-quarter observations. The descriptive statistics are given for mean standard deviation and the results of the paired sample t-Test. *Denotes
significance at 10% level; **Denotes significance at 5% level; ***Denotes significance at 1% level.
15Shleifer and Vishny (1997), argued, the ownership concentration is an incentive for owners to monitor management, however, if the ownership exceed
a certain threshold, the owners motivate to pursue their private benefits.
16The result is in agreement with Jensen’s study (1993).
17As per Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006), the higher shareholder rights and power enhance the power balance between management and
stakeholders.
18Audit committee quality represent the independency of the audit committee chair.
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Further, the number of independent directors and
outside directors in default firms is lower than that
in non-default firms (4.980 versus 5.412 and 4.951
versus 5.551, respectively).
Table 3 also reports the descriptive statistics of
accounting and market variables. All the mean
values of the accounting variables of default
firms is significantly lower than that of non-
default firms, which is consistent with the litera-
ture. Moreover, the results of market variables are
also in line with the literature. Specifically, default
firms have a lower average value of equity price,
firm size, and excess stock return, but a higher
value of equity volatility than non-default firms.
Estimation results of alternative bankruptcy
prediction specifications
Table 4 lists the estimation results of various model
specifications in which different types of informa-
tion are utilised. First, the results of Model 1, the
accounting-based approach, show that the effects of
the accounting variables on a firm’s bankruptcy
probability are significant.19 Second, the results of
Model 2 show that SHARE PRICE and EXCESS
RETURN are significantly negative, and
RELATIVE SIZE, and STOCK_VOL is significantly
positive. This result is consistent with the notion
that default firms are associated with a lower equity
value, and excess stock return,20 but higher equity
volatility and higher relative size.21
Third, Model 3 represents the setting with cor-
porate governance variables. Most of corporate
governance variables are significant and have
sign as hypothesized in Section 2.3, except the
variables BLOCK, AUDCOM_QUA and CEO
DUALITY. INST is significant and positive
(coeff. = 0.010 and t-Statistic = 4.08). Institutions
ownership concentration is an incentive for insti-
tutions owners to monitor management. However,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate that if the
ownership exceeds a threshold, the owners are
motivated to pursue their private benefits, which
increases default probability of firm. The
DIRECTOR variable is negative and significant
(coeff. = −0.013 and t-Statistic = −5.08), consistent
with the notion that the allocation of equity shares
increases management interest in supporting orga-
nizational goals above self-interest. The result also
indicates that the allocation of considerable num-
ber of shares to outside directors enhances effec-
tive monitoring of firm management (see Jensen
1993). NUM_SHARE is positive and significant
(coeff. = 0.087 and t-Statistic = 3.98), implying
the number of shareholders holding more than
5% shares is positively related to default.
The second category of corporate governance
examines the effect of shareholder rights and rela-
tions on default probability. The EXT_AUD and
REM_MAG variable is significant and negative, as
hypothesized. Our results show that shareholders
right and relations may decrease default probabil-
ity of firm, which is consistent the argument of
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006) that
shareholder rights and relations enhance the
power balance between management and
stakeholders.
For the third corporate governance category,
financial transparency and disclosures, the
AUDCOM_QUA is negative and insignificant
(t-Statistic = −1.03). One possible explanation is
that audit committee quality has no significant
effect on the quality of financial reporting, as
indicated by Rainsbury, Bradbury, and Cahan
(2009). Moreover, Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou
(2007), using the data of U.S. firms after enact-
ment of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002), find auditor
independence generates the problem of internal
control weaknesses. AUD_OP is significant and
shows a negative effect (coeff. = −1.584 and
t-Statistic = −2.98) as hypothesized in section 2.3.
Suggesting, a company with a qualified opinion is
less likely to default as a result of the potential
incentives of efficient earnings management.
The fourth category of corporate governance
examines board structure and process. First, the
19A study based on the USA by Deakin (1972), also found WCTA as the best predictor of potential distress re-classification. MVEBTD also found to be
significant in Aziz and Lawson’s study in 1989. STA ratio was the least significant variable in Altman’s study (1968). However, the highest prediction has
provided by EBITTA in his study. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) found CASHMTA variable as the most significant in their study.
20Excess return shows a negative coefficient, representing companies with higher excess return have less exposure to default risk (Shumway 2001).
21Size of the company measured based on the relative market capitalization indicates a positive sign even though we expect a negative sign. However, this
is in line with the results of Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). One possible explanation would be larger companies have complex business processes
and they are more exposed to the default risk due to this complexity.
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BOARD SIZE variable is positive and significant
(coeff. = 0.189 and t-Statistic = 5.02), suggesting
a large board brings complexity in decision-
making, and increases default probability of a firm.
Moreover, Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker (1994)
find that a large and diverse board is less effective
than a small board when directing strategic change
in a financial distress environment. Second, CEO
DUALITY is positive but insignificant (coeff. = 0.089
and t-Statistic = 1.15). The positive coefficient indi-
cates CEO duality decreases board effectiveness, and
thus increase default probability of firm (Daily and
Dalton 1994b). The insignificant coefficient implies
that the effect of CEO duality on bankruptcy predic-
tion is marginal, as consistent with Chaganti,
Mahajan, and Sharma (1985). Third, IND_DIRE
and OUT_DIRE are negative and significant, indi-
cating that companies with a higher proportion of
independent and outside directors are less likely to
go bankrupt than those with a lower proportion.
Model 4 incorporates both accounting and
market information. In Model 5 all the three
types of information, accounting, market and cor-
porate governance, are integrated. Comparing
results from the settings with a single source of
information (i.e. Models 1, 2 and 3) and the set-
tings with multiple sources of information (i.e.
Models 4 and 5), we find that although the mag-
nitude of estimated coefficients slightly change,
sign and significance are robust for most of esti-
mated coefficients. This result indicates a low
degree of multicollinearity in different types of
information and provides the justification for the
hybrid bankruptcy model.
Model 5 is associated with higher values of
Pseudo R2 and log likelihood ratio in comparison
with Models 1–4. This indicates that the hybrid
model in which all three types of information are
integrated performs better in explaining the in-
sample variation of the dependent variable (i.e.
bankruptcy or liquidation events). The final three
rows of Table 4 show certain goodness statistics
for model selection, including Pseudo R2, log like-
lihood ratio and Wald χ2.
Table 4. Logistic regression results of the alternative models.
Governance




Intercept 1.362 (12.19)*** −0.687 (−5.49)*** 3.389 (8.67)*** 1.264 (6.28)*** 3.787 (5.89)***
INST (%) 0.010 (4.08)*** 0.006 (1.87)*
DIRECTOR (%) −0.013 (−5.08)*** −0.015 (−3.96)***
NUM_SHARE 0.087 (3.98)*** 0.186 (6.83)***




EXT_AUD −1.176 (−12.72)*** −1.248 (−9.71)***




AUDCOM_QUA −0.232 (−1.03) 1.206 (−9.70)***




BOARD SIZE 0.189 (5.02)*** 0.146 (2.63)***
CEO DUALITY 0.089 (1.15) 0.057 (0.54)
IND_DIRE −0.103 (−2.58)** −0.150 (−2.90)***
OUT_DIRE −0.224 (−6.90)*** −0.173 (−3.98)***
Financial
variables
WCTA −0.541 (−4.38)*** −0.530 (−4.32)*** −0.489 (−2.61)***
MVEBTD −0.152 (−7.01)*** −0.099 (−4.35)*** −0.126 (−4.46)***
STA −1.365 (−6.49)*** −1.634 (−7.22)*** −1.737 (−6.48)***
RETA −0.354 (−4.80)*** 0.075 (0.86) −0.135 (−1.30)
EBITTA −2.795 (−7.59)*** −1.620 (−4.19)*** −1.728 (−3.67)***
CASHMTA −11.569 (−19.67)*** −12.449 (−19.66)*** −13.510 (−19.98)***
SHARE PRICE −1.601 (−16.060)*** −0.721 (−5.54)*** −0.769 (−4.74)***
STOCK_VOL 2.439 (11.410)*** 2.234 (8.76)*** 2.224 (8.01)***
RELATIVE SIZE 3.486 (7.350)*** 0.139 (0.24) 1.905 (2.58)**
EXCESS RETURN −0.825 (−2.800)*** −0.960 (−6.90)** −0.692 (−1.74)*
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.172 0.111 0.379 0.466
Likelihood ratio 1545.19*** 782.87*** 503.02*** 1722.59*** 2146.34***
Wald χ2 294.63***
This table presents the results of the logistic regression for five alternative models. Three thousand two hundred and eighty firm-quarter observations. 1 = if
the company is default and 0 otherwise. The goodness of fit of the models is measured by using Pseudo R2, Likelihood ratio χ2 and Wald χ2. Wald χ2
measures whether the corporate governance information explains the variation of the default probability compared to the accounting and market
information-based model.
Notes:Model 1: Default risk = f (Accounting),Model 2: Default risk = f (Market),Model3: Default risk = f (Corporate governance),Model 4: Default
risk = f (Accounting and Market),Model 5: Default risk = f (Accounting, Market and Corporate governance) **Denotes significance at the 5% level;
***Denotes significance at the 1% level. Z values are presented in parenthesis.
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Prediction performance: in-sample test
Validation is an integral part of the prediction mod-
els because it judges the quality of the prediction. In
this study, we use ROC (Receiver Operating
Characteristics) and CAP (Cumulative Accuracy
Profile) curves for model validation. The ROC
curve identifies the percentage of true positive pre-
dictions (percentage of defaults that are correctly
classified as defaults) on y-axis against the false
positive (percentage of non-defaults that are mista-
kenly classified as defaults) on x-axis. To plot CAP
curve, we first rank firms by their default probability
estimates, from highest to lowest. Next, we construct
a graph with the percentage of all the companies on
the x-axis and the percentage of all the defaults on
the y-axis. Figure 1 presents the ROC curves for the
five competing models proposed in the study; the
CAP curves are shown in Figure 2. We use ROC
and CAP curves to calculate the predictive accuracy
of risk measure errors into one statistic. The accu-
racy ratio is a fraction between zero and one and
models with higher accuracy ratios have more pre-
dictive power.22
The results of the accuracy ratio are summar-
ized in Table 6. We find Model 1 is associated
with a higher accuracy ratio in comparison with
Models 2 and 3. However, the accuracy ratios of
Models 4 and 5, the two hybrid models, are higher
than those of Models 1, 2, and 3. Model 5 has the
highest accuracy ratio. We establish hybrid models
in which three types of information (accounting,
market and corporate governance), are incorpo-
rated can enhance default prediction performance.
Implications and discussions
The findings of this research provide theoretical
and practical implications for corporate bank lend-
ing. Thus, we extend the existing literature by test-
ing hypotheses regarding the impact of corporate
governance on corporate default prediction. The
findings imply that the corporate default prediction
models should address a comprehensive application
of corporate governance variables, and further the
integration of accounting, market and corporate
governance information is needed to increase the
prediction performances. A credit manager is con-
cerned about the defaults of the individual bor-
rower in order to reduce the credit risk. Therefore,
it is necessary to recognize the sources behind the
corporate default risk. The findings of this study
open a new discussion on refining the current stra-
tegies to reduce default risk in terms of firms’ cor-
porate governance practices. First, the hypothesis
regarding ownership concentration confirms that
firms with higher ownership concentration reflect
a higher default risk than low ownership concentra-
tion firms. Therefore, when defining risk strategies,
banks should consider the ownership structure of
the company and increase economic capital to
absorb the additional credit risk loss involved in




















































Figure 1. ROC curve for alternative models.
22The calculation of accuracy ratio is described in Li and Miu study in 2010.
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As per the results, we also confirm the other
three hypotheses; that is the impact of board effec-
tiveness, financial transparency and shareholder
rights as governance dimensions are significant
on default risk. Therefore, if the loan granted to
corporate borrowers having a less effective board,
low financial transparency, and high shareholder
rights, the loans should be charged a higher inter-
est rate, imposed to compensate for the high risk.
Alternatively, loans could be extended to select
firms with more effective governance practices.
Further, confirmation of our fifth hypothesis
suggests that internal credit rating models should
not ignore accounting and market information in
predicting the default risk of their corporate bor-
rowers. In order to enhance the default prediction
ability of their models, they should integrate
accounting, market and corporate governance
information in a single model to protect banks
from making loans to risky borrowers.
Robustness tests
We conduct two alternative tests to check the
robustness of the primary results discussed
above. First, we control the industry effect. In
specific, we re-estimate our models by introducing
nine industry dummies defined by the first two
digits of the SIC codes. The results are reported in
Table 5. In addition to the one-period-ahead
prediction test, we conduct the three- and five-
period-ahead tests. The empirical results indicate
that our conclusions are robust, i.e. Model 5 is
associated with the highest prediction accuracy.23
Prediction performance: out-of-sample test
To complete the validation process, we conduct an
out-of-sample test. To do so, we randomly withhold
20% of default and non-default samples (i.e. 328
observations for default and non-default firms),
which are defined as the test set. The residual sam-
ples are defined as the model set and are used for
estimation of models. Table 7 presents the results of
the out-of-sample accuracy ratios obtained with
ROC and CAP curves of all the default prediction
models. Our results are consistent with the follow-
ing notions. First, in having higher values of accu-
racy ratio, the two hybrid models (i.e. Models 4
and 5) outperform Models 1 to 3. Second, by having
higher accuracy ratio, the hybrid model using three
types of information outperforms the hybrid model
with two types of information and those models
with a single type of information.
V. Conclusion and future research directions
In contrast to prior studies on default correlation
and corporate governance, this study incorporates


















































Figure 2. CAP curve for alternative models.
23Results are available upon the request.
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for corporate default prediction, in addition to
accounting and market information. We apply
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006)
four governance dimensions to hypothesize the
relations between corporate governance and
default prediction. Accordingly, we speculate that
default firms associate with higher ownership con-
centration, lower shareholder rights, lower finan-
cial transparency, and less effective board
structure. Further, we postulate that combining
corporate governance information with financial
information could improve default prediction.
Our empirical study is based on non-financial
U.S. firms over the period from 2000 to 2015.
Firms that experienced bankruptcy or liquidation
events as recorded in the Compustat database are
defined as default firms. The firms with similar
size from the same industry are collected as the
non-default firm samples.
Table 6. In-sample accuracy ratio comparison.
Model
Specifications
Accuracy ratio by ROC
curve
Accuracy ratio by CAP
curve
Model 1 72.97% 73.12%
Model 2 54.63% 53.77%
Model 3 41.87% 40.18%
Model 4 76.13% 75.82%
Model 5 82.05% 81.96%
This table summarizes the results of accuracy ratio as performance measure
of bankruptcy prediction. The value in bold denotes the maximum in the
column.
Table 7. Out-of-sample accuracy ratio comparison.
Model
specifications
Accuracy ratio by ROC
curve
Accuracy ratio by CAP
curve
Model 1 77.07% 76.89%
Model 2 58.59% 59.70%
Model 3 42.15% 41.04%
Model 4 79.75% 79.51%
Model 5 84.49% 85.00%
This table presents the out-of-sample accuracy ratio of the five competing
models. To conduct the out-of-sample test, we randomly select 3,280
firm-quarter observations from each group randomly. Named as test set,
and the rest of the observations are defined as ‘model set’. See section
4.5 for detailed discussion of the out of sample test.
Table 5. Logistic regression results with industry effect.
Governance




Intercept 1.262 (7.13)*** −0.212 (−1.11)*** 3.481 (8.09)*** 1.358 (5.59)*** 3.220 (4.97)***
INST (%) 0.010 (4.11)*** 0.006 (1.85)*
DIRECTOR (%) −0.015 (−5.45)*** −0.012 (−3.12)***
NUM_SHARE 0.096 (4.30)*** 0.181 (5.83)***




EXT_AUD −1.241 (−13.0)*** −1.221 (−9.21)***




AUDCOM_QUA −0.167 (−0.72) 1.454 (4.38)***




BOARD SIZE 0.193 (5.01)*** 0.138 (2.48)***
CEO DUALITY 0.103 (1.32) 0.093 (0.86)
IND_DIRE −0.108 (−2.59)** −0.115 (−1.88)***
OUT_DIRE −0.220 (−6.63)*** −0.206 (−4.28)***
Financial
variables
WCTA −0.704 (−5.25)*** −0.674 (−5.04)*** −0.625 (−4.36)***
MVEBTD −0.151 (−6.84)*** −0.097 (−4.12)*** −0.120 (−4.34)***
STA −1.726 (−6.83)*** −2.150 (−7.79)*** −2.291 (−7.29)***
RETA −0.362 (−4.67)*** 0.052 (0.58) −0.167 (−168)
EBITTA −2.793 (−7.44)*** −1.554 (−3.91)*** −1.491 (−3.37)***
CASHMTA −11.805 (−19.46)*** −12.767 (−19.45)*** −13.515 (−18.61)***
SHARE PRICE −1.694 (−16.54)*** −0.715 (−5.34)*** −0.820 (−1.52)***
STOCK_VOL 2.434 (11.26)*** 2.271 (8.74)*** 2.179 (7.64)***
RELATIVE SIZE 3.460 (7.20)*** −0.277 (−0.47) 1.963 (2.59)**
EXCESS RETURN −0.785 (−2.64)*** −0.913 (−2.57)** −0.586 (−1.52)*
Industry_dummy2 1.014 (3.35)** −0.088 (−0.31) −0.816 (−2.72) 1.190 (3.73)*** 0.732 (1.99)**
Industry_dummy3 0.514 (2.79) −0.432 (−2.60)*** −0.170 (−1.13) 0.433 (2.19)** 0.415 (1.89)*
Industry_dummy4 −0.50 (−0.24) −0.229 (−1.18) −0.276 (−1.46) −0.005 (−0.02) 0.032 (0.13)
Industry_dummy5 0.045 (0.15) −0.105 (−0.41) 0.019 (0.08) 0.091 (0.29) 0.380 (1.12)
Industry_dummy6 0.670 (2.87) −0.226 (−1.18) 0.017 (0.09) 0.700 (2.79)*** 1.032 (3.70)***
Industry_dummy7 −0.098 (−0.49) −0.604 (−3.39)*** 0.075 (0.46) −0.215 (−1.02) 0.017 (0.07)
Industry_dummy8 0.014 (0.05) −0.987 (−4.37)*** 0.042 (0.21) −0.227 (−0.85) 0.283 (0.97)
Pseudo R2 0.350 0.179 0.114 0.390 0.472
Likelihood ratio 1592.22*** 814.53*** 519.74*** 1774.6*** 2146.34***
Wald χ2 371.73***
This table presents the results of the logistic regression for five alternative models with industry effect. Notes: Model 1: Default risk = f (Accounting),Model
2: Default risk = f (Market),Model3: Default risk = f (Corporate governance),Model 4: Default risk = f (Accounting and Market), Model 5: Default
risk = f (Accounting, Market and Corporate governance)**Denotes significance at the 5% level; ***Denotes significance at the 1% level. Z values are
presented in parenthesis. Intercept = Mining, Industry_dummy2 = Construction, Industry_dummy3 = Manufacturing, Industry_dummy4 = Transportation,
Industry_dummy5 = Wholesale, Industry_dummy6 = Retail, Industry_dummy7 = Services, Industry_dummy8 = Public administration.
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Overall, our findings suggest that the default
risk rises with poor corporate governance in
terms of higher ownership concentration; lower
shareholder rights and relations; lower financial
transparency and disclosures; and less effective
board structure. Importantly, our findings provide
implications for banks and regulatory authorities.
We stress the importance of considering the com-
prehensive application of corporate governance
information in corporate credit decisions.
Further, we suggest that banks should incorporate
corporate governance information in addition to
the financial information in their default predic-
tion models for better performance. Selecting dif-
ferent sample criteria for non-default firm
selection, particularly firms with higher credit
quality, would be an interesting study for the
future. Also developing a modified Altman
model by including financial and corporate gov-
ernance information also could become a valuable
addition to the existing literature.
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ABSTRACT: We report the effectiveness of corporate governance variables (GOVs) in default prediction,
in a comparative study between Sri Lanka and the USA. Twelve GOVs are tested in addition to the
standard financial data. A panel logit model framework is employed to conduct empirical tests on 730 Sri
Lankan and 3280 USA observations from 2000 to 2015. Whilst an integrated model provides overall
stronger predictive value; financial information is more relevant for USA firms. GOVs appear more
relevant in emerging markets than in mature markets, but the effectiveness of the individual GOVs
differs between countries.
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Default prediction studies were initiated in the late 1960s, and most of those studies tested mature
markets, predominately in the USA (Bellovary, Giacomino, and Akers 2007). Latterly, emerging
markets have become the focus of a considerable number of studies (e.g., Lee and Yeh 2004; Wang
and Deng 2006; and Liang et al. 2016). In both mature and emerging markets, bankruptcy1 prediction
has originated from financial information; however, attention has shifted to confirming the signifi-
cance of corporate governance as a non-financial information source (e.g., Daily and Danton, 1994;
Parker, Peters, and Turetsky 2002; Simpon and Gleason, 1999).
In this paper, we demonstrate the value of examining a comprehensive set of corporate governance
variables (GOVs) in both an emerging and a mature market. Ignorance of essential governance
aspects could devalue the overall default prediction. It is reasonable to assume that the effectiveness
of the various corporate GOVs is different according to the market. Corporate governance practices in
emerging markets are seen to be less effective in terms of ownership concentration and board
effectiveness due to the share-ownership by founding families (Young et al. 2008) and weaker
legal systems (Klapper and Love 2004).
Emerging markets present several institutional differences that are not present in mature markets.
The rapid evolvement of emerging markets provides excellent experimental grounds for studying
many financial issues. For instance, Lee and Yeh (2004) and Liang et al. (2016) examine the effect of
ownership concentration and board composition on financial distress prediction using the data of
firms from advanced emerging markets. Our study extends the research by testing sample firms in Sri
Lanka, a representative secondary emerging market.2 Secondary emerging markets possess less
mature equity markets and lower transparency than advanced emerging economies (Classens and
Yurtoglu, 2013). Although the literature on emerging and mature market comparisons treats all the
emerging economies as one category, they have different characteristics. Classens and Yurtoglu
(2013) find the quality of corporate governance is higher in mature markets compared to emerging
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markets. Further, emerging markets show substantial differences in the governance characteristics
when compared to mature markets.
We follow the Standard and Poor’s (2002) governance framework in which four dimensions of
corporate governance are considered: ownership concentration, shareholder rights and relations,
financial transparency, and board effectiveness. Thus, we contribute to the literature by adopting
a comprehensive analysis of corporate GOVs to examine the effect on default prediction in firms in
Sri Lanka and the USA.
We provide a comparative analysis between the two countries, which furnishes new evidence on
the effectiveness of financial and non-financial information in default prediction. We argue that if
markets are efficient and the quality of financial information is high, we may mainly rely on financial
information for default prediction. However, if markets are not efficient, non-financial information
becomes essential. Accordingly, we expect the effects of the financial versus non-financial informa-
tion on default prediction will vary between mature and emerging markets. To the best of our
knowledge, few studies have systematically looked at this aspect.
Further, our study explores the effectiveness of an integrated model, based on financial (account-
ing and market) and non-financial (corporate governance) information to reduce default prediction
errors, when compared to a single predictor model. A number of studies reveal a combination of
different approaches (e.g., Kealhofer and Kurbat 2001), and various information (Li and Miu 2010)
improves default prediction. We extend these studies further by providing a comparative analysis
between the USA and Sri Lanka. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research methodology. Section 4 reveals
the empirical results. And Section 5 concludes the paper.
Literature and Hypotheses Development
Information for Bankruptcy Prediction
The literature identifies two basic forms of financial information (Tinoco and Wilson 2013), being
accounting information as in Beaver (1966)3; Altman (1968); and market information by Black and
Scholes (1973); Merton (1974); using option pricing models. The early studies on bankruptcy
develop from the seminal work by Beaver (1966). Since then some studies follow the univariate
analysis (e.g., FitzPatrick 1932; Smith and Winakor 1935). The first multivariate study starts with
Altman’s study in (1968), and it introduces the “Z-score” model with five higher predictable ratios.
The application of multivariate models is still popular since the 1960’s, and a recent study by Kim
(2018) also examines the bankruptcy threshold differences using the Z-score model. The main
advantage of using accounting information is its wide availability and accessibility. However,
accounting information is prepared on the basis of ‘going concern’ valuations whereas default
violates this key concept of accounting (Hillegeist et al. 2004). Further, Hillegeist et al. (2004)
argue that ratios based on a firm’s assets do not consider the volatility in the value of those assets.
Due to the weakness in accounting information, researchers use market information to improve
default prediction. Agarwal and Taffler (2008) point out the importance of market-based information
as it is backed by sound theoretical underpinnings and is free from accounting accrual adjustments.
Further, Beaver (1968) finds that, in an efficient market, the market information could anticipate the
default probability more quickly than the accounting ratios. Therefore, the problem is how to
incorporate the market information into the credit risk modeling directly. The issue is resolved
using the theory of option pricing introduced by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974).
See, for example, Vassalou and Xing (2004) and Bharath and Shumway (2008). However, the
market-based information is valid only in an efficient market. For example, insider dealings could
invalidate a market-based model. Therefore, researchers have combined accounting and market
information into their default prediction models (See, e.g., Atiya 2001; Campbell, Hilscher, and
Szilagyi 2008; Li and Miu 2010).
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Altman, Sabato, and, Wilson (2008) maintains qualitative or soft information can enhance the
assessment of a borrower’s credit quality. Bhimani, Gulamhussen, and Lopes (2013) endorse the
importance of non-financial information to default prediction of non-listed firms. They highlight that
evaluation of non-financial information is needed, such as institutional settings, firm type, and
industry group. Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985) pioneer examining differences in corporate
governance information between failed and non-failed firms, by considering three board character-
istics. Later, studies affirm the incorporation of corporate GOVs as non-financial information (for
example, Gales and Kesner 1994; Simpson and Gleason 1999; Daily and Dalton 1994; and Lee and
Yeh 2004).
Mature Markets
Beaver (1966) develops the first bankruptcy prediction model based on accounting information for
credit risk modeling. He used data from publicly owned industrial USA firms. Altman (1968) follows
by developing the Z-Score model based on the multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA),4 using
USA corporate data. Later, other studies also used USA data for bankruptcy prediction (e.g., Casey
and Bartczak 1985; Daily and Dalton 1994; Li and Miu 2010).
Several studies of non-USA mature markets relating to bankruptcy prediction were initiated in the
1970s. Takahashi and Kurokawa (1984) use data from Japanese listed companies and suggest the
auditor’s report should be considered as well as financial statements data. Izan (1984) is the first
study using Australia data. Elloumi and Gueyie (2001) use Canadian data and find corporate
governance (board director composition) affects financial distress. Agarwal and Taffler (2008), and
Tinoco and Wilson (2013) investigate listed companies in the UK. Tinoco and Wilson (2013) find the
utility of combining accounting, market and macroeconomic data for bankruptcy prediction.
However, no attention to firm-specific non-financial information has been given in their studies.
Recently, Ciampi (2015) examines the impact of corporate governance using data from small and
medium-sized enterprises in Italy and reveals the importance of GOVs information for SMEs default
prediction. Overall, in studies on mature markets, governance aspects are limited to board composi-
tion and ownership structure.
Emerging Markets
In emerging markets, researchers use financial and non-financial information individually or collec-
tively for bankruptcy prediction. Most of the emerging market literature focuses on accounting or
corporate governance data. For example, Gupta (2014) tests the Z-score and ZETA model for the
listed companies in India by using macro and accounting ratios. Samarakoon and Hasan (2003) apply
three versions of Z-score models to predict financial distress of the listed companies in Sri Lanka.
Salehi and Abedini (2009) and Sandin and Porporato (2008) predict financial trouble by using
financial ratios of listed companies in Iran and Argentina, respectively.
Since the year 2000, using corporate governance data, Lee and Yeh (2004) and Liang et al. (2016)
examine Taiwanese companies. Wang and Deng (2006) use Chinese companies, and Lakshan and
Wijekoon (2012) use a dataset from Sri Lanka. Overall, studies on the emerging market do not
develop the models further but extend the mature market-based studies to new locations.
Hypotheses Development
Default generally arises due to the poor financial performance of a company. Corporate governance is
the system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992). Therefore, the poor
financial performance of firms is attributed to the failure of corporate governance of firms because
studies has shown the effect of corporate governance on firm performances (Agrawal and Knoeber
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1996; Thomsen, Pedersen, and Kvist 2006). Goktan, Kieschnickand, and Moussawi (2006) argue that
if corporate governance affects company performance, the attributes of corporate governance also
ensure the survival of the company. The literature on default prediction further confirms the effect of
corporate governance on firm’s default probability (e.g., Daily and Dalton 1994). Even though studies
examine the incremental contribution of corporate governance on default prediction, few studies
systematically conduct a comparative analysis between mature and emerging markets. Moreover,
there is no single good corporate governance system that is applicable to all economies due to the
differences in legal systems, institutional frameworks, cultures, and economic conditions. Therefore,
in general, firms follow the best practices to attract investors. These best practices are different from
one country to another. Thus, our research focuses on the effectiveness of governance information,
categorized as non-financial information, on overall default prediction in an emerging market, SL,
and a mature market, USA. We define effectiveness as the ability of the various corporate GOVs to
identify default firms from non-default firms.
The corporate governance system of the US is deemed as a market-based system, and the
system is characterized by widespread ownership structure, higher investor protection, and
professional manager representation (Bhasa 2004). SL, which is an emerging market, carries the
features of the relationship-based model where it consists of the characteristics of concentrated
ownership, cross corporate shareholding, concentrated voting power (Maher and Andersson 2000).
These differences stimulate our interest to explore the effectiveness of corporate governance
information in classifying the default and non-default firms in both contexts. A recent study by
Kim (2018) compares Korea with the U.S. and examines the reasons for bankruptcy threshold
differences on institutional quality. It suggests that the Z-score bankruptcy threshold in the US is
higher than that of Korea.
Even though there is extensive literature on the effect of corporate governance on default
prediction, only the board characteristics in the mature markets are tested (e.g., Daily and Dalton
1994; Parker, Peters, and Turetsky 2002; Simpson and Gleason 1999). Research on emerging markets
focuses primarily on ownership concentration and secondary board characteristics (e.g., Lee and Yeh
2004; Wang and Deng 2006). However, in order to compare the effectiveness of governance
information in identifying default from non-default firms between two economies, it is necessary
to consider a comprehensive set of governance information due to the differences in the governance
systems. For this purpose, we use the Standard & Poor (2002) governance framework to system-
atically assess the effect of firms’ corporate governance on default prediction. In contrast to other
governance frameworks, Standard & Poor covers the aspects relating to individual company and
country governance aspects (Manawaduge 2012) where we believe these dimensions account for the
institutional differences between the two contexts. The four dimensions are ownership structure and
influence, shareholder rights and relations, financial transparency and board effectiveness. Next, we
describe how and why these four dimensions are critical in both contexts.
Corporate ownership has a more significant influence on building governance systems around the
world. For example, the US governance system is characterized mainly by dispersed ownership
where the managers have a higher power in decision-making. Therefore, the managers make
decisions for their interest, increasing the agency cost. Hence, the agency theory argues that owner-
ship concentration improves firm performances and reduces the agency cost. The governing system
of SL is characterized by concentrated ownership (Senaratne and Guneratne 2012). However, studies
in emerging markets support the view that ownership concentration (Claessens et al. 1999) and
weaker legal systems (Klapper and Love 2004) lead to governing practices that are not as effective as
those in the mature markets. Conversely, Manawaduge (2012) finds that concentrated firms in SL
have higher financial performances compared to dispersed ownership ones.
From an agency theory perspective, the managers as the agents of the shareholders do not act for
the interest of shareholders but their interest. This increases the agency costs and exasperates internal
inefficiencies. Therefore, agency theory argues that one of the purposes of governance mechanism is
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to assure shareholders that managers achieve the best to meet the shareholders’ interest (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). Therefore, shareholders should be given adequate rights to monitor the firms. Maher
and Andersson (2000) show that relationship-based governance system provides concentrated voting
rights due to concentrated ownership structure. The market-based model offers higher investor
protection due to dispersed ownership. Therefore, it is necessary to find the effectiveness of share-
holder rights on default prediction in both contexts because this dimension also implies the legal
infrastructure of the two economies.
Transparency and disclosures are essential to reduce information asymmetry and to ensure that
managers are accountable for the shareholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond 2006). The
Cadbury report (1992) identifies that the foundation of a governance structure is the transparency and
disclosures. This dimension emphasizes how a firm conveys the information to the stakeholders
effectively. The financial reporting quality is affected by the quality of the audit committee
(Rainsbury, Bradbury, and Cahan 2009). The quality of the audit committee reduces fraudulent
financial reporting, accounting irregularities (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1996), and overstatement
of earnings (Klein 2002). We assume the effectiveness of the dimension varies across SL and US
because if the controlling shareholders in the board dominate the firms in SL, the effect might be
different from the US context.
The board structure is essential since the board provides an independent view on management
performance and is responsible for the effective governance of the company (Simpson and Gleason
1999). Under the agency theory, Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985) argue a larger board creates
issues for coordination and increases managers’ freedom in decision-making. In contrast, resources
dependency theory states a larger board has the advantage of diversified skills and broader linkages to
the external environment (Pearce and Zahra 1992). Platt and Platt (2012) find board composition and
board member characteristics can prevent a firm from getting bankrupt relating to US context.
Simpson and Gleason (1999) propose having one person in the position of CEO and board chair
could reduce the risk of the company by better monitoring the board and management through proper
and up-to-date knowledge. In the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) requires companies to increase
the number of independent directors as the lack of independence of the board is a major issue behind
many corporate scandals (Platt and Platt 2012). Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) state that a higher
proportion of outside directors has a significant positive effect on effective monitoring of manage-
ment, whereas Elloumi and Gueyie (2001), Wang and Deng (2006) and Platt and Platt (2012)
establish independent directors are significant in bankruptcy prediction.
Due to the importance of these four dimensions on individual and country governance aspects, the
need for comprehensive application of governance information for default prediction is imperative.
Specifically, the framework covers the aspects of market infrastructure, legal infrastructure, regula-
tory environment, and information infrastructure through ownership structure and influence, share-
holder rights and relations, financial transparency, and board effectiveness (Manawaduge 2012). We
henceforth hypothesize:
H1: Corporate governance as non-financial information plays a vital role in identifying default from
non-default firms in both Sri Lanka and the USA.
There are definite limitations of using either accounting based values or market information for
bankruptcy prediction, especially if markets are not efficient. As a result, most of the empirical
studies have tested corporate governance as a critical non-financial factor to be used with conven-
tional accounting measures for default forecasting (e.g., Daily and Dalton 1994; Parker, Peters, and
Turetsky 2002; and Liang et al. 2016). However, the extant literature has not attempted to consider
whether the non-financial information is a more important predictor for default probability in
emerging markets when compared with mature markets. We expect the effects would vary with
different information on default prediction across different markets. We argue that non-financial
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information could be more relevant to emerging economies and that it should be given a higher
weight when evaluating the likelihood of default.
Berglof (1990) identifies two forms of financial systems: bank-oriented and market-oriented. In
bank-oriented financial systems, firms have close relations with banks to find their capital needs
whereas in market-oriented financial systems the firms use numerous ways to fund their capital. Ali
and Hwang (2000) find the relevance of financial reporting is less if economies have: (i) bank-
oriented financial systems, (ii) less private sector involvement for accounting standard settings, and
(iii) political and economic-oriented tax systems. Aguilera and Jackson (2003) suggest emerging
markets are bank-oriented and mature market as market-oriented. Accordingly, we argue that non-
financial information has higher default prediction ability than financial information in Sri Lanka, an
emerging market. Additionally, we argue that the effectiveness of financial information (i.e., account-
ing and market information) has less relevance in default prediction in Sri Lanka than in the USA,
a mature market. We hypothesize:
H2: Non-financial information has higher default prediction ability than the financial information in
Sri Lanka than the USA.
Even though we propose that non-financial information is superior to financial information in
emerging markets, Li and Miu (2010) argue that default models using financial information should
not be neglected entirely. Many empirical studies using USA firm data test for the superiority of market-
based models, with varying inputs, and varying results. Hillegeist et al. (2004) find the market informa-
tion-based model performs better than the accounting-based model. Campbell, Hillscher, and Szilagyi
(2008) find a model with accounting and market variables has higher prediction accuracy than that with
either accounting or non-financial information. Further, Miller (1998), and Mitchell and Roy (2007) also
find better performance by combining different types of information. Accordingly, we propose that
integrating accounting, market, and corporate governance information may be more valuable for default
prediction than any model with fewer types of information. We hypothesize:
H3: An integrated model, with accounting, market and corporate governance information, performs
better than any other model with fewer categories of information in Sri Lanka and the USA.
Research Methodology
Panel Logit Model
This study employs a panel logit model framework to conduct empirical tests. The panel logit model
allows the time-varying covariates (Shumway 2001; Tinoco and Wilson 2013). The logistic model is
presented as follows:
yitþ1 ¼ cont: þ βxit þ eitþ1; eitþ1eð0; σÞ ; (1)
where the explained variable, y*it+1, with i = 1, 2, …, N and t = 1, 2, …, T, represents the credit
quality of firms, where the subscript i denotes the ith firm and t + 1 denotes the time t + 1. The xit is
a vector of the explanatory variables for firm’s credit quality, and eit+1 denotes the error term.
Notably, y*it+1 is an unobservable latent variable. What we observe is a dummy variable yit+1,
defined as yit+1 = 1 if yit+1* > 0 (i.e., company i defaults at time t + 1); otherwise, yit+1 = 0 (i.e.,
company i does not default at time t + 1). Subsequently, the panel logit model follows a conditional
logit distribution. The conditional probability of Pr (Y = 1│x) is obtained with the following model:
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Then
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Empirical Models
This study tests the effectiveness of financial and non-financial information in Sri Lanka and the USA
for the default prediction. Specifically, the credit quality of firm is developed as follows:
yitþ1 ¼ cont: þ β1ACCit þ β2MKTit þ β3GOVit þ eitþ1; eitþ1eð0; σÞ : (5)
The integrated model (INTG) described in Equation (5) includes three types of information for firm credit
quality where ACC represents accounting information, MKT represents market information, and GOV
represents corporate governance information. We test whether INTG provides incremental information
for bankruptcy prediction than any non-integrated model (with one category of information only). We
propose three alternative empirical models for comparison, being of ACC, MKT, and GOV separately.
Prediction Evaluation Methods
According to Anderson (2007), studies should not use a single measure to evaluate the performance
of default prediction models. Therefore, we use five measures, that is, Receiver Operating
Characteristics (ROC), Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP), Gini rank coefficient, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov curve, and Pseudo R2 to evaluate the prediction performance and test the consistency of
the results.5 The ROC curve identifies how correctly a model discerns default from non-default firms
based on a cut-off point. Evaluation using the ROC curve requires the determination of a cut-off
point. In a ROC curve, the y-axis represents the ‘true positive rate’ (percentage of defaults that are
correctly classified as defaults) and the x-axis represents the ‘false positive rate.’ The resultant area
under the curve (AUC) is a direct measure of predictive accuracy.
Using CAP, the companies are ranked according to their predicted default probabilities ranging
from the highest to the lowest. CAP calculates the cumulative frequencies of the total number of
companies based on default scores (y-axis) against the cumulative frequencies of the default
companies captured as a percentage (y%) of a total number of default companies (x-axis).6 The
Gini rank coefficient and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are based on the AUC of the ROC curve.
Gini rank coefficient is used to identify how well the model segregates default from non-defaults.
7 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is the most used evaluation method in the USA (Anderson 2007;
Mays 2004). It identifies the maximum vertical deviation between the cumulative percentage of
a number of defaults and percentage of a total number of companies with different default
probability ranges.8 Pseudo R2 provides a general measure of goodness of fit of a logit model.
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Measurements of Variables
To establish a non-financial information bankruptcy model, we employ 12 corporate GOVs,
covering four dimensions of ownership structure, shareholder rights, financial transparency, and
board effectiveness. These four dimensions are tested by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond
(2006) who relate corporate governance to credit ratings. Panel A of Table 1 presents the
definitions of non-financial corporate GOVs. The definitions of financial information (accounting
and market) are given in panel B of Table 1.
Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable Definition
Panel A: Definition of corporate governance (non-financial) variables
Ownership structure and influence
INST (%) Percentage of share ownership by institutions
DIRECTOR (%) Percentage of share ownership of directors and officers
NUM_SHARE Number of shareholders hold more than 5% shares
BLOCK 1 = if at least one shareholder has more than 20% shares, 0 = otherwise
Shareholder rights and relations
EXT_AUD 1 = if shareholders appoint the external auditor, 0 = otherwise
REM_MAG 1 = if shareholders approve the remuneration of management, 0 = otherwise
Financial transparency
AUDCOM_QUA 1 = if the audit committee chair is an independent director, 0 = otherwise
AUD_OP 1 = if the opinion is qualified opinion, 0 = otherwise
Board structure and effectiveness
BOARD SIZE Number of board members in the board
CEO DUALITY 1 = if CEO and Chair are same person, 0 = otherwise
IND_DIRE Number of independent directors
OUT_DIRE Number of outside directors
Panel B: Definition of financial variables
Accounting information
WCTA Working capital to total assets
CASHMTA Cash to market value of total assets
MVEBTD Market value of equity to book value of total debt
STA Sales to total assets
RETA Retained earnings to total assets
EBITTA Earnings before interest and taxes to total assets
LTDTA Long term debt to total assets
TDTA Total debt to total assets
CFCL Cash flow from operation to current liabilities
CFTA Cash flow from operation to total assets
CFTD Cash flow from operation to total debt
Market information
SHARE PRICE Log price
STOCK_VOL Stock’s volatility for the present quarter; is computed as the sample standard deviation using the last
three quarter market prices
SIZE The logarithm of each firm’s market capitalization
EXCESS
RETURN
Quarterly return on the firm minus the market return based on S&P 500 (EXCESS RETURNit
= log(1 + Rit) - log(1 + RS&P500it))
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Empirical Results
Data
Measurement of default is a difficult task because defaults occur infrequently. We follow the
definitions by Parker, Peters, and Turetsky (2002), Gilson (1989) and Ross et al. (2011) to recognize
the default events for Sri Lanka.9 That is, if a company, during the period from 2000 to 2015, suffers
from losses, has negative net worth, or suffers from negative operating cash flows for more than three
consecutive years; then it is deemed to default. There are 294 companies listed in the CSE at the end
of 2016 representing 20 business sectors. We exclude the banking, finance, and insurance sectors
from the sample selection. Accordingly, 79 companies meet at least one criterion of the above.
Depending on the data availability, 73 default firms are taken for the sample. Then, by matching the
sample, 73 non-default companies are selected on the basis of industry and size.
Firms encountering bankruptcy or liquidation events, as defined by the Compustat database from
2000 to 2015, are selected as default firms of the US. We use the sample matching design to choose
non-default firms.10 The initial sample contains 469 default firms. From the dataset, banks, insurance,
and leasing firms, as well as firms with missing data for accounting variables and missing values for
SIC codes are dropped to obtain the final sample of default firms. Finally, 136 firms are also dropped
due to the unavailability of the data for corporate governance information. The remaining number of
default firms is then 82. For each default firm, we choose a firm of similar size (defined by the value
of total assets) in the same industry as a comparable non-default firm. The selection of comparable
non-default companies effectively mitigates imbalance problems (Liang et al. 2016) .11 For the
purpose of prediction, the explanatory variables for the credit quality of firms are collected as
panel data over five years before the default date on an annual12 basis for Sri Lanka (hereafter
referred to as SL) and on a quarterly basis for the US.13 The sample of SL contains 730 firm-year
observations, and that of the US has 3,280 observations. The literature demonstrates that the use of
panel data may mitigate the time-varying risk of the variables (Altman and Sabanto, 2007; Shunway,
2001; Tinoco and Wilson 2013). Table 2 summarizes the final panel data sets for SL and US firms.
We obtain accounting and corporate GOVs from the published annual reports. Information on
equity prices for market variables is from the CSE databases for Sri Lanka. For the US, we use the
Compustat database to collect accounting and market data and proxy statements for the governance
information.14
The Effectiveness of Governance Information for Bankruptcy Prediction
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of the corporate GOVs used to identify the effectiveness of
governance attributes in determining the default and non-default firms in SL and the US. This
analysis is conducted to address the first research hypothesis in our study which shows the corporate
governance information is essential for overall default prediction. It is mainly the case for the
comparison between the two economies. Therefore, we use the same set of GOVs under the four
dimensions of Standard and Poor’s governance framework to compare the effectiveness of govern-
ance information to differentiate defaults and non-defaults firms in both contexts.
Table 2. Distribution of firms in the final sample panel data for SL and the USA.
Panel A: SL Panel B: USA
Group No. of firms Observations No. of firms Observations
Default 73 365 82 1640
Non-default 73 365 82 1640
Total 146 730 164 3280
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Among the four dimensions of corporate governance information, ownership structure is particu-
larly influential. Institutional shareholdings (INST %) of default firms is on average at 69% in SL
compared to 32% in the US. The result is consistent with the emerging market studies on corporate
governance (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013). However, the US firms generally consist of dispersed
ownership. The result shows that the variable (INST %)15 does not show a significant difference
between default and non-default firms in SL. However, the US firms show a significant and
substantial mean difference between default and non-default firms (t-value = 8.269 for the US vs.
t-value = 0.716 for SL). US-based research argues that institutional shareholders reduce the competi-
tiveness and financial performance of the firms (Graves and Waddock 1994). Senaratne and
Gunaratne (2012) find the ownership structure of the companies in SL is largely characterized by
concentrated ownership where the companies are primarily influenced by controlling shareholders
represented by other corporations, but not the professional institutions such as mutual funds and
financial institutions. However, the role of institutional investors is vital among the firms in the US
(Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013). Thereby, the INS% could significantly identify the default and non-
default firms in the US.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Default Non-default
Predictor category Variables Mean St. Dev Mean St. Dev T statistics
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for Sri Lanka
Ownership structure and influence INST (%) 68.966 24.292 67.697 27.066 .716
DIRECTOR (%) 10.498 18.875 14.365 23.491 −2.956***
NUM_SHARE 2.888 1.449 3.093 1.638 −1.822
BLOCK 0.945 0.228 0.923 0.266 1.299
Shareholder rights and relations EXT_AUD 0.123 0.329 0.014 0.116 5.914***
REM_MAG 0.992 0.090 1.000 0.000 −1.737
Financial transparency AUDCOM_QUA 0.860 0.347 0.945 0.228 −3.744***
AUD_OP 0.172 0.378 0.169 0.376 0.099
Board structure and effectiveness BOARD SIZE 6.871 2.277 7.964 2.305 −6.640***
CEO DUALITY 0.225 0.418 0.162 0.369 2.034**
IND_DIRE 2.838 1.570 3.282 1.548 −3.830***
OUT_DIRE 4.274 2.168 5.603 2.096 −8.464***
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the USA
Ownership structure and influence INST (%) 32.174 20.839 26.430 19.130 8.269***
DIRECTOR (%) 19.924 21.185 20.771 19.407 −1.200
NUM_SHARE 3.974 2.208 3.524 1.956 5.884***
BLOCK 0.335 0.472 0.305 0.460 1.777
Shareholder rights and relations EXT_AUD 0.624 0.484 0.841 0.365 −14.171***
REM_MAG 0.905 0.293 0.990 0.098 −11.063***
Financial transparency and disclosures AUDCOM_QUA 0.971 0.169 0.973 0.162 −0.417
AUD_OP 0.573 0.494 0.570 0.495 0.170
Board structure and effectiveness BOARD SIZE 6.946 1.954 7.254 2.141 −4.196***
CEO DUALITY 0.539 0.499 0.520 0.500 1.149
IND_DIRE 4.980 1.926 5.412 2.214 −5.942***
OUT_DIRE 4.951 2.172 5.551 2.333 −7.509***
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the predictor information for two countries based on matched paired
sample design for each. The sample of SL represents 730 firm-year observations and 3280 observations for USA
market over the period of 2000 to 2015. The descriptive statistics are given for mean standard deviation and the results
of the paired sample t-test. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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The number of shareholders who hold more than 5% of shares (NUM_SHARE) has a significant
difference between the default and non-default firms in the US but not in SL (t-value = 5.884 for the
US vs. t-value = −1.822 for SL). NUM_SHARE of default firms in SL is on average 2.89 while that
at U.S default firms is on average 3.97, indicating the beneficiary share-ownership is more dispersed
in the US than SL. The variable BLOCK (the presence of one shareholder with 20% or more shares)
is not significant in either economy (t-value = 1.777 for the US vs. t-value = 1.299 for SL); however,
the average of the presence of block-holders is high in all firms in SL. In contrast, there are
significantly lower block-holders in the US firms. Consequently, INST (%), NUM_SHARE, and
BLOCK are not effective in signaling the default probability of firms in SL. Firms in emerging
markets are controlled by either family or financial institutions (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013). As
a result, the shareholders control the firms either directly or indirectly. Our results are consistent with
Holderness and Sheehan (1988) who point out that if a firm has block-holders, they usually represent
management. Accordingly, the family or high shareholder-dependent structure in SL causes the
block-holder attribute to be ineffective in distinguishing default from non-default firms.
Senaratne and Guneratne (2012) find that most of the listed companies in SL have concentrated
ownership and they tend to have a controlling shareholder. Further, they explain that the controlling
shareholder is usually represented by another corporation which is especially a parent company or
a group of companies ultimately controlled by families. Manawaduge (2012) finds that firms with
concentrated ownership have better performances through better corporate governance practices.
Therefore, based on the previous literature our result confirms that generally the firms in SL exhibit
higher ownership concentration and they show better performances. Thereby, low ownership con-
centration is a feature of the default firms in SL.
Low director and officers’ share-ownership (DIRECTOR %) is a property of the default firms in
both countries. The directors and officers of the default firms in the US own 19.9% of the equity
shares compared to 10.5% in SL. In the US, due to the spread of ownership, company survival largely
depends on the governing body. Therefore, to ensure better governance more company shares are
allocated to board members in the US relative to in SL. However, the allocation is less in default
firms than in non-default firms in both countries. But, DIRECTOR % could efficiently distinguish
between the default and non-default firms in SL, but this is not the case in the USA (t-value = −1.200
for the US vs. t-value = −2.956 for SL). Jensen (1993) finds that allocating a considerable number of
shares to outside directors enhances the effective monitoring of the firm’s management and helps to
weaken the likelihood of financial fraud (Beaver 1966). However, DIRECTOR% is more pronounced
in the emerging market context due to the concentrated ownership. Overall, it is evident that
ownership concentration is relatively higher in emerging markets. However, ownership concentration
could effectively differentiate the default from non-default firms in a mature market due to the well-
diversified shareholding structure of the survival companies compared to default counterparts and
those of emerging markets.
The shareholder right to appoint the external auditor of the company (EXT_AUD) is significant in
both countries at 1% level (t-statistics = −14.171 for the US vs. t-statistics = 5.914 for SL). The
shareholder right to approve the remuneration (REM_MAG) of the executive management is only
significant in the US (t-statistics = −11.063 for the US vs. t-statistic = −1.737 for SL). Therefore, the
shareholder right as a means to control the power balance between management and owners could
more effectively distinguish the default from non-default firms in mature markets compared to
emerging markets. This is because a large mean difference in the two variables is found between
default and non-default firms in the US. This finding accords with Gompers, Ishiiand, and Metrick
(2003) who find the US firms with stronger shareholder rights have better company performance and
higher market valuation. However, the default firms show a higher mean value compared to non-
default firms in SL. One possible explanation is, SL as a relationship-based governance model
possess concentrated voting power, thereby higher ownership concentration may bring about exces-
sive shareholder rights in SL context leading to higher influence on management decisions.
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Furthermore, Manawaduge (2012) indicates that due to the concentrated ownership in SL, the
participation by the non-controlling shareholders for voting rights at the AGM is lower. Klapper and
Love (2004) find shareholder rights are problematic in a country with a weaker legal system, which is
the case for emerging markets. Therefore, we suggest that due to the higher concentrated ownership,
the default firms are characterized by higher shareholder rights where largest shareholders’ control
the voting rights significantly. However, we could not neglect shareholder rights’ dimension in the
emerging market because we find EXT_AUD variable could significantly signal default firms
compared to non-default counterparts.
The two proxies under financial transparency show default firms in the US have lower transpar-
ency than non-default firms, but higher financial transparency compared to default firms in SL on
average. The variables audit committee quality (AUDCOM_QUA) and auditor opinion (AUD_OP)
are not significant in the US. AUDCOM_QUA effectively distinguishes default from non-default
firms in SL (t-statistic = −3.744 for SL vs. t-statistics = −0.417 for the US). Thereby the claim that
corporate governance is effective16 in distinguishing between the default and non-default firms in SL
is validated, and the result is consistent with Patel, Balic, and Bwakira (2002). They find that Asian
emerging markets have higher financial transparency than the other emerging markets in Latin
America, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe.
Amongst the default companies, the average board size is seven. Board size is effective in
distinguishing between default and non-default firms. But in SL, a higher mean difference is found
compared to the US firms (t-statistic = −6.640 for SL vs. t-statistics = −4.196 for the US). A higher
CEO duality exists in the US default firms compared to those in SL. However, CEO duality is only
effective to differentiate between default from non-default firms in SL (t-statistics = 2.034 for SL vs.
t-statistics = 1.149 for the US). The number of independent directors in default firms is on average
five in the US, whereas, in SL the number of independent directors is three. The number of outside
directors in the US default firms on average is five; however, in SL it is four. The significant feature
in these two variables is the smaller number of independent directors on the board compared to
outside directors in SL. Independent directors and outside directors are significant in both countries
(Independent directors: t-statistics = −3.830 for SL vs. t-statistics = −5.942 for the US; Outside
directors: t-statistics = −8.464 for SL vs. t-statistics = −7.509 for the US). Platt and Platt (2012)17;
determine that board characteristics can predict bankruptcy in the case of US.
Similarly, we find that board effectiveness as governance information is effective in identifying
default firms in SL and US. For the SL context, Senaratne and Guneratne (2012); find that participation
in management by the controlling shareholders is high in the firms in SL and that enhances the
corporate control. Therefore, the information relating to board structure and effectiveness is significant
in the emerging market context. On the other hand, in order to reduce the agency cost board
effectiveness also necessary to the US market due to the widespread ownership of the firms.
Overall, governance information is effective to distinguish default and non-default firms in both
SL and US. Three of the four ownership concentration variables are insignificant in SL. Therefore,
the results indicate, if we consider one aspect of corporate governance, for example, ownership
concentration, in the case of SL, the results might be biased. Hence, it is necessary to capture
comprehensive aspects of governance information to evaluate the overall picture of the governing
process, and their impacts on default prediction are significant. Accordingly, we affirm our first
hypothesis, that is, comprehensives analysis of non-financial information is necessary to effectively
classify default from non-default firms in both Sri Lanka and the USA.
The Performance Comparison of Alternative Bankruptcy Information
Table 4 shows the prediction performance of accounting, market, and corporate governance informa-
tion for both countries derived from the estimated logit model.18 Corporate governance information
shows higher prediction accuracy under the ROC curve with an AUC of 76.17% for SL.
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The AUC generated by accounting (ACC) and market (MKT) information in SL is 74.94% and
68.31%, respectively. However, the accounting information-based model possesses a higher AUC for
the USA firms with a value of 86.48%. Market and governance (GOV) information-based models
have AUC of 77.31% and 70.93%, respectively. The results indicate that non-financial information
has relatively higher prediction capacity in SL whereas accounting information has impressive
prediction accuracy for the USA firms. Accordingly, the accounting information has the second
highest prediction accuracy for the firms in SL and market information provides the lowest accuracy.
However, the market information has the second highest prediction accuracy for the USA firms, and
the non-financial information (GOV) has the lowest accuracy. The Gini rank coefficient derived from
the AUC follows a similar pattern. As pointed out by Anderson (2007),19 the Gini-coefficient above
50 percent is more satisfactory and that less than 35 percent means the performance of the model is
doubtful. A figure below 30 percent suggests unacceptable accuracy. Thus, all the models in the two
markets have generated a value of above 35%. Therefore, the results are reasonable.
The acceptable percentage under the Kolmogorov-Smirnov20 test ranges from 20% to 70%. The
highest prediction accuracy generated from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 58.22% from corporate
governance in SL and 56.76% from market information for the USA. The results of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test are consistent with other alternative methods in Sri Lanka: GOV figures are highest in
every performance test. But in the USA, the MKT figure generated by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is
not consistent with all the other predictor performance measures, which shows the financial information
is the most effective, indicating the importance of using different approaches for decision marking.
The accuracy ratio of the CAP curve also measures the prediction performance. Although the
calculation of CAP is different from the previous measures, it provides consistent results. The Pseudo
R2 measures the goodness of fit of the models. Accordingly, GOV shows relatively higher explana-
tory power than ACC and MKT for the firms in SL. The ACC has the higher Pseudo R2 for the USA
firms. Overall, the non-financial GOV shows relatively higher prediction accuracy than the financial
information in the SL. In the USA financial information, particularly the accounting information, has
higher prediction capacity. Thus, we affirm our second hypothesis (H2: Non-financial information
has higher default prediction ability than the financial information in Sri Lanka than the USA).
Table 4. Accuracy ratio comparison of financial and non-financial model.
Performance Measures ACC MKT GOV FIN INTG
Panel A: Model performances for Sri Lanka
AUC of ROC 74.94% 68.31% 76.17% 77.51% 84.11%
Gini rank coefficient 49.89% 36.62% 52.35% 55.02% 68.22%
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 54.53% 53.65% 58.22% 57.37% 63.84%
CAP Accuracy ratio 51.04% 36.63% 53.07% 55.37% 68.41%
Pseudo R2 9.12% 7.26% 13.16% 15.63% 27.66%
Panel B: Model performances for the USA
AUC of ROC 86.48% 77.31% 70.93% 88.07% 91.02%
Gini rank coefficient 72.97% 54.63% 41.87% 76.14% 82.05%
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 56.30% 56.76% 55.69% 57.79% 57.88%
CAP Accuracy ratio 73.12% 53.77% 40.18% 75.82% 81.96%
Pseudo R2 33.98% 17.22% 10.87% 37.88% 45.75%
This table summarizes the performance measures for SL and the USA based on five measures. ACC = accounting
information, MKT = Market information, GOV = Corporate governance information, FIN = Market plus accounting
information and ING = Integrated model. Bold values represent the highest prediction when considering single predictor
information (GOV, ACC, and MKT) and the highest prediction considering combined information (FIN, INTG).
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In addition to the above measures, we also use the analysis of the ROC and CAP curves. Figures 1
and 2 respectively show the ROC and CAP curves under three panels, namely, A (accounting),
B (market), and C (corporate governance) for both countries. Higher prediction accuracy is illustrated
by the curve which is further to the top left. Accordingly, in both figures, the USA reaches a more
upper curve for accounting in panel A (accounting), and for SL the more upper curve is achieved in
panel C (corporate governance).
The overall results of different performance measures for both markets imply that the financial
institutions in Sri Lanka should focus more on non-financial information, compared to the USA,
reconfirming our second hypothesis. The result is consistent with Tinoco and Wilson (2013), they
ascertain accounting information has higher prediction ability than the market and macroeconomic
factors in the UK as an example for a mature market. Our findings are supported by Ali and Hwang
(2000), who establish that the value relevance of financial reporting is smaller in emerging markets
due to the bank-oriented financial systems. As a result, the credibility of financial information is such
that it does not reveal the true financial position of companies in emerging economies. On the other
hand, the market information shows the least accuracy for the default prediction in emerging market.
The share markets in emerging economies21 have been judged to be inefficient by Kim and
Panel A: Accounting information Panel B: Market Information 







































































































Figure 1. ROC curve for various types of information: Sri Lanka versus the USA. Panel A: Accounting
information. Panel B: Market Information. Panel C: Corporate governance information.
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Shamsuddin (2008). In summary, our results propose that the corporate governance information has
more relevance for the default prediction in emerging markets than in the mature markets.
Column IV (INTG) in Table 4 tests the overall accuracy of the single measures of prediction and the
integrated model based on three measures. The integrated model shows 84.11% of AUC for the
companies in SL whereas the USA firms shows a 91.02% of AUC. The Gini rank coefficient and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov values are 68.22% and 63.84% for SL, respectively, whereas the values are
82.05% and 57.88% for USA firms, respectively. The accuracy ratio of CAP curve is 68.41%, and
Pseudo R2 is 27.66% for SL firms. USA firms show an accuracy ratio of 81.96% under the CAP curve
and a 45.75% of Pseudo R2 for the integrated model. For all tests, the integrated model provides the
highest values for both countries. Therefore, it is the superior model for default prediction.
Panel A: Accounting information Panel B: Market Information

















































































































































Figure 2. CAP curve for various types of information: Sri Lanka versus the USA. Panel A: Accounting
information. Panel B: Market Information. Panel C: Corporate governance information.
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These findings suggest that the financial institutions in emerging markets should not ignore the
accounting and market information even though we find the governance information-based model is
superior for emerging markets. Consistent with Li and Miu (2010), we find one model might be
superior to another, but the combination of models can enhance the prediction performance further.
Our study discovers that the integrated model has higher prediction accuracy than any counterpart
with a single information category.22 This is evident in both Sri Lanka and the USA. We thus affirm
our third hypothesis (H3: An integrated model, with accounting, market and corporate governance
information, performs better than any other model with fewer categories of information in Sri Lanka
and the USA). Therefore, the financial institutions should pay attention to the importance of integra-
tion of information for default prediction.
Table 4 (column FIN) further reports the prediction performances of the integrated model
excluding governance information. The purpose of this testing is to identify the power of risk
differentiation in the absence of governance information, i.e., to test the prediction performances
of the financial information, that is, accounting and market information. The results of both
countries show that significant reduction in the accuracy percentages comes across from integrated
model to financial model. Therefore, the findings suggest that the role of governance information
in predicting default probability is vital for both countries. However, when analyzing the percen-
tage changes from INTG model to FIN model, the changes are higher in SL than the US. For
example, the area under the ROC shows 7% reduction from INTG model to FIN model for SL
whereas reduction of the US is 3%. This implies that the influence of governance structure is
higher for firms in SL compared to the US.
Conclusions
This study contributes to the literature by examining the effectiveness of several variables of
corporate governance information to predict default, from a new perspective of providing an inter-
national comparison between an emerging market (Sri Lanka) and a mature market (USA). Most past
studies suggest corporate governance is only useful in mature markets. In contrast, we confirm
corporate governance information should be considered in depth with more variables in an emerging
market, as well as in a mature market because essential aspects differ across different contexts. We
test the prediction performance of financial (accounting and market) information and non-financial
(corporate government) information, in Sri Lanka and in the USA, to examine whether or not non-
financial information is relevant for prediction.
Overall, corporate governance information is useful in default prediction in both Sri Lanka and the
USA. In both cases, seven out of the twelve variables we tested are significant. Our results indicate that the
corporate governance informationmayhavemore relevance for the default prediction in emergingmarkets
than in the mature market. Further tests are conducted to unveil the importance of individual variables
according to the context and level of maturity of the market. We find that ownership variables have less
prediction ability in Sri Lanka.We find that the relative prediction performance of accounting, market and
governance information varies across the two markets. ACC carries higher prediction accuracy for
a mature market (USA), followed by the MKT and GOV. However, non-financial corporate governance
information has a higher prediction ability than financial information in emerging markets (Sri Lanka).
Moreover, we argue both emerging, and mature markets should utilize the joint predictive power of
integrated information because it could provide incremental effectiveness in predicting corporate default.
We establish that an integrated model, with accounting, market, and corporate governance information,
performs better than any other model with fewer categories of information in Sri Lanka and the USA.
Although the findings of the study are significant, there are several limitations. First, the compar-
ison is made between only two countries, Sri Lanka, and the United States. Second, the model
estimation is based solely on the logit regression. Third, a statistical test to examine the significant
differences among the prediction performances of the models among the two countries will be left for
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a future study. Therefore, it would be desirable to expand the country of study onto more emerging
and mature markets.
Further, the multivariate discriminant analysis and neural network also could be alternative models
to estimate the default probabilities. Testing the model with these methods and examining the
significance of the differences among the prediction performances of the countries would make the
results more pronounced. Analyzing different legal frameworks of best practices of the countries also
remains for future research.
Notes
1. In this paper the terms financial distress, failure, bankruptcy, and liquidation are used interchangeably as
each represents the situation where a firm is placed in default and investors suffer credit loss.
2. The FTSE country classification defines four types of markets: Developed, advanced emerging, secondary
emerging, and frontier.
3. Beaver used univariate analysis to differentiate failed firms from non-failed companies. The results based
on prediction error test in Beaver’s study found, cash flow to total debt has the highest prediction ability.
4. MDA is technique used to classify the observations into a group in order to reduce the variations between
variables.
5. See Li and Miu (2010) for more explanations of ROC and CAP curve.
6. Accuracy ratio by CAP curve = (the area under a model’s CAP)/(the area under the ideal CAP).
7. The accuracy ratio is calculated as ((2*AUC)-1).
8. For calculations please refer to Anderson (2007).
9. Lakshan and Wijekoon (2012) use losses and negative cash flows to identify the failed listed companies in
Sri Lanka.
10. Matched pairs design has been used by more than 70% of the studies in this area (Zmijewski 1984).
11. The bankruptcy prediction results are generally used to find the effect of selected variables on default
likelihood of the companies which may go bankrupt, but not to generalize to the entire population (Ciampi 2015).
12. Quarterly data are not available for the selected sample of Sri Lanka.
13. We assume five year observations are necessary to find the signal of default risk among default and non-
default companies and banks generally conduct 3 to 5-year analysis of their borrowers. Most of studies based on
the USA have predicted for maximum of five years. (e.g., Beaver 1966).
14. To avoid biased results due to outliers, we winsorize accounting and market variables at 5% level as
a solution to the outliers found after applying the median absolute deviation (MAD). After detecting outliers, we
use trimming to avoid false positive results. For trimming, we apply winsorizing, which means changing an
outlier’s value into the value of the closest non-outlier.
15. In this paper, institutional shareholder represents share-ownership by any institutions including mutual
funds, banks, investment banks, insurance companies, private and public companies, and governments.
16. Rainsbury Bradbury, and Cahan (2009) find audit committee quality has no significant effect on the quality of
financial reporting. However, we are still consistent with our notion that even though the financial transparency and
disclosures are effective in SL it does not necessarily mean the financial reporting quality is high.
17. The proxies are board-size, CEO duality, independent directors, and director share-ownership.
18. Results of the estimated models are available upon request.
19. Anderson (2007, p. 205).
20. Anderson (2007, pp. 195–196).
21. Kim and Shamsuddin (2008) characterized secondary emerging markets as inefficient; however, advanced
emerging markets, e.g., Singapore, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are weak-form efficient.
22. Consistent with Bhimani, Gulamhussen, and Lopes (2013), and Liang et al. (2016), the combination of
different models enhances bankruptcy prediction.
Data availability
Data analyzed in the study are collected from public sources.
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Chapter Three  
 
Corporate governance and default correlation 
 
Chapter three consists of one research paper that has been submitted for review and 
publication. The title of the paper is “Corporate governance and default correlation.” 
This paper is under the second-round of review by Corporate Governance: An 
International Review (SSCI and ABDC ranking = A). In this paper the impact of 
corporate governance on the correlation in corporate defaults is tested. It is 
hypothesized that the degree of default correlations would increase 
disproportionally for firms with weak corporate governance in terms of 
concentrated ownership, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency, and 
high shareholder rights. This work employs Lucas’s (1995) method to provide 
empirical evidence based on the historical default data in the United States from 
2000 to 2015. The empirical results imply that corporate governance is essential for 
credit risk management because poor corporate governance increases not only 
individual default risk but also the domino effect of credit defaults. Moreover, the 
impact of corporate governance on correlation in corporate defaults is more 
pronounced during a financial crisis. This paper was also presented at the 31st 
Australasian Finance and Banking Conference in Sydney, Australia, during 
December 2018.   
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Corporate governance and correlation in corporate defaults  
 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This study examines the effect of weak corporate 
governance in terms of concentrated ownership, low board effectiveness, low 
financial transparency and higher shareholder rights on default correlation given 
the different credit qualities. 
Research Findings/Insights: Using historical default data in the United States 
from 2000 to 2015, we find that the degree of default correlation increases 
disproportionally for firms with concentrated ownership, low board effectiveness, 
low financial transparency and disclosures, and higher shareholder rights. More 
importantly, the effect of weak corporate governance on default correlation is high 
during a financial crisis. 
Theoretical/ Academic Implications: This study is one of the first studies testing 
the impact of corporate governance on the correlation in corporate defaults. It 
strongly indicates new avenues of research for both corporate governance and credit 
risk management on why the joint default probabilities vary among firms.  
Practitioner/ Policy Implications: Our results imply that good corporate 
governance is essential for credit risk management because poor corporate 
governance may increase not only individual default risk but also create the domino 
effect of credit defaults. Practitioners and policy makers should enhance control 
over poor governance practices to reduce the probabilities of default. Moreover, the 
impact of corporate governance on correlation in corporate defaults is more 
pronounced in the financial crisis and could warrant policy makers taking steps to 
cushion its effects. 
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Evaluating the default correlation among credit portfolios is a crucial process for 
bank credit risk management. Default correlation implies the relationship between 
a firm’s individual default probability and joint default probability among firms. 
Thus, the estimation of default correlation depends not only on the individual firm’s 
default probability but also on joint default probabilities among firms. For example, 
in a crisis default correlation arises as a result of events of particular firm default 
and the collective default among firms. Researchers have identified cyclical, 
contagion and learning from others as the factors that cause the joint default 
probabilities over the last few decades (Das et al., 2007). However, why the joint 
default probabilities vary among firms is still under investigation. In this paper, we 
provide convincing reasons for the variations based on the results of an empirical 
investigation of firms’ corporate governance practices.  Thus, we make theoretical 
contributions by testing the impact of corporate governance on corporate default 
correlation. In brief, we hypothesize that the degree of default correlations increases 
disproportionally for firms with weak corporate governance. The dynamic nature 
of default correlations due to corporate governance implies that weak corporate 
governance not only increases individual default risk but also may accompany a 
disproportional increase in the credit risk of a portfolio.  
The issue of correlation in corporate defaults has been generated 
considerable interest and research has expanded focusing on methodology and 
examinations of factors causing defaults. Default correlations can be estimated by 
any one of three methods. The first method is to estimate default correlations based 
on asset correlations (e.g., Das et al., 2007). The second method is to use the credit 
default swap (CDS) or bond spread data (e.g., Jorion and Zhang, 2007). The third 
method proposes using a standard binomial approach to measure default correlation 
based on realized historical default data (e.g., Lucas, 1995). Notably, default 
correlations have not been satisfactorily modelled. Lucas’s method, which we adopt 
in this research, takes advantage of model-free estimation techniques (see Li and 
Chen, 2018). 
Research to examine the factors causing correlation in corporate defaults 
has generated considerable interest. Das et al. (2007) identifies the three main 
reasons for default clustering as cyclical correlation, (Duffie, 1998, Keenan, 2000 
Chapter 3: Corporate Governance and  
Default Correlation| 56 
 
 
and Duffie et al., 2007); contagion effect (Aharony and Swary, 1983, Lang and 
Stulz, 1992 and Giesecke, 2004); and learning from defaults (Jarrow and Yu, 2001). 
A recent study by Li and Chen (2018) tests the default correlation due to liquidity, 
systematic risk and size as an extension to the three primary sources of default 
correlation proposed by Das et al. (2007).  
This paper contributes by hypothesizing and examining the impact of 
corporate governance on the correlation in corporate defaults. Extensive studies test 
the effect of corporate governance on individual corporate defaults in the literature 
(see Daily and Dalton, 1994). We have been unable to find any studies that 
systematically investigate the impact of corporate governance on correlations in 
corporate defaults. Following Standard and Poor’s governance framework (2002), 
we define four critical domains of corporate governance as ownership structure and 
influence, board effectiveness, financial transparency and disclosures, and 
shareholder rights. Accordingly, we develop four research hypotheses regarding the 
impact of corporate governance on correlations in corporate defaults. Our empirical 
results further indicate that default correlation is high for firms with concentrated 
ownership, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency and disclosures, and 
higher shareholder rights. 
Moreover, differing from the previous research, we follow Lucas (1995) 
approach to test the impact of corporate governance on correlations in corporate 
defaults using the realised default data in the U.S. over the period of 2000 to 2015. 
In addition, following with the studies of Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Erkens et 
al. (2012), which indicate the effect of corporate governance on firm performance 
varies during a financial crisis, we retest our research to add a fifth hypothesis 
relating to default correlation in both crisis and non-crisis periods.  
The results of this research can provide policy implications to banks and 
regulatory authorities. As hypothesized in this study, the degree of the domino 
effect of credit defaults increases disproportionally for firms with weak corporate 
governance, and the phenomena are more pronounced during the crisis periods. 
Regulators should consider these findings and develop a viable regulatory capital 
framework for credit risk management to mitigate the potential consequences of 
underestimating default clustering due to poor corporate governance. Our empirical 
results imply that poor corporate governance might cause an increase in individual 
default risk and also exaggerate the domino effect of credit defaults. The increase 
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in default correlations will, in turn, reveal an increase in portfolio credit risk. 
Without considering the impact of corporate governance on default correlations, we 
indicate that the benefit of reductions in risk stemming from credit portfolio 
diversification is likely to be overestimated for firms with weak corporate 
governance. Firms with weak corporate governance are associated with higher 
default correlations and, hence, are less effective in risk reduction if included in 
credit portfolio diversification efforts. Our findings support the argument that 
regulators should further adjust capital requirements for banks which make loans to 
weak governance firms at crisis periods. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature 
on sources of default correlation, modelling for default correlations and develops 
the research hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and research design. 
Section 4 presents the results of empirical findings. Section 5 presents robustness 
tests. Section 6 concludes and provides future research directions. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
2.1.  Sources of default correlation 
There are three main reasons for default correlation, that is, common factors or 
cyclical correlation, contagion effect, and learning from others (Das et al., 2007). 
Cyclical correlation arises due to a similar pattern of correlated risk factors among 
firms. Common economic factors include interest rate, inflation, GDP, business 
cycle, and stock market performances. Duffie (1998) explains that the aggregate 
default rates are correlated due to the general interest rate movements. Further, 
Duffie et al. (2007) find that personal income growth and term structure levels also 
affect the changes of default probabilities. De Servigny and Renault (2002) report 
that joint default probabilities are higher in recession periods than non-recession 
periods. During a recession or a financial crisis, all businesses are adversely affected 
by their sensitivity to the general economic conditions. Li and Chen (2018) suggest 
firms with a low beta, which represents the systematic risk, have high default 
correlation.  
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The contagion effect implies that the default of one company induces the 
default of another company.5 For example, the default of a subsidiary company 
creates a default for its parent company. Accordingly, the default clustering 
phenomena are invariably observed between closely related companies with buyer-
supplier relations. The initial studies on the contagion effect focus mainly on stock 
market information (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992). Later studies focus on industry-
related factors as the reason for the contagion effect. Among them, Jorion and 
Zhang (2007) record a positive correlation among credit derivatives due to the 
contagion effect and a negative correlation due to competition. They assume the 
contagion effect is created among firms with similar cash flows6. Accordingly, they 
choose equity, industry concentration, and leverage to measure the correlation 
among the bankruptcy firms and their competitors.  
The third reasoning for the default correlation is learning from defaults. For 
example, the failures of Worldcom and Enron highlight the importance of 
regulatory changes to firm irregularities which affect surviving companies (Das et 
al., 2007). Learning from others implies that the reason for one company’s default 
also could exist in other companies, thereby, recognizing or revealing those reasons 
could benefit the various stakeholders of other companies.  
 
2.2. Modelling default correlation  
There are different approaches for estimating default correlation. The first approach 
is to estimate the default correlation on a structural model based on assets 
correlation. The most popular method is Merton’s (1974) model. An extension of 
this model is developed and tested by Black and Cox (1976). The Merton model 
demonstrates stock as a call option where the strike price equals the face value of 
debt payment. It identifies two common factors for firms’ defaults, that is, a firm’s 
debt ratio and volatility of assets. Based on this model, the default probability is 
transformed into a hazard rate. Geske (1977) generates the default correlation by 
using the hazard rate and the default probabilities from the model. However, this 
assumes that default only occurs at a single point in time (i.e., at maturity), which 
                                                 
5 See Lucas (1995) for real world examples due to contagious effect. 
6 They follow Lang and Stulz (1992) to select the variables to measure contagion effect.  
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is unrealistic because some credit instruments may default more than once. Also, 
the default probability of a firm is recognized when its assets’ value falls below its 
debt. Zhou (2001) uses the implications of the asset return model to establish the 
default correlation. Yet, Das et al. (2006) suggest that asset volatility is more 
important than asset return in modelling default correlation.  
The second approach is called a reduced-form method which is based on 
default intensity. This is an implicit approach where some observable market 
information, such as swap spreads and prices of bonds, is used to generate the 
default probabilities (Li, 2000). Default intensities are derived by estimating a 
model based on state variables such as interest rates, credit spreads and company 
ratings relating to the changes of business cycles. Duffie et al. (2003) use this 
method to find the correlation among sovereign spreads. This approach assumes 
that although the default events are independent, the correlation arises through the 
common influence of the changes of the state variables. Jarrow and Yu (2001) 
extend this approach to gauge default clustering due to firm-specific risk factors 
such as counter-party risk. The above methods recognize the default probability 
based on credit losses due to credit downgrading. 
An alternative approach is proposed by Lucas (1995) that estimates default 
correlation based on historical default data, using actual default probabilities. It 
takes advantage of model-free estimation techniques and has proven useful in 
modelling default correlations in practice. Using the same approach, Li (2000) 
introduces a ‘copula framework’ for default correlation, which solves the problem 
of joint distribution in a credit portfolio.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses development: Corporate governance attributes and default 
correlations  
Agency theory forms a part of the bigger picture of corporate governance and it 
suggests that the separation of ownership from management is a cost to the 
organization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). There are two types of agency conflicts, 
that is, the conflicts between managers and stakeholders, including shareholders 
and debtholders, and the conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. These two 
types of conflicts eventually increase default risk and reduce firm value. Agency 
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cost is particularly extensive in the U.S. where the firms’ ownership is diffused. 
The widespread share ownership requires managers to control the operations of the 
firms. Thus, the manger-shareholder conflicts arise due to the self-serving behavior 
of managers over other stakeholders’ interest. 
The second conflict, between shareholders and debtholders, incurs the 
agency cost of debt. The value maximization objective of shareholders frequently 
conflicts with the interest of debtholders. Galai and Masulis (1976) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) show that shareholders engage in risk-shifting behavior. For 
example, shareholders of highly levered firms that suffer financial distress tend to 
undertake risky investments with negative NPV.  Such actions could lead to issues 
for firms’ future cash flows and creates uncertainties to debtholders.  
The hypotheses of our study focus on examining the effect of corporate 
governance on default correlations. The literature on corporate governance and 
default risk establishes that default firms are associated with weak corporate 
governance mechanisms.  Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) show that governance 
mechanisms have an impact on default risk by mitigating agency cost. Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006) find that firms with stronger governance mechanisms enjoy 
higher credit ratings due to lower default risk.  
In the following sections, we develop our hypotheses on the relationship 
between corporate governance and default correlation in terms of four important 
attributes, that is, ownership structure and influence, board effectiveness, financial 
transparency and disclosures, and shareholders rights. Most of the governance 
attributes we test in this study aim to reduce the two types of agency conflicts and 
to ensure that the governance mechanisms provide independent monitoring of 
management and avoid managerial opportunism. We hypothesize that the default 
correlations are not homogenous across firms and could increase asymmetrically 
for firms with poor corporate governance attributes.   
a. Ownership structure and influence 
Generally, firms with dispersed ownership heavily rely on governance mechanisms 
to reduce managerial opportunistic behavior and agency cost. Strong corporate 
governance mechanisms should be able to protect the interest of all stakeholders 
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including debtholders. However, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms 
varies depending on the ownership structure and its influence.  
Ownership concentration can have a positive or negative impact on the 
organization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). The 
positive effect stems from block-holders and institutional investors who have 
financial interest and independent views, and therefore they are expected to have a 
positive influence on company monitoring processes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, the agency cost is lower in firms with 
concentrated ownership implying low default risk and high credit quality.  
However, concentrated ownership might be a challenge for management in 
performing their managerial functions for the betterment of all stakeholders. For 
example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Galai and Masulis (1976) introduce the 
problem of risk-shifting behavior from shareholders to debtholders where firms 
with concentrated ownership can influence the management on investing in risky 
projects where the success of projects increases the wealth of the shareholders, 
while the bondholders should equally bear the failure of the project.  
 La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) point out that if the 
controlling shareholders have significantly higher voting rights than their cash flow 
rights, there is a negative effect on minority interests. Further, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) suggest that if ownership concentration exceeds a certain threshold, 
controlling shareholders try to increase their personal benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders and debtholders. La Porta et al. (1999) and Johnson et al. 
(2000) further suggest that under concentrated ownership, poor corporate 
governance transfers the value from the firm to the controlling shareholders.  
The literature presents mixed findings on the relationship between 
concentrated ownership and firm credit quality. For example, Bhojraj and Sengupta 
(2003) find that firms with high institutional share ownership tend to have high 
credit ratings, which suggests a low default risk. Yet, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) 
find that large shareholders have a negative effect on credit ratings. Further, Elloumi 
and Gueyie (2001), Parker et al. (2002) and Fernando et al. (2019) find that firms 
with concentrated ownership are more likely to default, suggesting poor credit 
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quality. We employ the percentage of institutional ownership7, the percentage of 
the five largest shareholders’ ownership, and blockholdership to measure the 
ownership structure and influence. Switzer et al. (2018) find that institutional share 
ownership negatively effects default risk. Erkens et al. (2012) find that concentrated 
institutional share ownership positively associates with risk-taking behaviour 
before the financial crisis occurred during the period 2007-2009. Thus, we posit 
that the potential risk-shifting behaviour of shareholders increases the default 
correlation among the firms with concentrated ownership due to a cyclical effect.   
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) suggest that under the “management 
disciplining” hypothesis 8  ownership concentration reduces default risk and 
increases credit quality, whereas under the “wealth distribution” hypothesis 9 
concentrated ownership increases default risk and reduces credit quality. Given the 
mixed findings and arguments about the ownership structure and its influence on 
agency cost, our first hypothesis is non-directional:  
H1: Firms with different ownership structures are associated with 
different levels of default correlation. 
b. Board effectiveness 
An active board provides an independent view on management performance and is 
responsible for the effective governance of the firm (Simpson and Gleason, 1999). 
It is also observed that an effective board of directors should be comprised with 
greater independence (see, for example, Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Board 
effectiveness includes factors such as board size, board composition, and leadership 
structure. To represent board effectiveness, we use board size, CEO duality, and the 
number of independent and external directors on the board. Resource dependency 
theory suggests that the board of directors is the mechanism for reducing 
environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972), and managing external dependencies 
                                                 
7 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), describe that under the wealth distribution hypothesis, when the % 
of share ownership by institutions increases it affect the wealth transfer to bondholders. They suggest 
a negative relationship between institution share ownership and credit ratings.  
8 They described the role of corporate governance under the management disciplining hypothesis is 
to avoid the managerial opportunism.  
9 The wealth distribution hypothesis is defined as the role of governance mechanisms is to ensure 
the wealth distribution among all stakeholders.  
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(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Accordingly, it is expected that an effective board 
reduces the moral hazard problem and the agency cost of debt.  
The first attribute under board effectiveness is board size. Resource 
dependency theory suggests that a larger board brings a greater amount of 
experiences, skills, and views to the board table.  A larger board creates barriers for 
insiders to exercise managerialism by better monitoring. Therefore, that will lead 
to reducing the risk of bankruptcy.  Switzer et al. (2018) find that board size is 
positively associated with default risk. However, Lipton and Lorsh (1992) show 
that a larger board is less effective when considering the coordination and free-
riding problems. Platt and Platt (2012) find that default firms are characterized by 
a small board and a few independent directors. Thus, there is no clear conclusion 
on the larger board and board effectiveness. However, based on resource 
dependency theory we argue that a larger board is necessary to increase board 
effectiveness and to reduce default risk.  
The second attribute we consider is CEO duality. Governance mechanisms 
are effective when there is greater independence of the insiders. Dalton and Kesner 
(1987) argue that an effective board is created when one person does not hold the 
positions of board chairman and CEO. Daily and Dalton (1994) and Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. (2006) suggest that CEO duality increases default risk. Lorsch (1989) 
further suggests that firms could face a financial crisis effectively when it occurs, 
when they have an independent board structure and separate positions of the CEO 
and the board chairman. On the other hand, CEO duality could enhance the 
effectiveness as the CEO would be more aware than outsiders about what is 
happening with the organization.  Regarding bank credit risk, Pathan (2009) finds 
a negative effect of CEO duality. However, we posit that firms with CEO duality 
possess reduced board effectiveness and increased credit risk because it is less 
likely for board members to provide independent monitoring and to control the 
managerialism. 
The third element is board independence. We posit that greater the board 
independence, the greater the board effectiveness because board independence is 
necessary to provide independent monitoring and to reduce managers’ self-directed 
behaviours. Further, the literature shows that board independence has a significant 
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effect on reducing a firm’s default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006, Switzer and 
Wang, 2013) suggesting board independences increase credit quality.  
Further, the lack of board effectiveness could mean that firms are less 
exposed to growth opportunities. The literature well documents a positive 
relationship between firm performance and board effectiveness. Thus, better firm 
performance provides benefits to all stakeholders, and that increases credit quality. 
With these reasons, we assume that firms with less effective boards reflect high 
default correlation due to the board’s inability to adjust to external environmental 
shocks. Our hypothesis:   
H2: Firms with the low/high effective board are associated with high/low default 
correlation. 
c. Financial transparency and disclosures  
Governance mechanisms should be able to ensure financial transparency to reduce 
information asymmetry between managers and all other stakeholders. Therefore, 
timely and adequate information helps shareholders and debt-holders to make 
appropriate financing decisions. Thus, we posit that firms with greater financial 
transparency have reduced management discretionary actions and increased value-
relevant information. We use audit committee quality measured through audit 
committee independence and auditor opinion as to the proxies for financial 
transparency and disclosures.  
Financial transparency through an independent audit committee reduces 
fraudulent financial reporting, accounting irregularities (Dechow et al., 1996); and 
reduces overstatement of earnings (Klein, 2002). It also reduces information 
asymmetry and increases investor confidence (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires all the members of the audit committee 
to be independent. However, Choen et al. (2010) point out that there is a substantial 
variation of the audit committee composition and their effectiveness. Klein (2002) 
finds audit committee independence significantly affects abnormal accruals 
whereas Bédard et al. (2004) find that 100 percent audit committee independence 
reduces aggressive earnings management.   
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Ensuring the reliability of financial information and reporting is an integral 
part of governance mechanisms. As a proxy for quality of disclosures, we use a 
dummy variable, coded as one if a firm receives unqualified opinion and zero 
otherwise. The literature shows that firms receiving a qualified auditor opinion tend 
to have higher accruals (e.g. Francis and Krishnan 1999; Bradshaw, Richardson, 
and Sloan 2001), suggesting higher managerial opportunism. Further, the literature 
relating to bankruptcy prediction also shows the effect of auditor opinion on default 
risk (e.g., Altman and McGough, 1974; Lensberg, Eilifsen, and McKee, 2006).  
Lensberg et al. (2006) point out that the most significant variable in their final 
model of bankruptcy prediction is the auditor’s opinion validating the value 
relevance information of auditor’s reports. According to the above literature, we 
include a qualified auditor opinion to reflect the low financial transparency and 
disclosures. We assume that the firms receiving a qualified auditor opinion reflect 
higher agency costs due to higher earnings management. 
If corporate governance ensures better monitoring and financial reporting, 
then it reduces managerial opportunism and enhances financial transparency and 
disclosures. Therefore, firms with low financial transparency are deemed as firms 
with poor governing practices. Moreover, Sengupta (1998) finds that firms with 
higher disclosure ratings could enjoy lower interest cost of issuing debt, suggesting 
higher financial transparency and disclosures reflects higher credit quality. Hence, 
we assume that firms with low financial transparency reflect low credit quality. 
Thus, the potential information asymmetry and earnings management due to weak 
financial transparency and disclosures may increase the contagion effect on default 
correlation (being low credit quality firms). Our hypothesis: 
H3: Firms with high/low financial transparency and disclosusres are associated 
with low/high default correlation. 
d. Shareholder rights  
The attribute of shareholder rights reflects the power balance between shareholders 
and management. The role of governance mechanisms on this attribute is to ensure 
that the managers do not use their discretionary power to gain personal benefits. 
Another role is to ensure that shareholders’ rights do not conflict with minority 
shareholders’ and bondholders’ interests. Many have argued shareholders’ rights 
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relate to corporate governance.  However, evidence of such a relationship, as 
reported in the extant literature, is inconclusive. 
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) find that enhanced shareholders rights increases 
their ability to monitor managers’ actions and reduces biases in financial reporting. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) identify the lower shareholders rights with poor 
governing practices on the basis that lower shareholders rights increase managerial 
opportunistic behavior for earnings management, and as a result, increase agency 
cost. Gompers et al. (2003) suggest companies with stronger shareholders rights 
have higher firm value, higher profits, and higher sales growth. Moreover, strong 
shareholders rights can mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviors which may have 
a negative impact on firm value (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). These studies 
support the view that higher shareholders rights represent good corporate 
governance and reduce agency problems.  
 The conflict between shareholders and debtholders creates the agency cost 
of debt. By giving a greater power to shareholders, on the decisions of the 
ownership control and the changes of management, can be detrimental to 
bondholders (FitchRatings, 2004). FitchRatings (2004) further indicates greater 
power to shareholders brings an undesirable influence on management, which 
adversely affects the bondholders and thus creates a negative impact on wealth 
distribution. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) demonstrate that greater power to 
shareholder leads to lower credit ratings because stronger shareholders rights 
increase the risk of wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders. The risk-
shifting behavior also could be more obvious in the case of greater shareholders 
rights over management, and agency costs of debt increases as a result. Klock et al. 
(2005) show that firms with higher shareholders rights are associated with a higher 
cost of debt financing. Chava et al. (2008) find firms with higher shareholder rights 
are charged with higher loan spreads.  
The two proxies we use to measure the shareholders rights are the powers 
to ratify the independent auditors and to approve the remuneration of executive 
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management.10 Coffee (2006) stresses that independent auditors are crucial in the 
corporate governance framework. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 provides that the 
audit committee is responsible for the appointment and oversight of the independent 
auditors. Dao et al. (2012) stress that most of the boards consist of management and 
they hold a significant influence on the auditor appointment. Therefore, it is 
necessary that the shareholders ratify the auditor selection to ensure the chosen 
auditor is matched with the company size and financial reporting needs. The 
literature shows that the final decision of auditor selection by the shareholders 
brings benefits to organizations (Mayhew and Pike, 2004; Dao et al.2012). 
Therefore, based on this reasoning, we assume that higher shareholders rights in 
terms of auditor ratification ensure auditor independence and reduce the managerial 
opportunism that causes low credit quality.   
Agency theory (Jensen and Mackling, 1976) stresses that the shareholders 
should be the agents to design the compensation of executive management. 
However, the widespread ownership of US public companies provides an incentive 
for the board of directors to design the compensation for executives. Core et al. 
(1999) find that less effective boards result in excessive CEO compensation.11 
Further, Davis (2007) and Deane (2007) find that having an input on-pay decisions, 
ensures better alignment of the owner-manager interest and enhances governance 
quality. Therefore, we assume that giving shareholders the rights to approve the 
remuneration of executive directors reduces compensation and increases value to 
the shareholders. Given the mixed evidence on the relationship between the level 
of shareholders rights and corporate governance, our hypothesis is non-directional, 
as follows: 
H4: Firms with different levels of shareholder rights are associated with different 
levels of default correlations. 
                                                 
10 The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP), appointed by the U.S. Department 
of Treasury, recommends public companies to use the shareholder voting to ratify the auditor 
appointment. 
11  The say-on-pay legislation was included in Dodd-Frank Wall street reform and consumer 
protection act in 2010. However, we consider the variable in our study as we cover the time period 
from 2000 to 2015. 
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e. Corporate governance effect on default correlation in crisis and non-crisis 
periods 
Crouhy et al. (2000) and Gersbach and Lipponer (2003) show that default clustering 
is high in recessions. De Servigny and Renault (2002) find the default correlation 
among non-investment grade firms are higher in a recession than in a growth period. 
Further, Li and Chen (2018) reveal that firms with very low credit quality have a 
high correlation in the crisis period. Accordingly, we expect that the impact of weak 
corporate governance (i.e., ownership concentration, low board effectiveness, low 
financial transparency and disclosures, and higher shareholders’ rights) on 
correlations in corporate defaults is more pronounced during crisis periods. Our 
hypothesis differentiates the impact of corporate governance on default clustering 
risk in crisis periods from that of non-crisis periods. Our hypothesis:  
H5:  Firms with weak corporate governance practices have higher default 
correlation in a crisis period than a non-crisis period. 
 
 
3. Research method and data 
3.1. Data  
We recognize the firms encountering bankruptcy or liquidation as those defined by 
the Compustat database as default firms over the period 2000-2015. Due to the 
infrequent nature of default events, it is necessary to control the number of non-
default firms to minimize the bias results caused by having a relatively small 
number of default firms. Accordingly, we couple the default firms with non-default 
firms by selecting five firms with the largest market capitalization from each 
industry using the first two-digit of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes. The rationale for the non-default firms' selection criteria is that firms with 
the highest market capitalization arguably and relatively have a strong financial 
position with high credit quality and possess good corporate governance practices. 
Thus, our non-default firms ensure that they necessarily differ from default firms in 
terms of credit quality and corporate governance practices. We exclude the financial 
firms (representing SIC codes 6000-6999) from the sample selection because of 
their different operating activities and capital structures. The final sample consists 
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of 160 default and 675 non-default firm-year observations over the period of 2000-
2015. We collect financial information from the Compustat database to calculate 
the credit quality of each firm. Equity prices are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Corporate governance data are 
collected through company proxy statements and the Data Stream Database.  
 
3.2. Estimation of default correlation 
Testing default correlation first requires recognizing the companies with different 
credit qualities. For this purpose, following Li and Chen (2018), we use the Altman 
(1968) Z-score model to measure the credit quality. Thus, the five financial ratios, 
being sales to total assets, working capital to total assets, earnings before interest 
and tax to total assets, retained earnings to total assets and market value of total 
assets to book value of total liabilities, are used with the original Altman model’s 
weights. It is well documented in the literature that high credit rating firms imply a 
high score. After calculating the Z-score values, we define three credit ranges: high 
credit quality (Z-score ≥ 2.99), medium credit quality (2.99 < Z-score ≥1.81), and 
low credit quality (Z-score < 1.81). These ranges are based on the original work by 
Altman’s (1968) study, where he identified 2.99 as the highest and 1.81 as the 
lowest value for recognizing bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. A Z-score value 
above 2.99 clearly identifies a non-bankrupt firm and a Z-score below 1.81 is 
recognized as bankrupt. The area between 1.81 and 2.99 is defined as a gray area 
with uncertainity about bankruptcy.  
We follow Lucas’s (1995) approach to measure default correlation among 
the firms with different credit qualities associated with corporate governance 
practices. Here, we briefly describe the procedure. Assume that there are two types 
of firms: firms A and B. Then we define Ai (t) = 1 if firm i defaults at time t, and 0 
otherwise. A represents default under high credit quality.  Let Bi(t) = 1 if firm i 
defaults at time t, and 0 otherwise. B represents default under low credit quality. 
Then, the default correlation is computed as follows: 
 
      𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝐵(𝑇) = 
𝑃𝐴𝐵(𝑇)−𝑃𝐴(𝑇)×𝑃𝐵(𝑇)
√𝑃𝐴(𝑇)×𝑃(1−𝑃𝐴(𝑇))×√𝑃𝐵(𝑇)×𝑃(1−𝑃𝐵(𝑇))
      (1) 
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Where PA (T) and PB (T) represents the average default probabilities of high 
and low credit quality firms over T years, i.e. total number of years. PAB (T) is the 
average joint default probability over T years. Lucas (1995) suggests a standard 
binomial approach to estimate the individual and joint default probabilities based 
on a historical number of default data.   
Let NA(t) and NB(t) be the total number of firms with high credit quality and 
low credit quality at time t, respectively. Thus, we define, NA(t) = NA,1 + NA,0, where 
NA,1 is the total number of default firms with high credit quality at year t and NA,0 is 
the total number of non-default firms with high credit quality at the same year. 
Accordingly, NB(t) = NB,1 + NB,0, where NB,1 is the total number of default firms with 
low credit quality at year t and NB,0 is the total number of non-default firms with 
low credit quality at the same year.  
Following this method, the number of all the possible pairs of high and low 
credit quality firms could be computed as NA(t) x NB(t). Similarly, the number of all 
possible pairs of high, low and medium credit quality default firms is NA(t),1 × NB(t),1. 
Accordingly, the average joint default probability over T years among the high and 
low credit quality firms is, 
                            𝑃𝐴𝐵  (T) =
[∑
𝑁𝐴 (𝑡),1 𝑋 𝑁𝐵 (𝑡),1
𝑁𝐴 (𝑡) 𝑋 𝑁𝐵 (𝑡)
]
𝑇
                                                         (2) 
Following the same concept, we estimate the individual default probability for high 
credit quality and low credit quality firms as follows: 






                                                                            (3) 






                                                                            (4) 
 
 
3.3. Research design 
To test the hypotheses of asymmetric default correlation among firms on corporate 
governance we develop indices for each governance dimension. Hypothesis 1, 
described in section 2.3, is to test the default correlation on concentrated/dispersed 
ownership. For this purpose, we use three proxies, viz., institutional share 
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ownership (INS%), shareholding by five major shareholders (FIVE_SH), and a 
dummy variable to measure the existence of a major shareholder holding 20% of 
the total shares outstanding (BLOCK_20). We define the total index value to be the 
sum of the three variables. We use the ownership structure index to divide our 
sample firms into two subgroups: (1) concentrated ownership, and (2) dispersed 
ownership. Dispersed ownership is where the sum equals to 0 or 1, and concentrated 
ownership is where the sum is equal to 2 or 3 (refer Table 1 for variable definition 
and Table 2 for indices development). Then, we estimate the default correlations 
separately for each subgroup under each pair of three credit qualities as described 
in Section 3.2.  
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Table 1: Definitions for governance indicators 
Indicator Definition 
Ownership structure and influence 
INS_SH Percentage of share ownership by institutions 
FIVE_SH Percentage of share ownership by five largest 
shareholders 
BLOCK_20 1= if at least one shareholder has more than 20% 
shares, 0=otherwise 
Board effectiveness 
BOARD_SIZE Number of board members in the board  
CEO_DUA 1= if CEO and Chair are the same person, 0= 
otherwise 
IND_DIRE Number of independent directors 
OUTS_DIRE Number of outside directors 
Financial transparency and disclosures 
AUD_QUALITY 1= if audit committee chair is an independent 
director, 0= otherwise 
AUD_OP 1= if the opinion is unqualified, 0= otherwise 
  
Shareholder rights  
EX_AUDITOR 1= if shareholders appoint the external auditor, 0= 
otherwise 
REM_MGT 1= if shareholders approve the remuneration of 
management, 0= otherwise 
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Table 2: Construction of indices for governance dimensions 
Indicators criteria for the indices Construction of the indices 
Ownership Concentration 
INS_SH 1 if the percentage is 
greater than 25%; 0 
otherwise 
If the total equals to 0 or 1, the 
company is considered to have 
dispersed ownership, If the 
total equals to 2 or 3 the 
company is considered to have 
concentrated ownership.  
FIVESH 1 if the percentage is 
greater than 25%; 0 
otherwise 
BLOCK_20 1 if the company has 
single shareholder with 





1 if the board size is equal 
to or greater than 1212; 0 
otherwise 
If the total equals to 3 or 4, 
company is considered to have 
high board effectiveness; and if 
the total is 0, 1 or 2, company is 
considered to have low board 
effectiveness. 
CEO_DUA 1 if the CEO and the 
chairman is separate; 0 
otherwise 
IND_DIRE 1 if the company has 75% 
or more independent 
director from the total 
board members1; 0 
otherwise 
OUTS_DIRE 1 if the company has 75% 
or more independent 
director from the total 





1 if the audit committee is 
chaired by an independent 
director; 0 otherwise 
If the total equals to 2 the 
company is considered to have 
high financial transparency; if 
the total is equals to 1or 0 the 
company is considered to have 
low financial transparency 
AUD_OP 1 if the company received 
unqualified opinion; 0 
otherwise 
Shareholder rights  
EX_AUDITO
R 
1 if shareholders appoint 
the external auditor; 0 
otherwise 
If the total equals to 2 the 
company is considered to have 
high shareholder rights; if the 
total is equals to 1 or 0 the 
company is considered to have 
low shareholder rights 
  
                                                 
12 The criteria is consistent with S&P corporate governance survey (2012) results. 
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The second hypothesis is based on board effectiveness. Board effectiveness 
is measured through four indicators: board size, CEO duality, and the number of 
independent (IND_DIRE) and outside directors (OUTS_DIRE) on the board. As 
this dimension includes four variables, we define the companies with high board 
effectiveness, if the sum of the index value is 3 or 4, whereas if the sum is 0, 1 or 2, 
the companies are presumed to have low board effectiveness. We then split our 
sample into two subgroups: (1) high board effectiveness, and (2) low board 
effectiveness. Next, we estimate the default correlations separately for each 
subgroup under each pair of three credit qualities as described in Section 3.2.  
Hypothesis 3 relates to financial transparency and disclosures. This is 
measured by two indicators: the audit committee quality (AUD_QUALITY) and 
the auditor opinion (AUD_OP). The higher financial transparency is captured by 
the companies with the sum of index value equal to 2. If the amount of the index 
value is 0 or 1, this means low financial transparency and disclosures. We use the 
financial transparency and disclosures index to divide our sample firms into two 
subgroups: (1) high financial transparency and disclosures, and (2) low financial 
transparency and disclosures. Then we estimate the default correlations separately 
for each subgroup under the three credit qualities as described in Section 3.2.  
To test the shareholder rights (Hypothesis 4), a shareholder rights index is 
constructed by using two indicators: shareholder rights to ratify the external auditor 
of the companies (EX_AUDITOR) and shareholder rights to approve the 
remuneration of the executive management (REM_MGT). As the index includes 
only two indicators the higher and low shareholder rights, the higher shareholders’ 
rights is indicated by a sum of index value equal to 2. If the sum of the index value 
is equal to 0 or 1, this indicates low shareholders rights. We then split our sample 
into two subgroups (1) High shareholder rights, and (2) low shareholder rights. Next, 
we estimate the default correlations separately for each subgroup under each pair 
of three credit qualities as described in Section 3.2.  
To test the effect of corporate governance on default correlation in the crisis 
and non-crisis periods (hypothesis 5), we split the whole sample of firms into two 
groups under each dimension. For example, for ownership concentration, we split 
the whole sample into two subsamples in terms of concentrated/ dispersed 
ownership. Then each subsample is divided further into two more subsamples of 
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crisis and non-crisis periods. Thus, the correlation is identified on the basis of 
concentrated/ dispersed ownership in crisis and non-crisis periods. The crisis period 
represents the periods of 2001-2002 and 2007-2009 whereas the remaining periods 
are considered as the non-crisis period. We follow the same procedure of splitting 
the sample for all the other dimensions we test. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the descriptive statistics and correlations of the Z-score 
components and corporate governance variables, respectively. Panel A of Table 3 
presents a comparative analysis of descriptive statistics between default and non-
default firms for Z-score variables. Accordingly, non-default firms show higher 
mean values than default firms for all the ratios except for sales to total assets, 
indicating that the default firms have low working capital, market value, and 
earnings. Panel B of Table 3 reports the correlation among the Z-score components; 
however, no significant or high correlation is reported among the variables.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation among Z-score variables  
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of Z-score values  
 




Test of equal 
means 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. T-value P-value 
WC/TA .068 1.158 .123 .169 -1.194 .233 
MVE/TL 6.601 16.526 198.991 2042.431 -1.191 .234 
S/TA 1.153 1.065 .853 .578 4.884 .000 
RE/TA -4.650 10.608 .317 .322 -12.164 .000 
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Panel B: Correlation matrix for Z-score variables 
Variables WC/TA MVE/TL S/TA RE/TA EBIT/TA 
WC/TA 1.0000     
MVE/TL -0.0107 1.0000    
S/TA -0.1166 -0.0728 1.0000   
RE/TA 0.1746 0.0107 -0.0343 1.0000  
EBIT/TA 0.0579 0.0013 -0.1509 0.3184 1.0000 
Note: The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-default 
firms) for the period of 2000-2015. The Z-score components are defined as: WC/TA= Working 
capital/ Total assets, MVE/TL= Market value of equity/ Total liabilities, S/TA= Sales/ Total assets, 
RE/TA= Retained earnings/ Total assets, and EBIT/TA= Earnings before interest and tax/ Total 
assets. This table shows the mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), T-statistics and the significant of 
T-values.  
  
Panel A of Table 4 provides a comparative analysis of the descriptive 
statistics between default and non-default firms for the governance variables. 
Default firms show higher mean values for ownership concentration variables. The 
proxies for board effectiveness are lower in default firms than non-default firms in 
terms of a small board, low independent and few outside directors.  Under financial 
transparency and disclosures, the mean value of audit committee quality is low in 
default firms. They also show a lower mean value for auditor opinion (low 
unqualified opinion13) indicating low financial transparency and disclosures.  
Shareholder rights and relations reveal a mixture of findings. Shareholder 
right to ratify an external auditor in non-default firms is higher than in default firms. 
However, the shareholder right to approve the remuneration of executive 
management (REM_MGT) is higher in default firms than non-default firms. All the 
proxies are significantly different between the two groups except for REM_MGT. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the correlation among governance variables. All 
variables show low correlation except for independent (IND_DIRE) and outside 
director (OUT_DIRE) variables.  
 
                                                 
13 Compustat database defines Unqualified Opinion as “there are no unresolvable restrictions in company 
financial statements and auditor has no significant exceptions as to the accounting principles, the consistency 
of their application, and the adequacy of information disclosed”.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation among governance variables 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for governance variables 
  Default firms  Non-default firms Test of equal means 
 
Mean S.D Mean S.D t-value P-value 
Ownership structure and influence 
INS 37.258 25.368 21.270 27.354 6.738 0.000 
FIVE_SH 50.853 24.039 26.278 28.307 10.147 0.000 
BLOCK_20 0.425 0.496 0.240 0.427 4.768 0.000 
Board effectiveness 
BOARD_SIZE 6.450 2.040 12.671 3.955 -19.293 0.000 
CEO_DUA 0.519 0.501 0.609 0.488 -2.089 0.037 
IND_DIRE 4.375 2.012 9.116 3.679 -15.745 0.000 
OUTS_DIRE 4.613 2.113 9.679 3.755 -16.453 0.000 
Financial transparency and disclosures 
AUD_QUALITY 0.931 0.254 0.987 0.115 -4.160 0.000 
AUD_OP 0.263 0.441 0.630 0.483 -8.780 0.000 
Shareholder rights  
EX_AUDITOR 0.956 0.205 1.000 0.000 -5.551 0.000 
REM_MGT 0.556 0.498 0.554 0.497 0.050 0.960 
Note: The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-default 
firms) for the period of 2000-2015. The variables are defined as: INST (%)=Institutional share 
ownership, FIVE_SH= Shareholding by five largest shareholders, BLOCK_20= A dummy variable 
for the presence of block shareholder with at least 20% of shareholding, EXT_AUD= shareholder 
rights to appoint external auditor, REM_MAG= shareholder rights to approve remuneration of  
executive management, AUDCOM_QUA= audit committee quality, AUD_OP=auditor opinion,  
BOARD SIZE, CEO DUALITY, IND_DIRE= number of independent directors in the board,  
OUT_DIRE= number of outside directors in the board. Panel A shows the mean, standard deviation 
(Std. Dev.), T-statistics and the significant of T-values and panel B reports the coefficients for 
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INST (%) 1 
          
FIVE_SH .682 1 
         
BLOCK_20 .446 .748 1 
        
EXT_AUD -.024 -.098 -.090 1 
       
REM_MAG -.039 -.070 -.111 .050 1 
      
AUDCOM_QUA -.034 -.084 -.114 -.014 .049 1 
     
AUD_OP .023 -.038 -.036 .077 .063 .066 1 
    
BOARD SIZE .015 -.198 -.162 .114 -.053 .165 .162 1 
   
CEO DUALITY -.226 -.284 -.202 .030 -.156 .045 -.050 -.042 1 
  
IND_DIRE -.201 -.444 -.421 .103 -.011 .197 .162 .729 -.003 1 
 
OUT_DIRE -.152 -.349 -.319 .104 .030 .203 .171 .778 -.057 .898 1 
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4.2. Default correlation among credit qualities over different time horizons 
 We examine the default correlation among the firms with different credit qualities 
over one, five and ten-year time horizons. As described in section 3.3, the credit 
quality is derived by using Z-score value. According to Table 5, a low default 
correlation is found for a one-year horizon. However, the default correlations in 
five-year and ten-year horizons are higher particularly for the firms with low credit 
quality. The result is consistent with previous findings (e.g., Crouhy et al., 2000; 
Zhou, 2001; and Li and Chen, 2018) indicating firms with low credit quality are 
unable to adjust to the external environmental shocks, and they have less capacity 
to repay their loans than high credit quality firms. 
 
Table 5: Default correlation over short and long time horizon 
Time 
Horizon Credit quality Credit quality 
One year  
 
High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 2.80% (2.44)*   
Medium Grade 3.24% (2.06)* 1.66% (0.39)  
Low Grade 6.39% (5.45)** 7.19% (3.13)** 12.15% (5.29)** 
Five year 
 
   
High Grade 23.73% (23.84)**   
Medium Grade 29.33% (24.43)** 34.62% (11.11)**  
Low Grade 29.27% (44.34)** 33.84% (29.97)** 56.97% (64.88)** 
Ten year 
 
   
High Grade 34.95% (32.90)**   
Medium Grade 40.78% (35.29)** 48.48% (19.22)**  
Low Grade 40.42% (68.29)** 50.62% (55.39)** 69.61% (104.49)** 
Note: This table presents the estimates of default correlations for various credit qualities over one, 
five and ten-year time horizons. Default correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) for each 
pair of firms. T-statistics are in parentheses.   ** and * represent significance at 1% and 5%, 
respectively.  The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-
default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. Five-year and ten-year time horizons indicate that five 
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4.3. The effect of ownership structure and influence 
Table 6 shows the results of the impact of ownership concentration on default 
clustering. Default correlation among firms with concentrated ownership is higher 
than those with dispersed ownership. Default correlation of high credit grade firms 
is lower for those with dispersed ownership, while the high credit grade firms in the 
concentrated ownership category show higher correlation. The default correlation 
among the low credit grade firms with the dispersed ownership concentration is 61% 
whereas the correlation of the low credit grade firms with the concentrated 
ownership is 75%. Therefore, the result supports Hypothesis 1, that firms with 
concentrated/ dispersed ownership are associated with high/low default correlation. 




Credit quality Credit quality 
Dispersed 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 15.16% (7.19)**   
Medium Grade 18.11% (5.54)** -2.68% (-0.26)  
Low Grade 27.13% (18.69)** 28.55% (8.81)** 60.84% (29.72)** 
     
Concentrated 
High Grade 52.23% (23.85)**   
Medium Grade 54.46% (28.18)** 55.94% (16.10)**  
Low Grade 52.73% (51.60)** 56.37% (43.69)** 75.32% (77.12)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among different credit qualities under high and low 
ownership concentration windows. Default correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) for each 
pair of firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * represent significance at the 1% and 5%, 
respectively.   The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-
default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. 
 
4.4. The effect of board effectiveness on default correlation 
We analyze the effect of board effectiveness on default clustering. Table 7 reports 
the correlations among low board effectiveness firms and high board effectiveness 
firms. The comparative analysis indicates that low board effectiveness firms have 
higher correlation than the high board-effective firms. For example, low credit 
grade firms with the low board effectiveness show 72% correlation, whereas low 
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credit grade firms with the high board effectiveness show only 58% correlation. 
High credit grade firms with the high board effectiveness exhibit only 19% 
correlation; however, high credit grade firms with the low board effectiveness have 
44% correlation. Thus, these empirical finding support Hypothesis 2 that firms with 
the low/high effective board are associated with high/low default correlation. 
Table 7: Default correlation: High versus low board effectiveness 
Board 
effectiveness 
Credit quality Credit quality 
Low 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 43.85% (26.82)**   
Medium Grade 46.64% (26.84)** 51.76% (14.39)**  
Low Grade 46.87% (58.35)** 51.06% (42.53)** 72.22% (90.73)** 
     
High 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 18.77% (6.11)**   
Medium Grade 28.55% (8.20)** 38.50% (4.42)**  
Low Grade 28.23% (11.29)** 50.66% (12.40)** 58.52% (13.79)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among different credit qualities under high and low 
board effectiveness windows. Default correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) for each pair 
of firms.  T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * represent significance at the 1% and 5%, 
respectively.  The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-
default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. 
 
4.5. The effect of financial transparency and disclosures 
Table 8 presents the correlation result for low financial transparency and disclosures 
and high financial transparency and disclosures with different credit grades. For 
each pair of grades, firms with low financial transparency and disclosures show 
higher default correlation. Under low financial transparency and disclosures, a 
correlation of 71% is reported by low credit grade firms whereas medium and high 
credit grade firms have only 59% and 45% correlations, respectively. The 
correlations among the high, medium and low credit grade firms with high financial 
transparency and disclosures are 25%, 39%, and 65%, respectively. Hence, the 
result confirms Hypothesis 3, that firms with high/low financial transparency and 
disclosures are associated with low/high default correlation. 
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Table 8: Default correlation: High versus low financial transparency 
Financial 
transparency 
Credit quality Credit quality 
Low 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 45.40% (22.95)**   
Medium Grade 51.33% (25.27)** 59.17% (13.69)**  
Low Grade 49.38% (54.30)** 62.71% (46.88)** 70.93% (83.14)** 
     
High 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 24.66% (10.88)**   
Medium Grade 30.49% (11.45)** 39.36% (6.20)**  
Low Grade 33.31% (18.06)** 37.68% (12.21)** 65.46% (21.20)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among different credit qualities under high and low 
financial transparency windows. Default correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) for each 
pair of firms.  T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * represent significance at the 1% and 5%, 
respectively.   The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-
default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. 
 
4.6. The effect of shareholder rights 
Table 9 reveals firms with high shareholder rights exhibit a higher default 
correlation compared to firms with low shareholder rights. The correlation among 
the low credit grade firms with high shareholder rights is 75% correlation; however, 
low credit grade firms with low shareholder rights show only 64% correlation. More 
importantly, firms other than the low-grade firms show close correlation for both 
low and high shareholder rights.  
The result is consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), who find a 
positive association between weaker shareholder rights and credit ratings.14 This 
suggests firms that place more power in their shareholders’ hands affect negatively 
the bondholders and this is viewed as detrimental by the credit rating agencies. 
Moreover, FitchRatings (2004) documents higher shareholders rights are not 
                                                 
14 They measure the shareholder rights by using Gomper et al. (2003) governance index, where they found a 
positive association between the governance index and credit ratings. The higher score of the governance index 
indicates weaker shareholder rights.  
 
Chapter 3: Corporate Governance and  
Default Correlation| 83 
 
 
considered necessarily as good governing practice. Chava et al. (2008) also provide 
supporting evidence for our findings as their results indicate banks charge higher 
interest to firms with higher shareholder rights than firms with lower shareholder 
rights. They suggest firms with higher shareholder rights have higher financial risk 
due to lower takeover defenses. Our results confirm that higher shareholder rights 
reduce the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms and companies 
with higher shareholder rights exhibit higher default correlation due to the 
contagion effect. Thus Hypothesis 4, in which firms with higher shareholders rights 
are associated with high default correlations, is accepted. 
 
Table 9: Default correlation: High versus low shareholder rights  
Shareholder 
rights  
Credit quality Credit quality 
Low 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 31.17% (15.13)**   
Medium Grade 39.83% (19.32)** 47.98% (11.31)**  
Low Grade 39.34% (31.01)** 51.03% (28.19)** 63.76% (40.18)** 
     
High 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 38.12% (17.13)**   
Medium Grade 42.67% (16.18)** 46.73% (7.10)**  
Low Grade 40.12% (36.11)** 48.15% (25.69)** 75.54% (66.71)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among different credit qualities under high and low 
shareholder rights windows. Default correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) for each pair 
of firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * represent significance at the 1% and 5%, 
respectively.   The sample consists of 835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-
default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. 
 
4.7. The effect of the crisis on default correlation through corporate 
governance 
We test the effect of firm governance practices on default correlation in both the 
financial crisis and non-financial crisis periods. Table 10 presents the results of the 
default correlations for the firms in both crisis and non-crisis periods under different 
levels of corporate governance practices. Panel A shows firms with the 
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concentrated ownership have higher default correlation in both crisis periods (17%) 
and non-crisis periods (5%). The correlation is higher in the crisis period than in the 
non-crisis period. The default correlations among firms with the low board 
effectiveness in both crisis and non-crisis periods are 18% and 4%, respectively, as 
indicated by Panel B. Firms with high board effectiveness show a correlation of 14% 
in the crisis and 5% in the non-crisis period. Panel C shows the default correlation 
among the firms with low financial transparency shows a higher correlation in the 
crisis period (14%) than in the non-crisis period (2%). The respective default 
correlations for firms with high financial transparency show 11% in the crisis and 
1% in the non-crisis period. Panel D indicates in the crisis period the correlation 
among firms with higher shareholder rights is higher when compared to those with 
low shareholder rights (14% vs. 10%).  However, the default correlation in the non-
crisis period among firms with lower shareholder rights is high when compared to 
the other corporate governance dimensions. The reason might be mixed evidence 
on shareholder rights as poor or good corporate governance from different company 
perspectives (i.e., credit ratings, firm values, etc.).  
 All the indicators of weak governance (ownership concentration, low boards 
effectiveness, low financial transparency and disclosures, and higher shareholder 
rights) show a higher correlation to default in periods of crisis. Accordingly, 
Hypothesis 5, that firms with weak corporate governance practices have higher 
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Table 10: Default correlation: Good and poor corporate governance effect in 
crisis and non-crisis period 




Dispersed_Owner 2.17 % (0.94)  
Concentrated_Owner 9.65 % (5.10)** 17.46 % (6.57)** 
Non-
crisis 
Dispersed_Owner 0.24 % (0.18)  
Concentrated_Owner 1.24 % (1.12)** 5.41 % (2.93)** 
Panel B:  Board effectiveness (Board_eff) 
  Low Board_eff High Board_eff 
Crisis Low Board_eff 17.61% (8.07)**  
 High Board_eff 14.74% (8.01)** 14.48% (4.53)** 
Non-
crisis 
Low Board_eff 4.27 % (3.01)**  
High Board_eff 5.12 % (4.68)** 5.33 % (3.22)** 
Panel C:  Financial transparency (Fin_trans) 
  Low Fin_trans High Fin_trans 
Crisis Low Fin_trans 14.24 % (4.79)**  
 High Fin_trans 15.25 % (6.30)** 10.89 % (2.91)** 
  Low Fin_trans High Fin_trans 
Non-
crisis 
Low Fin_trans 2.43 % (1.41)  
High Fin_trans -4.59 % (-3.90)** 0.66 % (0.54) 
Panel D:  Shareholder rights (Share_rights) 
Crisis 
 Low Share_rights High Share_rights 
Low Share_rights 10.54 % (4.16)**  
High Share_rights 15.08 % (8.02)** 13.94 % (5.66)** 
  Low Share_rights High Share_rights 
Non-
crisis 
Low Share_rights 15.28 % (8.75)**  
High Share_rights 1.37 % (1.20) -3.50 % (-2.74)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among poor and good corporate governance firms 
in crisis and non-crisis periods. Poor corporate governance defined as high ownership concentration, 
low board effectiveness, low financial transparency and high shareholder rights. Default correlations 
are calculated by using Equation (1) for each pair of firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. . ** and 
* represent significance at the 1% and 5%, respectively. The sample consists of 835 firm-year 
observations (160 default firms and 675 non-default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. Bold 
numbers represent the highest correlation. 
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4.8. Implications of the findings 
The findings of this research provide implications on credit portfolio management 
of banks and corporate financiers. A credit portfolio manager is concerned about 
not only the defaults of the individual borrower but also the possible multiple 
defaults in a portfolio. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the sources behind 
correlated defaults among multiple firms. The findings of this study open a new 
discussion on refining the current strategies to reduce default risk in a portfolio in 
terms of firms’ corporate governance practices. First, the hypothesis regarding 
ownership concentration confirms that firms with concentrated ownership reflect 
higher default correlation than firms with dispersed ownership. Therefore, when 
diversifying a credit portfolio to reduce potential credit losses, financiers should 
consider the ownership structure of a company and should allocate more funds to 
firms with dispersed ownership. It appears that the perceived benefit of reductions 
in risk stemming from credit portfolio diversification is likely to be overestimated 
for firms with weak corporate governance. 
 This research also considers the impact of board effectiveness, financial 
transparency and disclosures, and shareholders rights because these governance 
dimensions also show a significant effect on default clustering probabilities. That 
is, if the credit portfolio consists of corporate borrowers having a less effective 
board, low financial transparency and disclosures, and high shareholders rights, the 
portfolio should be changed, or higher interest rates imposed to compensate for the 
high risk. Alternatively, the portfolio could be extended to select firms with more 
effective governance practices. 
 Further, financiers should re-examine their portfolio in a crisis period as a 
higher default correlation exists in the crisis period than the non-crisis period. 
Consequently, they should give substantial consideration on the borrowers with 
high ownership concentration, less effective board structure, and low financial 
transparency and disclosures in the crisis periods. Overall, if banks consider the 
dynamic nature of firms’ corporate governance practices, they could create a high-
return portfolio with risk being effectively controlled. 
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5. Robustness test 
We conduct various tests to check the robustness of our primary results. These tests 
use alternative measures of credit quality, financial transparency and shareholder 
rights. 
 
5.1. Alternative measurement for credit quality  
First, we use firm credit rating as an alternative measurement for credit quality. For 
this purpose, we use the long-term issuers’ credit ratings complied by Standard and 
Poor’s from the Compustat database. The credit ratings reflect the creditworthiness 
of the issuers’ debt obligations. These ratings range from AAA (highest rating 
indicating lowest default risk) to D (lowest credit rating indicating highest default 
risk). For our analysis we divide the ratings into three categories, namely, high 
credit quality (from AAA to A-), medium credit quality (from BBB+ to B-), and 
low credit quality (CCC+ to D). We retest the four hypotheses relating to corporate 
governance using these classifications of credit quality. The results of Table 11 
reconfirm our findings above. First, firms with concentrated ownership show a 
higher default correlation than the dispersed ownership firms (e.g., 75.32% and 
67.92%). Second, firms with low board effectiveness show a 73.53% correlation 
whereas those with higher board effectiveness at 69.11%. Third, firms with low 
financial transparency show a higher default correlation than those with high 
financial transparency (e.g.,79.51% and 62.97%). Lastly, firms with higher 
shareholder rights show a higher default correlation compared to firms with low 
shareholder rights (e.g.,73.64% and 72.64%). All these results are significant at the 
1% level.15  
 
  
                                                 
15 Note that, all the results relating to higher credit quality and governance attributes report zero 
correlation because none of the default firms do not secure higher credit ratings and do not belong 
in the high credit quality. 
Chapter 3: Corporate Governance and  
Default Correlation| 88 
 
 
Table 11: Non-uniform default correlations: Using credit ratings as an 





High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
Panel A: Ownership structure and influence 
Dispersed High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) -2.57% (-0.22)  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 27.23% (8.76)** 67.92% (37.81)** 
Concentrated High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 56.06% (5.00)**  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 56.22% (31.00)** 75.32% (115.00)** 
Panel B: Board effectiveness 
Low High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 28.75% (3.32)**  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 38.52% (25.01)** 73.53% (128.36)** 
High High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 41.00% (2.46)*  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 47.98% (8.49)** 69.11% (15.52)** 
Panel C: Financial transparency and disclosures 
Low High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 34.21% (3.40)**  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 35.57% (20.63)** 79.51% (123.78)** 
High High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 28.41% (2.16)**  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 45.41% (13.43)** 62.97% (33.19)** 
Panel D: Shareholder rights 
Low High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 21.89% (1.98)*  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 37.31% (15.79)** 72.64% (65.52)** 
High High Grade 0.00% (0.00)   
 Medium Grade 0.00% (0.00) 35.92% (2.92)**  
 Low Grade 0.00% (0.00) 43.50% (20.24)** 73.64% (89.40)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among poor and good corporate governance firms 
using credit rating as an alternative measurement for credit quality. Default correlations are 
calculated by using Equation (1) for each pair of firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * 
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represent significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. The sample consists of 835 firm-year 
observations (160 default firms and 675 non-default firms) for the period of 2000-2015. 
 
5.2. Alternative measurement for financial transparency and disclosures  
The second robustness test we conduct is based upon alternative proxies for 
financial transparency and disclosures. We use two new proxies for financial 
transparency, i.e., audit committee independence (measured by a binary variable 
where it equals one if firms audit committee is formed 100% from outsiders, and 
zero otherwise) and financial expertise (a binary variable that equals one if the firm 
has at least independent financial expert on the audit committee and zero 
otherwise).16 Table 12 shows that firms with low financial transparency tend to 
have a higher default correlation at the 1% significant level compared to those with 
low financial transparency. For example, under low financial transparency and 
disclosures, a 74% correlation is reported by low credit grade firms, whereas high 
financial transparency and disclosures firms have only 48% correlation among low 
credit grade firms.  
 
Table 12: Non-uniform default correlations:  An alternative measure for 
financial transparency and disclosures 
Financial 
transparency 
Credit quality Credit quality 
Low 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 65.35% (127.75)**   
Medium Grade 65.67% (96.14)** 65.39% (35.21)**  
Low Grade 66.98% (143.32)** 67.10% (75.66)** 74.16% (87.63)** 
     
High 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 21.02% (8.65)**   
Medium Grade 15.26% (4.85)** 19.96% (2.28)*  
Low Grade 17.69% (12.27)** 33.86% (12.78)** 48.12% (27.88)** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among different credit qualities under high and low 
financial transparency windows. In this table, we employ audit committee independence (a binary 
variable where 1 if firms audit committee is formed 100% from outsiders, otherwise 0) and financial 
expertise (a binary variable where 1 if firm has at least independent financial expert in the audit 
committee; otherwise 0) to serve as an alternative measure of financial transparency. Default 
                                                 
16 Financial expertise is defined as the audit committee member having a CPA or being a CFO. 
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correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) for each pair of firms.  T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. ** and * represent significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.   The sample consists of 
835 firm-year observations (160 default firms and 675 non-default firms) for the period of 2000-
2015. 
 
5.3. Alternative measurement for shareholder rights 
Finally, we employ an alternative measure for shareholder rights using the 
governance index (GOV_INDEX) used by Gompers et al. (2003). GOV_INDEX 
covers 24 provisions to measure the balance of power between investors and 
management. These are categorized into five areas: voting rights, tactics for 
delaying hostile bids, other takeover defenses, director/officer protection and state 
takeover laws. According to Gompers et al. (2003), a higher score (GOV_INDEX 
≥ 14) indicates higher managerial power and weaker shareholder rights. A lower 
score (GOV_INDEX ≤ 5) indicates higher shareholder rights and lower managerial 
power. The median GOV_INDEX of our sample is 8. Thus, we categorize the firms 
as having lower shareholder rights if the GOV_INDEX is greater than or equal to 
8.  If the GOV_INDEX is less than 8, the firms are considered to possess higher 
shareholder rights.17 The results presented in Table 13 show that firms with higher 
shareholder rights tend to have higher default correlation when compared to those 
with lower shareholder rights. For example, the correlation among the low credit 
grade firms with high shareholder rights is 58%; whilst, low credit grade firms with 









                                                 
17 The data for GOV_INDEX is available on Andrew Metric’s website: 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html. The data of this score is available until 2006. 
Thus, for this analysis we limit our sample firms from 2000 to 2006. Accordingly, 437 firms were 
included in this test.  
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Table 13: Non-uniform default correlations: An alternative measure for 
shareholder rights  
Shareholder 
rights  
Credit quality Credit quality 
Low 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 14.90% (2.87) **   
Medium Grade 23.28% (3.37) ** 9.33% (0.45)  
Low Grade 23.36% (7.15) ** 39.34% (6.42) ** 50.19% (11.98) ** 
High 
 High Grade Medium Grade Low Grade 
High Grade 17.32% (4.88) **   
Medium Grade 20.48% (6.57) ** 17.40% (3.04) **  
Low Grade 24.66% (10.29) ** 29.88% (9.96) ** 57.85% (17.40) ** 
Note: This table reports the default correlations among different credit qualities under high and low 
shareholder rights windows. In this table, we use Gompers’ et al. (2003) governance index as an 
alternative measure for shareholder rights. Default correlations are calculated by using Equation (1) 
for each pair of firms. T-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * represent significance at 1% and 5%, 
respectively.   The sample consists of 437 firm-year observations for the period of 2000-2006. 
 
6. Conclusion and future research directions 
This study addresses the effects of the corporate governance practices of firms on 
default correlations. Das et al. (2007) identify three causes of default correlations: 
cyclical effect, contagion effect, and effect of learning from others. This paper 
contributes to the literature by extending the reasoning of Das et al. (2007).  We 
find the corporate governance practices of firms significantly affect the clustered 
default risk among firms. We apply the Lucas’s (1995) method to test five 
hypotheses.  The historical U.S. default data of 835 firm-year observations 
throughout the period from 2000 to 2015 is employed for the analysis. First, we find 
firms with concentrated (dispersed) ownership are associated with high (low) 
default correlation. Second, firms with the low (high) effective board are associated 
with high (low) default correlation. Third, firms with low (high) financial 
transparency are associated with high (low) default correction. Fourth, high (low) 
shareholder rights create high (low) default correlation among firms. Fifth, firms 
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with weaker corporate governance practices have higher default correlation in a 
crisis period than a non-crisis period. Our results imply that firms with weak 
corporate governance may have high default correlations and, hence, they could be 
less effective in risk reduction if included in a credit portfolio for diversification 
tasks. 
This research has implications for financiers, and regulatory authorities. We 
recommend financiers consider corporate governance information for portfolio 
credit risk management. They should closely monitor firms with concentrated 
ownership, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency and high 
shareholders rights regarding the credit portfolio management. Overall, our findings 
indicate that regulators should adjust capital requirements for banks that make loans 
to firms with weak governance during crisis periods. 
Our empirical results should be interpreted with caution. First, the results 
are limited by the selection of variables. Although we conduct several robustness 
tests using alternative measures of credit quality and corporate governance, some 
other proxies might be used for the firm characteristics. Second, the Lucas’s method 
for default correlation, which we adopt in this paper, takes advantage of model-free 
estimation techniques and measures default correlation based on the realized 
historical default data. Since there are a few ways to estimate default correlations, 
it would be of academic interest to determine if this method is superior, because 
default correlations have not always been satisfactorily modelled and each method 
has its own merits and disadvantages. Third, we collect the historical data of credit 
quality and corporate governance until the last available year before the occurrence 
of the default event to examine the impact of corporate governance on default 
correlations. Future studies may examine the mutual relationship between them and 
address the issue of endogeneity. 
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Capital structure adjustments and corporate defaults 
 
Chapter four consists of two completed and submitted research papers. The title of 
the first paper is “Heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment revisited: Default 
versus non-default firms and short versus long time horizons.” It is under the first 
round of review by Journal of Banking and Finance (SSCI and ABDC ranking = 
A*). This paper shares the tests conducted to examine the heterogeneity of capital 
structure adjustments over two types of firms (default and non-default firms), and 
two types of measures (cumulative versus marginal). The fixed effect panel 
regression is employed to provide empirical evidence from U.S. 6,203 and 51,371 
firm-year observations for default and non-default firms, respectively, over the 
period from 1975 to 2015. The empirical results show that the default firms are 
associated with a higher speed of adjustment than non-default firms and firms take 
multiple periods to reach to target leverage. Further, the marginal speed of 
adjustment accelerates from the beginning period to the end period, as is consistent 
with the anchoring and adjustment bias heuristic.  
The title of the second paper is “Do leverage dynamics strengthen bankruptcy 
prediction? A comprehensive test.” This paper is under the first round of review by 
Applied Economic Letters (SSCI and ABDC ranking = B). Herein the effect of 
leverage deviation on measuring firms’ default risk in a comprehensive information 
environment is examined. A logistic model is employed to estimate the explanatory 
power of leverage deviation together with information from accounting, market and 
corporate governance variables for default prediction over five-year time horizons.  
The in-sample and out-of-sample tests suggest that taking into account leverage 
deviation enhances the capacity of measuring corporate borrowers’ default risk and 
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Heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment revisited: Default 
versus non-default firms and short versus long time horizon 
 
Declaration about the role and the contributions of authors 
I (Ruwani Fernando) confirm that I am the principal author of the following paper. 
As the principal author, I developed the conceptual framework, collected the data, 
conducted the data analysis, interpreted the results, and wrote the research paper. 
Leon Li provided conceptual advice, commented on and edited all versions of the 
paper. Greg Hou also commented on and edited all the versions of the paper. 
Please see the Co-authorship form attached in Appendix 4. 
This paper has been submitted and is under review by Journal of Banking and 
Finance. 
• Fernando, J.M.R., Li. L., & Hou. G.  (2019). Heterogeneity in capital 
structure adjustment revisited: Default versus non-default firms and short 
versus long time horizons.   
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Heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment revisited: Default 





This paper reexamines the issue of the heterogeneity of the speed of capital structure 
adjustment in firms. In contrast to previously documented contemporaneous results, 
we test the issue through distinguishing two types of the firm (default and non-
default firms), and two measures of the speed of adjustment (cumulative versus 
marginal). Our empirical results show that the speed of adjustment is non-uniform 
across firms and over time. In particular, default firms are associated with a higher 
speed of adjustment than non-default firms. The completion of leverage adjustment 
takes multiple periods. The marginal speed of adjustment accelerates from the 
beginning period to the end period, which is consistent with the anchoring and 
adjustment bias heuristic. Our empirical results are robust using a book/market 
leverage and a two-/one-step estimation approach.  
 
Keywords: Capital structure, speed of adjustment, default firms, cumulative 
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Capital structure decisions vary across firms, time, industries, and general economic 
conditions. Therefore, the concept of target leverage has become one of the major 
concerns of the recent capital structure literature searching for the reasons behind 
the heterogeneity of leverage adjustments among firms. Research suggests that the 
leading cause for the firms to lag behind their optimal leverage is the transaction 
cost (Myers, 1984). Further, literature suggests, investment opportunities (Elsas et 
al., 2014), corporate governance (e.g. Chang et al. 2014), debt covenants (Devos et 
al. 2017), credit ratings (Huang and Shen, 2015), and macroeconomic conditions 
(e.g. Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Cook and Tang, 2010) also affect the speed of 
adjustment (SOA) towards target leverage. 
Recent studies in this area examine the heterogeneity of SOA by splitting 
samples using different firm characteristics (e.g., Dang et al., 2012). New insights 
are supported by the dynamics of capital structure adjustments relating to different 
financial conditions of firms (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Dang et al., 2012). 
A few studies have addressed and examined the heterogeneity of leverage 
adjustment speed across various conditions, for example, high versus low financing 
imbalances (Dang et al., 2012), financial constraints versus non-constraints 
(Korajczyk and Levy, 2003), financially distressed firms before and after 
restructuring their debt (Gilson, 1997), and firms with financial deficit versus 
surplus when they are below and above the target leverage (Byoun, 2008). In this 
study, we first investigate the heterogeneity of leverage adjustment across default 
and non-default firms. To run the investigation, we define default 18 as the firms 
that have gone through bankruptcy or liquidation. Our empirical results indicate 
that firms that are close to default should exhibit a different pattern of capital 
structure and adjustment speed when compared to non-default firms. Next, we 
examine the heterogeneity of leverage adjustment across various periods. To run 
examination, we estimate the speed of adjustment over various time horizons and 
propose the two measurements for the speed of adjustment, that is, cumulative and 
                                                 
18 In this paper the terms bankruptcy and liquidation are used interchangeably as each represents the 
situation where a firm is placed in default and investors suffer credit losses.  
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marginal. Our empirical results indicate that the degree of leverage adjustment is 
smaller at the beginning period and becomes larger as time increases. 
Our study differs from those of Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Byoun (2008), 
and Dang et al. (2012) by choosing firms that are based on realized defaults and 
presume no continuity in the future. More specifically, there are two types of credit 
risk in finance, default and downgrade, but the most important is default risk. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003), Byoun (2008), and Dang et al. (2012) discuss the issue 
of heterogeneity in leverage adjustment across firms with various credit ratings (e.g., 
high versus low rating). Our focus is on the comparison between default and non-
default firms. Our argument is that although prior studies have investigated the issue 
of leverage adjustment as the credit rating of firms moving up and down, this is not 
the risk that investors should be focused on.  The risk that should be focused on is 
when investing in a business, whether the chances that we are going to lose our 
money are high or low, and whether there is likely to be a permanent loss. The risk 
is default risk. 
Therefore, we examine the heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment toward 
target leverage between default firms and non-default firms using realized data of 
default events. We estimate the speed of adjustment over various time periods and 
address two measurements of leverage adjustment speed: cumulative and marginal 
adjustment. Our study provides two main contributions to the literature. First, we 
offer new insights on the speed of adjustment of capital structure among default and 
non-default firms using a realized default sample. Secondly, we address an essential 
issue in this arena by understanding how firms’ capital structure adjustment varies 
across various periods. We note that, firms’ leverage adjustment is slower at the 
beginning and faster at the ending period and the phenomenon is consistent with 
the anchoring and adjustment heuristic.   
To estimate the target leverage, we use a standard set of explanatory 
variables from the literature. Both book and market values of leverage are used, and 
the results are compared. Our empirical results highlight that the leverage 
adjustment speed of default firms is significantly faster than that of the non-default 
firms. To test the issue of leverage adjustment at the beginning versus ending period, 
we estimate the speed of adjustment over various time horizons and then define the 
time of completion when the degree of adjustment reaches 100 percent. Then we 
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specify the cumulative and marginal speed of leverage adjustment and analyse the 
speed of adjustment at various periods.  
The rest of the paper is organized in sections: Section 2 reviews the literature 
and develops research hypotheses; Section 3 presents the data and model 
specification and Section 4 discusses the empirical results. The summary and 
conclusions are presented in Section 5.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1. Literature review  
The focus of our study is to examine the heterogeneity in the SOA of capital 
structure across default and non-default firms and over various time periods. To 
examine this, we follow the literature to determine the optimal leverage and split 
sample firms according to their financial conditions. After estimating the SOA over 
various time horizons, we address the issue of cumulative versus marginal SOA.  
Seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (1958) paved the way for many 
researchers to examine the implications of static trade-off theory on optimal capital 
structure. Under the trade-off theory, optimal leverage demands a balance between 
the tax benefit of borrowing debt and the cost of financial distress/bankruptcy. 
Traditional capital structure research suggests that firms have target leverage; 
however, due to the adjustment cost, firms deviate from their target leverage. 19  
Empirical studies show that firms adjust their actual leverage to the target slowly 
(e.g., see Fama and French, 2002) and thus the SOA lies between zero and one.  
Some studies examine how fast the firms adjust their leverage towards the target 
and identify various factors causing the heterogeneity in the SOA (e.g., Hovakimian 
et al., 2001; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The factors identified include transaction 
cost (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Gilson, 1997) as the main, and additionally, 
financial behaviour (e.g. Jalilvand and Harris, 1984), investment opportunities 
(Elsas et al., 2014), corporate governance (e.g., Chang et al., 2014), financing needs 
(Byoun, 2008), macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Korajczyk and Levy, 2003), debt 
                                                 
19 For examples of studies, see Flannery and Rangan (2006); Byoun (2008); and Lemmon et al. 
(2008).  
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covenants (e.g., Devos et al., 2017),  and growth opportunities (e.g., Dang et al., 
2012).  
Gilson (1997) examines the transaction cost on leverage ratio choices by 
financially distressed firms when reorganized through Chapter 11 US bankruptcy 
code and out of court restructuring. Gilson finds that, in general, the financially 
distressed firms tend to have higher leverage after contracting with their creditors. 
However, the transaction cost is higher when the firms are restructured out of court 
because various factors increase the cost of reducing debt/ or issuing equity. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) split the sample based on financial constraints to 
examine the effect of macroeconomic and firm-specific factors on target capital. 
They find financially unconstrained firms’ leverage varies counter-cyclically 
whereas constrained firms’ leverage matches macroeconomic conditions. Further, 
they find that macroeconomic conditions significantly affect issue-choice (either 
debt or equity) of unconstrained firms, but the effect is less pronounced with 
constrained firms.  
A critical study by Byoun (2008) provides reasons why and how firms 
adjust their capital structure. His research suggests that firms change their leverage 
to the target when they face a financial deficit/surplus. Notably, he indicates that 
firms adjust the leverage mostly when they are overleveraged with financial surplus 
or underleveraged with financial deficit. Further, he notes that when firms have 
financial surplus and associate with over-target leverage, they try to reduce the debt 
with financial surplus (adjustment speed on an average is 30%). For firms with 
leverage below target leverage and financial deficit, the debt would be raised to 
meet firms’ financial deficit (adjustment speed on an average is 24%). Korajczyk 
and Levy (2003) define financially constrained firms as firms that have insufficient 
cash flows to undertake new investment. Similarly, Byoun (2008) identifies the 
financial deficit20 based on cash flows, considering operating cash flows of a firm 
to cover investment, dividend, and changes in working capital expenses. A recent 
study by Dang et al. (2012) focuses on the SOA among firms with different degrees 
of financing imbalances, growth opportunities, and investment. They use the same 
definition as Byoun (2008) to define financial imbalance. They also find that firms 
                                                 
20 Financial deficit = (Net investment+ dividends+ net change in working capital) – operating cash 
flows; if the value is positive it is known as financial deficit; otherwise financial surplus. 
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with higher financial imbalance have higher SOA (75%) compared to firms with 
lower financing imbalance SOA (50%). They argue that firms with higher financing 
imbalance have a faster leverage adjustment due to the high pressure to cover their 
financial deficit.  
Further, Elsas and Florysiak (2011) affirm the findings of Byoun (2008), 
where they find that firms with high deficit or surpluses adjust their leverage faster 
than the moderate financing deficits. They examine the SOA differences among the 
firms by using long-term issuer credit ratings as a measure of default risk because 
they argue the credit ratings are an important part of debt policy, providing signals 
for default risk. Interestingly, they found that higher SOA by low-credit rating firms 
compare to highest credit rating firms. Their finding is consistent with Gilson (1997) 
as he discovered that financially distressed firms adjust the leverage faster (when 
restructuring their debt out of court) in order to avoid bankruptcy.  Although Elsas 
and Florysiak (2011) study may capture the credit losses due to downgrade, as credit 
rating moves up and down frequently, it is not that which short-term risk investors 
should focus on. We argue that the more relevant risk is the chance of losing money 
where there is to be a permanent loss. The risk is default risk or bankruptcy risk 
which is captured through realized default considering the firms that have gone 
through bankruptcy and liquidation processes.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses development 
While researchers have investigated the issue of heterogeneity in the SOA of capital 
structure, to our knowledge, none has yet specifically examined the issue across 
default and non-default firms and over various periods. To address these gaps in the 
literature, this study distinguishes the two types of firms: default versus non-default 
firms, and two measures of the SOA: cumulative versus marginal, and links those 
with the issue of heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment.  
The definition of default is the inability of the counterparty to meet their 
obligations because they suffer from large financial deficits which trigger from a 
few years back to the date of default. Trade-off theory suggests (Myers, 1977) that 
firms are limiting their debt level by considering the cost of bankruptcy and tax 
benefits. Therefore, default arises as a result of increasing the cost of debt rather 
than from the benefits discussed under the trade-off theory.  
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Researchers in this area confirm that firms do have target leverage; however, 
they reach the target slowly to adjust their capital structure to the target due to the 
transaction cost (Fama and French, 2002). Researchers who focus on leverage 
adjustment of firms with financial issues suggest that they adjust their target 
leverage faster compared to financially healthy firms (e.g., see Dang et al., 2012; 
Byoun, 2008). Dang et al. (2012) show that firms with financial imbalances adjust 
their leverage faster in order to reduce bankruptcy cost and liquidation cost and also 
to face the pressure of financial deficit. Byoun (2008) explains that firms with 
financial deficits tend to have higher SOA by increasing debt to reduce financial 
deficit. Korajczyk and Levy (2003) also argue that financially constrained firms 
face a high cost of issuing equity, which forces them to adjust leverage faster toward 
their target leverage.  In general, the SOA of the firms ranges from 10 percent (Fama 
and French, 2002) to 34 percent (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). However, 
Faulkender et al. (2012) and Dang et al. (2012) argue that studies which impose the 
same SOA for all the firms in the sample possibly produce misleading results. 
Recent studies examine this issue by splitting the sample on a different basis; among 
them, some studies show that firms with financial problems have higher SOA 
compared to financially healthy firms. For example, Dang et al. (2012) finds that 
firms with high financial imbalances have an SOA of 75 percent compared to the 
SOA of 50 percent of the low counterpart. Byoun (2008) finds that when firms’ 
leverage is above the target leverage with financial surplus tend to have, on average 
a SOA of 30 percent . On the other hand, the firms that are below the target leverage 
with financial deficit have a SOA of 24 percent. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) find 
that low credit rating firms show SOA of 51 percent whereas high credit rating firms 
show SOA of only 29 percent.  
In alignment with the literature, we postulate that default firms are 
associated with higher SOA than non-default firms. When the firms are deviating 
from the target either they issue debt/equity, pay down their debt, or repurchase 
shares. Therefore, default firms being a special case of financial issues, we assume 
that they need to pay down their debt at the expense of the shareholders with a large 
adjustment either to avoid default/ bankruptcy or to prepare for the liquidation. 
Hence, we present our first hypothesis:  
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H1: Default firms have a higher speed of leverage adjustment than non-default 
firms. 
Most of the extant literature on the issue of the SOA focuses on examining 
the contemporaneous effect of leverage deviation on leverage changes (e.g., Dang 
et al., 2012, Byoun, 2008). Leary and Roberts (2005) argue that the studies focusing 
on temporary and cross-sectional leverage adjustment could be unable to fully 
capture firms’ financial decisions behaviour.  Baker and Wurgler (2002) conclude 
that capital structure is formed as a result of the cumulative outcome of historical 
reactions to the market changes. Therefore, we argue that recognizing the SOA over 
a long time horizon is necessary.  
A few studies have addressed the dynamics of capital structure over a longer 
horizon. Dang et al. (2012) examine the persistence of the determinants of target 
leverage in the long run.  Welch (2004) finds that firms are failing to rebalance their 
capital structure even over a long time horizon and indicate modest mean reversion 
of leverage. Kayhan and Titman (2007) examine the effect of the long time horizon 
on the changes of capital structure decisions through financial deficit, stock return, 
leverage deficit, and target leverage changes. They find that firms’ histories 
influence the capital structure and their results show that firms have faster SOA 
towards a new target than the current target.  
The literature has documented that transaction cost has a direct impact on 
leverage changes (e.g., see Fischer et al., 1989; Strebulaev, 2007; Altinkilic and 
Hansen, 2000). Altinkilic and Hansen (2000) suggest that the transaction cost of 
equity and debt issues consist of fixed and variable components.  Leary and Roberts 
(2005) further examine the adjustment to target leverage when fixed and variable 
cost components in the transaction cost are considered. Faulkender et al. (2012) find 
that firms could adjust their leverage at a lower marginal cost for reasons other than 
the transaction cost.  
Kayhan and Titman (2007) examine the changes of capital structure over a 
long time horizon to determine the effect of cash flows, stock prices and investment 
opportunities on the changes of debt ratios over five- and ten-year periods. Flannery 
and Rangan (2006) offer a controversial finding against that previously expressed 
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in the literature21 on the speed of leverage adjustment. They conclude that a firm 
achieves the target leverage each year by one-third of the target as a fixed proportion 
of adjustments.  
Based on the studies mentioned above, we extend the literature to examine 
the degree of SOA over various time horizons. However, we argue that market 
imperfections, such as adjustment costs or other constraints, lead firms to have a 
lower SOA in the short term but a higher SOA in the long term since firms may 
reduce the transaction cost of leverage adjustment at a greater extent in the long 
term. We thus develop the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2:  The short (long) time horizons are associated with a low (high) degree of 
leverage adjustment. 
The initial studies on the issue of the SOA suggest that firms adjust their 
leverage slowly (Fama and French, 2002) suggesting that firms take a long time to 
reach their optimal leverage. Studies show that there are various reasons to have 
different SOA among firms and different economies. However, all the firms tend 
to actively rebalance their leverage in order to reduce the gap between the current 
and the target leverage (Leary and Roberts, 2005). Although the literature suggests 
that the optimal leverage is achieved in the long run, no study has made an attempt 
to examine the dynamic behaviour of the leverage adjustment during the adjustment 
period. An adjustment period is a period in which a firm rebalances the capital 
structure from a beginning year to a final year of adjustment. Leary and Roberts 
(2005) indicate that firms do not adjust their leverage every period, but when they 
adjust, they do so within a target range rather than to a specific level. Also, they 
note that the transaction cost is the main reason for firms to deviate from their target, 
and they suggest that firms could lower the transaction cost by making frequent 
adjustments. Thus, we assume, from beginning to end, a number of frequent 
adjustments could emerge. Notably, Leary and Roberts (2005) also argue that under 
a fixed cost of the transaction cost, the number of adjustment frequencies increases 
over time, thus the average fixed cost decreases.  
Thus, we argue that firms not only achieve the target leverage in multiple 
years but also the adjustment speed varies over various periods. Consistent with 
                                                 
21 For example, Fama and French (2002) 
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Leary and Roberts (2005), we hypothesize that firms start their adjustment at a 
slower rate at the beginning of an adjustment period and faster at the ending year 
of the adjustment. We argue that during an adjustment period, i.e., from the 
beginning year of an adjustment onwards, the adjustment frequency increases 
thereby reducing transaction cost. Our hypothesis is further supported by the 
“anchoring and adjustment” heuristic. The anchoring effect has been documented 
in studies on behavioural finance, for example, stock return estimates (Kaustia et 
al., 2008), capital asset pricing model (Siddiqi, 2018), mergers and acquisitions 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2012), and credit spread (Douglas et al., 2015).  Shiller (1999) 
argues that the behaviour of financial markets is affected by anchoring heuristic. 
Anchoring and bias adjustment are one of the three decision-making heuristics 
described by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). The decision-making process is 
affected by an anchor, and even experienced managers are concerned and cause the 
adjustment bias towards an anchor. The anchor is a starting value, which is chosen 
arbitrarily, and the process is continued or the adjustment made until a final estimate 
is achieved (Fiedler, 1999). Thus, our third hypothesis is:  
H3: The leverage adjustment is completed in multiple periods, and the speed of 
adjustment is slower/faster at the beginning/ending year of adjustment. 
 
 
3. Data and model specification 
3.1. Data  
American firms encountering bankruptcy and liquidation, as defined by Compustat 
database over the period from 2000 to 2015, are used to define default firms in our 
study. Each default firm is coupled with five non-default firms by considering the 
highest market capitalization in the same industry (defined by the first two digits of 
SIC) and the default year. Accordingly, 568 default and 2840 non-default firms are 
included in the sample. We exclude financial (6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4999) 
firms from the sample as there are different regulations pertaining to these 
industries. We further exclude firms with missing values and the leverage ratio 
outside the range of zero and one. All other variables are winsorized at 1 percent 
and 99 percent level in order to avoid extreme outliers. Our final sample consists of 
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6,203 and 51,371 firm-year observations for default and non-default subsamples, 
respectively, over the period from 1975 to 2015. The sample selection is 
summarized in Table 1. We extracted the financial statement information from the 
Compustat database and collected the information on stock prices from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. GDP growth rates were obtained 
from the Federal Reserve Bank. Commercial paper rates and Treasury bill rates 
were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board’s web page. 
 
Table 1: Sample selection 
Selection criteria Number of firms 
Default firms  
Total number of firms encountering bankruptcy and 
liquidation events  
1753 
      Non-US firms (191) 
     Financial and Utilities firms  (674) 
     Missing data (351) 
Final default firms 537 
Total number of firm-year default firm observations 3733 
Non-default firms (1:5 non-default firms) 2685 
Total number of firm-year non-default firm observations 42036 
Notes: The table describes the procedure followed to obtain the final sample of default firms and the 
number of non-default firms. Firms encountering bankruptcy or liquidation events, as defined by the 
Compustat database from 1990 to 2015, are selected as default firms of the US. After filtering 537 
firms are qualified as default firms and we select five non-default firms to each default firm by 
considering highest market capitalization matched with default year and industry of the default firm.  
 
3.2. Model specification 
This section describes how the target leverage of the firms is measured and how the 
measurements of the SOA, i.e., the cumulative SOA and the marginal SOA, are 
derived over various time horizons. The literature suggests two distinct partial 
adjustment models for estimating SOA. For our purpose, the standard partial 
adjustment approach (two-step approach) is more flexible, which allows us to 
examine the leverage deviation among the default and non-default firms under the 
Chapter 4: Capital Structure adjustments and  




first step. It also enables estimation of the cumulative and marginal SOA over 
various time horizons based on a determined leverage target obtained from the first 
step estimation. Following the literature (Hovakimian et al., 2001; Heshmati, 2001), 
the typical target leverage estimation model can be written as: 
Lev*it = Xit + uit                (1) 
We estimate Equation (1) by using the panel fixed effect model where we specify 
the target leverage (Lev*it) as a function of the exogenous firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors represented by Xit
 . 22  Both book and market value of 
leverage ratios are used in this study (Book leverage = long-term debt plus short-
term debt/book value of total assets; Market leverage = long-term debt plus short-
term debt/market value of total assets) as separate models. As shown in Equation 
(1), the target leverage ratio varies across firms and time in our study. Following 
the literature (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingalies, 1995; Hovakimian 
et al., 2001; Fama and Fench, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006, Kayhan and 
Titman, 2007), we consider most commonly used determinants of the target 
leverage (see Table A of Appendix for the variable definition). Next, the fitted 
values from Equation (1) known as the target leverage (Lev*it) apply to the second 
step in the following model. 
Levit -Levit-1 = α + β (Lev
*
it - Levit-1) + εit             (2) 
The model in Equation (2) regresses the leverage change (i.e., Levit -Levit-1) on the 
leverage deviation (i.e., Lev*it  - Levit-1). In the equation, Levit denotes the year-end 
leverage for the ith firm, and Levit-1 is the lagged leverage of the i
th firm.  β in 
Equation (2) represents the SOA, which measures how fast firms adjust their current 
leverage towards the target leverage.  
In a real world, it is assumed that firms do not fully adjust to their target 
leverage due to transaction cost (Hovakimian et al., 2001), thereby the value of β is 
expected to be between zero and one. If β = 1, it represents firms fully adjust for 
any deviation from their target leverage. The literature suggests that the SOA 
(measured by the coefficient on leverage deviation) is inversely related to 
                                                 
22 Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Hovakimian and Li (2011) apply the panel fixed effect model. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) introduce the GMM estimator as a solution to the bias estimation due to 
endogeneity issues. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) use a tobit model highlighting the censored 
dependent variable in the model. We replicate our baseline results by using System GMM and tobit 
model to estimate the SOA, and our results are robust to different models.  
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transaction cost. 23  In particular, if β = 1, it implies that the transaction cost is zero, 
and thus Levit = Lev*it. This particular case is under the assumption that firms could 
adjust to the target leverage in the absence of transaction cost.  However, the 
literature indicates that firms adjust their leverage slowly (Fama and French, 2002) 
and the adjustment process might be non-uniform across time (Leary and Roberts, 
2005). Therefore, this study examines the SOA across various time horizons. The 
procedure is described below.  
First, we estimate Equation (2) across various time horizons. For instance, 
we use Levit-2 to replace Levit-1 and rewrite Equation (2) as follows:  
Levit -Levit-2 = α + β (Lev
*
it - Levit-2) + εit.               (3) 
Notably, now the coefficient on the leverage deviation (i.e., β) gives the SOA over 
two periods. This equation can be used recursively to get the SOA over n periods:   
Levit -Levit-3 = α + β (Lev
*
it - Levit-3) + εit.                 (4) 
Levit -Levit-4 = α + β (Lev
*





Levit -Levit-n = α + β (Lev
*
it - Levit-n) + εit.        
  
Notice that these are the cumulative speed of adjustment.   
The other measure of SOA is also of interest to us: the marginal speed of 
adjustment. The marginal SOA is the leverage adjustment that the firm completes 
in any given period. It is calculated by taking the difference in the cumulative SOA. 
For instance, the cumulative SOA over one period is 50 percent, over two periods 
it is 75 percent, over three periods it is 90 percent, and over four periods it 
researches to 100 percent. These results imply that the firm uses four periods to 
reach its optimal leverage. In other words, the firm started to adjust its leverage four 
periods ago. We thus define the period of (t-4) as the beginning period (i.e., BEG) 
of leverage adjustment. The current period t is defined as the end period (i.e., END) 
of leverage adjustment. Last, the marginal SOA at a given period would be 10 
                                                 
23 See for example, Gilson (1997) and De Miguel and Pindado (2001). 
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percent (100% - 90%), 15 percent (90% - 75%), 25 percent (75% - 50%), and 50 
percent (50% - 0%) from the beginning period to the ending period. Panels A and 
B of Figure 1 illustrate the cumulative and marginal SOA for the example, 
respectively.   
 
Figure 1: An illustration of cumulative and marginal SOA 
 
Panel A: Cumulative SOA 
 
Panel B: Marginal SOA 
 
 
4. Empirical results and the discussion  
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports the mean and median of firm leverage (including book and market 
value) and the variables used to determine the target leverage. First, the differences 
between default and non-default are significant at the 1 percent level, except the 
dummy variable No R&D for the difference in the median. Second, default firms in 
the study are associated with a lower level of book leverage than non-default firms. 
In particular, the mean and median of book leverage for default firms are 0.185 and 
0.157, respectively. The corresponding values for non-default firms are 0.192 and 
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0.184. However, the mean of market leverage for default firms is 0.257, higher than 
the corresponding value for the non-default firm, 0.241. Last, the market value of 
leverage is higher than the book value of leverage for both default and non-default 
firms. The reason could be that the market leverage is subject to higher non-
controllable factors than the book leverage (e.g., Drobetz and Wanzenried, 2006).  
The determinant variables for the target leverage also present a significant 
difference between default and non-default firms. For instance, the mean and 
median of profitability ratio for default firms are -0.092 and 0.032, respectively. 
The corresponding values for non-default firms are 0.130 and 0.127. This result 
implies that default firms are less profitable than non-default firms. Next, the 
growth ratio, the mean and median growth ratio for default firms are 1.711 and 
0.881, respectively. The corresponding values for non-default firms are 1.640 and 
1.105. The result implies that default firms, on average, tend to have a high growth 
level compared to non-default firms. Drobetz and Wanzenried (2006) suggest that 
high-growth firms may have low profitability and limited internal funds and depend 
heavily on external financing, which we observe as characteristics of a default firm. 
The mean and median values of the depreciation shield for default firms are slightly 
higher than the non-default firms. In particular, the mean and median depreciation 
shield of default firms are 0.050 and 0.037, respectively. The corresponding values 
for non-default firms are 0.043 and 0.039.  
The mean and median of the size variable for default firms are 3.627 and 
3.627, respectively. The corresponding values for non-default firms are 6.733 and 
6.889, respectively. Consistent with the literature, default firms report a lower mean 
and median value for tangible assets compared to non-default firms. In particular, 
the mean and median values for default firms are 0.263 and 0.210 whereas non-
default firms report 0.324 and 0.290 for mean and median respectively. The result 
implies that default firms less equipped with collateral against external financing. 
The variable No R&D is a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if a firm’s research 
and development expenses are not reported in a particular financial year; and 0 
otherwise.  It is a proxy for a firm’s uniqueness. Accordingly, the mean value for 
default firms is 0.369 and the corresponding mean value for non-default firms is 
0.364, suggesting when the firms are near default/bankruptcy the value of intangible 
assets diminishes. The mean value of the median industry debt of default firms is 
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slightly lower than non-default firms. In particular, the mean and median industry 
debt values for default firms are 0.228 and 0.186, respectively. The corresponding 
values for non-default firms are 0.247 and 0.198. respectively.24  Last, Table 3 
shows the correlation among the leverage ratios and the determinants of the target 
leverage. We find there is no multicollinearity among these variables due to low 
correlations among the variables.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
















Leverage        
Book leverage 0.185 0.192 0.157 0.184 -0.007*** -0.027*** 
Market leverage 0.257 0.241 0.150 0.158 0.016*** -0.007 
Determinants of target leverage 
Profitability  -0.092 0.130 0.032 0.127 -0.221*** -0.096*** 
Growth 1.711 1.640 0.881 1.105 0.071*** -0.224*** 
Depreciation shield 0.050 0.043 0.037 0.039 0.006*** -0.002*** 
Size 3.627 6.733 3.627 6.889 -3.106*** -3.263*** 
Tangibility 0.263 0.324 0.210 0.290 -0.061*** -0.080*** 
No R&D 0.369 0.364 0.000 0.000 0.005*** 0.000 
Industry median 
debt 0.228 0.247 0.186 0.198 -0.019*** -0.012*** 
GDP 3.529 3.115 3.555 3.555   
Spread 1.139 1.152 1.114 1.114   
Notes: This table reports the mean and median comparison of the leverage ratios and explanatory 
variables of target leverage among the default and non-default firms for years 1975-2015. The 
sample contains an unbalanced panel of 537 default and 2685 non-default firms covering 3733 and 
42036 observations respectively. Book leverage is long term debt plus debt in current liabilities to 
total assets; Market leverage is the ratio of long term debt plus debt in current liabilities to market 
value of total assets (number of shares outstanding times share price). Profitability is defined as the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; growth ratio is the ratio of market to book 
equity; non-tax shield is the ratio of depreciation expenses to total assets; size is natural logarithm 
of total assets; tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Uniqueness is defined as a dummy 
variable, 1 if firm did not report R&D expenses, 0 otherwise, Industry median debt is the median 
market leverage ratio for each industry defined by the first two digits of SIC number; GDP is the 
GDP growth rate; and term spread is defined as three-month commercial paper rate over three-month 
                                                 
24 The minimum GDP and term spread values during this period are 2.776 and 1.048, and the 
maximums are 7.259 and 3.324, respectively. 
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treasury bill rate.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov and K-sample equality of median test was used to test the 
distribution equality of mean and median respectively. *** represents the significant level at 1%. 
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Table 3: Correlation coefficients of determinants of target leverage 
  BLEV MLEV PROFIT GROWTH DEP SIZE TANG NO R&D IND_MEDIAN GDP CP.Spread  
Panel A: Default firms   
Profitability  0.000 0.173 1.000                 
Growth -0.082 -0.372 -0.388 1.000               
Depreciation shield 0.130 0.053 -0.394 0.033 1.000             
Size 0.043 0.251 0.376 -0.327 -0.090 1.000           
Tangibility 0.281 0.254 0.029 -0.072 0.350 0.139 1.000         
No R&D 0.149 0.199 0.177 -0.141 -0.021 0.115 0.199 1.000       
Industry median debt 0.015 0.140 0.220 -0.140 -0.155 -0.001 0.056 0.102 1.000     
GDP 0.042 0.031 0.023 -0.028 -0.018 -0.007 0.014 0.015 -0.110 1.000   
Commercial paper 
spread 
-0.026 0.004 -0.071 -0.033 0.027 0.028 -0.015 -0.037 -0.056 -0.225 1.000 
Panel A: Non-default firms 
Profitability  -0.202 -0.322 1.000                 
Growth -0.306 -0.506 0.314 1.000               
Depreciation shield 0.047 0.030 -0.092 -0.061 1.000             
Size 0.175 0.106 0.042 -0.086 0.075 1.000           
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Tangibility 0.245 0.218 -0.051 -0.198 0.534 0.105 1.000         
No R&D 0.096 0.111 -0.027 -0.123 -0.037 -0.148 0.109 1.000       
Industry median debt 0.000 0.146 0.104 -0.186 -0.088 -0.230 0.088 0.104 1.000     
GDP -0.008 -0.006 0.026 0.002 0.011 -0.076 0.020 0.014 -0.066 1.000   
Commercial paper 
spread 
0.012 -0.012 0.021 -0.007 -0.026 0.173 -0.065 -0.035 -0.089 -0.263 1.000 
 Notes: This table reports the correlation coefficient between the leverage ratios and the explanatory variables of target leverage. Book leverage is long term debt plus debt in 
current liabilities to total assets; Market leverage is the ratio of long term debt plus debt in current liabilities to market value of total assets (number of shares outstanding times 
share price). Profitability is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets; growth ratio is the ratio of market to book equity; non-tax shield is the ratio 
of depreciation expenses to total assets; size is natural logarithm of total assets; tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Uniqueness is defined as a dummy variable, 
1 if firm did not report R&D expenses, 0 otherwise. Industry median debt is the median market leverage ratio for each industry defined by the first two digits of SIC number; 
GDP is the GDP growth rate; and term spread is defined as three-month commercial paper rate over three-month Treasury bill rate. 
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4.2. Target leverage  
The results of the fixed effect panel method to estimate the target leverage for 
default and non-default firms are reported in Table 4. Our results on target leverage 
determinants are similar to those found in the literature. We found that target 
leverage is negatively related to the firm’s profitability and growth. The 
depreciation shield is negatively related with non-default firms’ target leverage 
whereas default firms report a positive effect on firm leverage and this is consistent 
with the findings of Bradley et al. (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1983). Bradley 
et al. (1984) and Ozkan (2001) suggest that firms that invest highly intangible assets 
have higher depreciation and tax credits, leading to higher leverage. Further, Scott 
(1977) states that firms can borrow at a lower interest rate due to the more highly 
secured debt under the “secured debt” hypothesis.  
The variables of firm size and tangibility are positively related to a firm’s 
target leverage for both default and non-default firms. The dummy variable (No 
R&D) is used as a proxy for the firm uniqueness. The result for the variable No 
R&D is consistent with the default firms. However, non-default firms show an 
adverse effect from that variable on target leverage. 25Industry median debt ratio is 
positively related to leverage for both default and non-default firms. Considering 
the effect of macroeconomic conditions, GDP is positively related to target leverage. 
The commercial paper spread shows a positive and significant impact on firm 
leverage. 26  Notably, all the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables 
significantly differ from default to non-default firms with market leverage. Except 
for the industry median debt and GDP, all other variables are also significant with 
book leverage.  
                                                 
25 However, Flannery and Rangan (2006) also report a negative association between these two 
variables under fixed effect panel model. One possible justification for this relation is, in general, 
non-default firms are operated on a large scale and they possess a good reputation in the market, 
thus, even though there is no uniqueness of their assets they can attract more shareholders due to 
their profitability, stability or large operations. 
26 Following Korajczyk and Levy (2003), we defined commercial paper spread as an annualized 3-
month commercial paper rate over Treasury bill rate. They find a positive and significant effect with 
firm target leverage under unconstrained firms’ category. The reason for the positive relation is the 
higher commercial rate over Treasury bill rate would be attractive to the debtholders to invest in 
issuing firms rather than the government security thereby increasing a firm’s leverage.  
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To sum up, these results confirm the preliminary evidence of the differences 
in leverage and its determinants between the default and non-default firms shown 
in Table 2. Some of the results of target leverage shown in Table 4 are consistent 
with the pecking order theory (e.g., a negative relation with profitability and 
leverage) and trade-off theory (e.g., a negative relation with depreciation shields). 
 
Table 4: Regression results for target leverage estimation 
Lev*it = Xit + uit 
 















Firm specific determinants 


































































































R2 within 0.083 0.136 0.065 0.162   
R2 between 0.087 0.175 0.183 0.372   
R2 overall 0.084 0.183 0.151 0.295   
Wald test (F-
Test) 
32.12*** 55.56*** 89.31*** 249.92***   
Hausmann 
test 
27.26*** 354.93*** 57.18*** 163.70***   
Notes: This table reports the results from the fixed effects panel regression of the leverage ratios on 
firm specific and macroeconomic determinants. The sample contains an unbalanced panel of 537 
default and 2695 non-default firms covering 3733 and 42036 observations, respectively. Book 
leverage is long term debt plus debt in current liabilities to total assets; Market leverage is the ratio 
of long term debt plus debt in current liabilities to market value of total assets (number of shares 
outstanding times share price). Profitability is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and 
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taxes to total assets; growth ratio is the ratio of market to book equity; non-tax shield is the ratio of 
depreciation expenses to total assets; size is natural logarithm of total assets; tangibility is the ratio 
of fixed assets to total assets. Uniqueness is defined as a dummy variable, 1 if firm did not report 
R&D expenses, 0 otherwise; Industry median debt is the median market leverage ratio for each 
industry defined by first two digits of the SIC number; GDP is the GDP growth rate; and term spread 
is defined as three-month commercial paper rate over three-month treasury bill rate. The last two 
columns show the results of the coefficient differences of each variable among default and non-
default firms with significant levels. These significant levels were obtained by using interaction 
terms with a default dummy where 1=if the firm is in default; 0 otherwise. The coefficient results 
are not included for brevity. The significant level of 1% and 5% are represented by * and ** 
respectively.  
 
4.3 Speed of adjustment: Default versus non-default firms 
After estimating the optimal leverage using Equation (1), we estimate the SOA 
using Equation (2), and the results are presented in Table 5. To test our first 
hypothesis (1) regarding the heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment between 
default versus non-default firms, we run Equation (2) for the default and non-default 
firms samples individually and make a comparative analysis between them. Last, 
we consider two measurements of firm leverage: book and market value. The results 
of book and market leverage are presented in Panels A and B of Table 5, 
respectively.    
Restated, the SOA is derived by regressing the change in leverage, Levit -
Levit-1, on the leverage deviation, Lev
*
it - Levit-1 (see Equation (2)). Panel A of Table 
5 provides the results by using book leverage. First, the estimated coefficients on 
the leverage deviation for default firms and non-default firms are 0.567 and 0.392, 
respectively. This result implies that the SOA of default and non-default firms is 
56.7 percent and 39.2 percent, respectively. The SOA of default firms is faster than 
non-default firms by 17.5 percent (17.5% = 56.7% - 39.2%).27  In other words, 
assuming a constant SOA over time, a default firm, on average, takes 1.76 (100/56.7) 
years to adjust its leverage to the target leverage whereas a non-default firm takes 
2.55 (100/39.2) years to change its capital structure to the optimal level. These 
                                                 
27 We always used dummy variable to test the difference in SOA between default and non-default 
firms (not tabulated). The results show the difference is significant at a 1% level. We also used a set 
of control variables in the regression. The inclusion of the control variables did not changes our 
conclusion.  
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results indicate that default firms are associated with a higher speed of adjustment 
to target leverage than non-default firms. Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of 
market leverage, an alternative measure of leverage. The estimated coefficients on 
the leverage deviation (Lev*it - Levit-1) for default firms and non-default firms are 
0.630 and 0.510, respectively. The result indicates the SOA of default firms is faster 
than non-default firms by 12 percent (0.12 = 0.63 – 0.510). This result supports that 
our H1 holds for both market and book leverage.  
 
Table 5: Speed of adjustment towards target leverage: Default vs. Non-default 
firms 
Levit -Levit-1 = α + β (Lev
*
it - Levit-1) + εit 
where β = SOA 
 Default firms Non-default firms 
Panel A: Book leverage   
Constant -0.001(-0.54) -0.002***(-3.38) 
Lev*it  - Levit-1 0.567***(32.04) 0.392***(54.38) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes 
R2 0.145 0.116 
Panel B: Market leverage   
Constant -0.002 (-0.69) -0.009***(-7.61) 
Lev*it  - Levit-1 0.630***(33.85) 0.510***(67.82) 
Fixed effect Yes Yes 
R2 0.170 0.192 
Notes: This table reports the results of estimating Equation (2) for default and non-default firms 
controlling for firm fixed effects and with robust standard errors. Panels A and B present the results 
for book and market leverage, respectively. The value in the parenthesis is the standard error of the 
estimate.  The *** denotes significance at 1% level.  
 
4.4. Speed of adjustment over various time horizons: Cumulative SOA 
Table 6 provides the estimated SOA over different time horizons. The time horizons 
from one to seven years are considered in this study. Panels A and B present the 
results of book and market leverage, respectively. Figure 2 further graphs the results. 
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Notice that the SOA over multiple periods shown in Figure 2 and Table 6 is 
cumulative SOA. Apparently, the cumulative SOA is continuing to increase as time 
passes and has a ceiling value of 100 percent.    
First, the upward-sloping pattern of the SOA shown in Figure 2 supports 
our H2 that the short (long) time horizons are associated with a low (high) degree 
of leverage adjustment. We define the time of completion as when the degree of 
cumulative SOA reaches 100 percent for the first time. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 6, the estimate of SOA for default and non-default firms researches 100 
percent in four and six years, respectively. In other words, default firms use a 
shorter period to complete their leverage adjustment than non-default firms. This 
finding further supports our H1 that default firms have a higher speed of leverage 
adjustment than the non-default firms. Last, Panel B of Table 6 and Figure 2 
presents the results of market leverage. Comparing Panels, A and B indicates that 
our conclusion is robust with the two measures of leverage.  
 
Table 6:  Speed of adjustment over various time horizons: Cumulative SOA 
Time 
horizons 
Default firms Non-default firms 
SOA t-stat. R2 SOA t-stat. R2 
Panel A: Book leverage (in years) 
One  0.57 32.04 0.145 0.39 54.38 0.116 
Two  0.80 39.43 0.239 0.62 70.06 0.177 
Three  0.92 40.11 0.275 0.76 78.77 0.221 
Four  1.00# 41.77 0.329 0.88 82.84 0.242 
Five  1.03 40.40 0.349 0.92 85.99 0.264 
Six  0.97 37.36 0.363 1.00# 90.50 0.289 
Seven  0.99 36.04 0.398 1.01 89.63 0.307 
Panel B: Market leverage (in years) 
One  0.63 33.85 0.170 0.51 67.82 0.192 
Two  0.82 38.83 0.257 0.72 86.15 0.278 
Three  0.94 40.25 0.296 0.85 96.74 0.331 
Four  1.00# 43.49 0.348 0.93 103.64 0.373 
Five  1.08 38.84 0.345 0.97 106.15 0.396 
Six  1.05 35.49 0.344 1.00# 108.36 0.424 
Seven  1.03 32.00 0.344 1.02 107.15 0.448 
Notes: This table presents the estimate of the SOA over various time horizons, from one to seven 
years. The # denotes the SOA researching 100% (i.e., the value of one) for the first time.  
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Figure 2: Cumulative speed of adjustment over various time horizons 
 
Panel A: Book leverage 
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4.5. Speed of adjustment for a given period: Marginal SOA 
The other measure of SOA of interest is the marginal SOA. As illustrated in Figure 
1, the marginal SOA is calculated by taking the difference in the cumulative SOA 
and it represents the degree of leverage adjustment in a given period. Table 7 shows 
the results of marginal SOA for default and non-default firms. The results are also 
graphed in Figure 3. The results of book and market leverages are listed in Panels 
A and B, respectively. The upward-sloping pattern of the marginal SOA shown in 
Figure 3 supports our H3 that the speed of leverage adjustment is slower/faster at 
the beginning/ending year of adjustment.  
 
Table 7:  Speed of adjustment for a given period: Marginal SOA  
Given period (BEG to END)  Default firms  Non-default firms 
Panel A: Book leverage   
Year 1 0.08 0.08 
Year 2 0.12 0.04 
Year 3  0.24 0.12 
Year 4  0.57 0.14 
Year 5  NA 0.23 
Year 6  NA 0.39 
Year 7 NA NA 
Panel B: Market leverage   
Year 1 0.06 0.03 
Year 2 0.12 0.04 
Year 3  0.19 0.08 
Year 4  0.63 0.12 
Year 5  NA 0.21 
Year 6  NA 0.51 
Year 7 NA NA 
Notes: This table presents the speed of adjustment for a given period, i.e., marginal SOA. The 
marginal SOA is calculated by taking the difference in the cumulative SOA and it represents the 
degree of leverage adjustment in a given period. Figure 1 illustrates an example. We define the time 
of completion when the degree of cumulative SOA reaches 100% for the first time under the 
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Figure 3: Marginal speed of adjustment for a given period 
 
Panel A: Book leverage 
 
 











































































A given period (From BEG to END) 
Default Non-default
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4.6. Discussion and implications  
This section presents the discussion and the implications relating to our findings. 
First, the results reveal that default firms are associated with a higher speed of 
adjustment than the non-default firms. These results support our first hypothesis 
(H1) and are consistent with the literature (Dang et al., 2011; Dang et al., 2012; 
Elsas and Floyrsiak, 2011). They find that firms with high financial imbalances 
exhibit a higher speed of adjustment. They argue that highly leveraged firms have 
a higher risk of bankruptcy and higher liquidation cost; therefore, they adjust their 
target capital structure faster. Elsas and Floyrsiak (2011) find that low credit rated 
firms have higher SOA compared to firms with high/moderate credit rating. They 
argue that the firms with low credit rating (i.e., close to default) would attempt to 
get rid of defaults and thus offset their debt faster than the non-default firms. As a 
result, low/high credit rating firms are associated with a higher/lower SOA. Dang 
et al. (2012) suggest that firms with low financial imbalances are under relatively 
lower pressure to adjust their target leverage due to low transaction cost of retiring 
debt or repurchasing equity when they adjust their leverage to the target.  
Thus, based on the literature we suggest that firms that are close to default 
events should exhibit a higher speed of adjustment in order to avert bankruptcy and 
liquidation cost. This finding provides implications for credit risk managers of 
banks. Banks analyse the current leverage of borrowers when making their credit 
decisions. We suggest that banks should consider the changes in capital structure, 
more precisely considering the speed of change of the borrower’s leverage ratio. 
Further, if a firm is having an unusual change in leverage ratio that might signal the 
risk of default. Thus, credit risk managers should take this into their rating system’s 
consideration in order to reduce potential credit losses. 
Next, we find that firms have low adjustment degrees in a short time horizon 
compared to high adjustment degrees in the long time horizon. We provide the 
reasons on the basis of explicit transaction cost and other constraints for leverage 
adjustments. Consistent with the literature, we suggest that transaction cost has an 
impact on rebalancing firms’ leverage in the short and long runs. Following Gilson 
(1997), we define transaction cost first. Transaction cost equals the inverse of SOA 
(i.e., Transaction cost=1-SOA), and De Miguel and Pindado (2001) carry the same 
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definition to support their findings. 28 Accordingly, we find higher transaction cost 
in the short run for default (0.43= 1.00-0.57) and non-default (0.61=1.00-0.39) and 
lower transaction cost in the long run; for example the three years’ implied 
transaction cost is 0.08 (1-0.92) for default and 0.24 (1-0.76) for non-default firms, 
suggesting the long run firms experience lower transaction cost. The results imply 
that the firms have the advantage of reducing transaction cost in the long run might 
be due to the different components of transaction cost as suggested by Altinkilic 
and Hansen, (2000); Leary and Roberts (2005); and due to other constraints (e.g. 
Faulkender et al., 2012). This result provides policy implications for firms in 
general; showing that ignoring the heterogeneity of SOA in short and long time 
horizon could underestimate the effect of transaction cost on leverage adjustment.  
Finally, we find a typical firm takes multiple years to adjust their capital 
structure and this is consistent with Flannery and Rangan (2006). They suggest that 
a firm adjusts their leverage each year, that is, firms achieve one-third of their target 
every period. Our result is partially consistent with Flannery and Rangan (2006); 
additionally, we suggest that firms adjust at a slower adjustment speed at the 
beginning year of an adjustment period and increase the adjustment when they are 
close to the end year of the adjustment horizon.  Flannery and Rangan (2006) find 
that firms chose a fixed proportion of SOA each period within few years: in contrast, 
we show that firms adjust their leverage every period but with different degrees of 
adjustment. Our results are consistent with Leary and Roberts (2005) since they 
suggest that over time when the adjustment frequency increases the transaction cost 
decreases. Thus, the higher adjustment speed at the ending year of adjustment 
suggests that during an adjustment period firms increase the number of adjustments 
compared to the beginning year.  
Additionally, we suggest that the low (high) adjustment speed of leverage 
at the beginning (ending) of an adjustment period is consistent with the decision-
making behaviour described under anchoring and adjustment bias. Literature has 
already documented the effect of anchoring and adjustment bias on the other areas 
in finance; for example, credit spread (Douglas et al., 2015); capital asset pricing 
                                                 
28 They compare the SOA differences among Spain and the USA and suggest that the main reason 
for the difference is the transaction cost due to different institutional characteristics.  
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model (Siddiqi, 2018). Studies using anchoring and adjustment bias emphasize that 
in an adjustment process, the initial adjustment starts arbitrarily, and then 
adjustments are frequently updated until the final adjustment is reached.29  The 
variations of the adjustment across time periods reemphasize the extant literature 
of capital structure adjustment on the influence of the transaction cost and other 
market constraints for adjustment towards the target.  
4.7. Speed of adjustment: One-step approach 
In the previous discussion, we use a two-step approach to estimate the SOA. In brief, 
we use Equation (1) to obtain the optimal leverage, then run Equation (2) to estimate 
the SOA. We may merge Equations (1) and (2) to obtain a reduced-form partial 
adjustment leverage model:  
Levit = α + β(πX it-1) + (1-β) Levit-1 + υit.                      (6) 
We may generalize Equation (6) as: 
Levit = α + γX it-1 + θ Levit-1 + υit.                                             (7) 
Where θ = 1 -  β, or β (i.e., SOA) = 1 – θ.  
The results of SOA over various time horizons via the one-step approach are 
presented in Table 8. Comparing this with Table 6 and Figure 2, the upward-sloping 
pattern of the cumulative SOA is pronounced. That is, the cumulative SOA 
increases as time passes. The ceiling value of 100 percent for the cumulative SOA 
repeats. Lastly, Table 9 presents the marginal SOA for a given period via the one-
step approach. Comparing Table 9 with Table 7 and Figure 3, the upward-sloping 
pattern of marginal SOA is robust with the alternative estimation method.  Notably, 
we also replicate our results by using different statistical models to test the 
robustness of our results under different models. To run these tests, we employ 
Tobit (Elsas and Florysiak, 2011) and the system GMM model suggested by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) for dynamic panel data. The results (not tabulated) 
support our hypotheses.30 We use these two methods only to find the contemporary 
                                                 
29  In a study based on real estate auctions and anchoring effect suggests that people start the 
adjustment at a low rate and ends at a high rate (Ku et al., 2006) opposing the view of start high and 
end high effect in anchors in the process of individual judgements.  
30 Tobit model is appropriate if the dependent variable is censored. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) use 
Tobit model as they argue that the leverage ratio is censored between 0 and 1. Under the one-step 
approach, the lag dependent variable creates the issue of endogeneity, and Arellano and Bond (1991) 
suggest the Generalized Method of Movements (GMM) provides the consistent estimator. We used 
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SOA due to the assumption that we made on constant target leverage by using one-
step approach.  
Table 8:  Cumulative speed of adjustment: One-step approach 
Time horizons Default firms Non-default firms 
Panel A: Book leverage (in years)  
One  0.55 0.34 
Two  0.80 0.60 
Three  0.92 0.75 
Four  1.01# 0.84 
Five  1.04 0.91 
Six  1.02 1.00# 
Seven  0.99 1.01 
Panel B: Market leverage (in years) 
One  0.60 0.40 
Two  0.81 0.70 
Three  0.93 0.83 
Four  1.08# 0.93 
Five  1.09 0.97 
Six  1.05 1.01# 
Seven  1.04 1.02 
Notes: This table presents the cumulative SOA estimate over various time horizons via a one-step 
approach. The equation for estimation is presented in Section 4.7. The # denotes the SOA 
researching 100% (i.e., the value of one) for the first time. 
 
Table 9:  Marginal speed of adjustment: One step approach  
Given period (BEG to END)  Default firms  Non-default firms 
Panel A: Book leverage   
Year 1 0.09 0.09 
Year 2 0.12 0.07 
Year 3  0.35 0.09 
Year 4  0.55 0.15 
Year 5  NA 0.26 
Year 6  NA 0.34 
Year 7 NA NA 
Panel B: Market leverage   
Year 1 0.15 0.03 
Year 2 0.12 0.04 
Year 3  0.21 0.10 
Year 4  0.60 0.13 
Year 5  NA 0.30 
Year 6  NA 0.40 
Year 7 NA NA 
                                                 
leverage lagged by two periods as the instrumental variables suggested by Anderson-Hsiao as a 
solution to the endogeneity problem.  
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Notes: This table presents the speed of adjustment for a given period, i.e., marginal SOA. The 
marginal SOA is calculated by taking the difference in the cumulative SOA and it represents the 
degree of leverage adjustment in a given period. Figure 1 (panel B) illustrates an example. We define 
the time of completion when the degree of cumulative SOA reaches 100% for the first time under 
the cumulative SOA. The marginal SOA is therefore not available after completion and is denoted 
as NA.   
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Using 45,769 firm-year observations in the United States from 1975 to 2015, we 
re-examine the issue of heterogeneity in capital structure adjustment by addressing 
the comparison between the two types of firms (default versus non-default firms) 
and the two measures of speed of adjustment (cumulative versus marginal). Our 
empirical findings are consistent with the following notions. First, we find default 
firms are associated with a higher speed of adjustment than non-default firms. 
Second, a short (long) time horizon is associated with a low (high) degree of 
leverage adjustment. Third, firms take multiple periods to complete the adjustment 
on leverage, and the speed of adjustment is slower (faster) at the beginning (ending) 
period of adjustment. Overall, the empirical results support our hypothesis that the 
speed of adjustment is non-uniform across firms and over time.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. Unlike most of the 
previous studies, we estimate the SOA over a long time horizon focusing on 
important characteristics of firms’ leverage adjustment behaviour. In contrast to the 
fixed proportion of adjustment speed suggested by Flannery and Rangan (2006), 
we find that firms have different degrees of adjustments over a long time horizon 
and throughout an adjustment period due to market imperfection or other 
constraints. Thus, our results stress that transaction cost and other constraints have 
a strong influence on leverage adjustment being varied across time periods. Also, 
we contribute by extending the literature on dynamic capital structure to focus on 
the firms’ leverage adjustment with different time intervals. However, since our 
study is primarily designed to test the heterogeneity of SOA over the long-time 
horizon under the assumption of constant target, the results should be interpreted 
with these limitations in mind.  
In sum, we argue that financial institutions should consider the leverage 
dynamics of firms more precisely due to the heterogeneity of their leverage 
adjustments. Further, ignoring the leverage adjustment across firms and time is 
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likely to have led to misleading the conclusions of dynamic capital structure 
literature. 
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Table A: Determinants of target leverage 




Book leverage Book value of debt divided by total assets  
Market leverage Book value of debt divided by market 
value of total assets 
 
Target leverage determinants 
Size Natural logarithm of Total assets + 
Tangibility Fixed assets divided by total assets + 
Growth 
opportunity 
Market value of total assets divided by 
book value of total assets 
-/+ 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes divided 









Dummy variable equal 1 if R&D expenses 
are missing, 0 otherwise 




Median market industry debt ratio using 
first two digits of SIC  
+ 
GDP  Annual GDP growth rate - 
Commercial paper 
spread 
Annualized 3-month commercial paper 
rate over 3-month Treasury bill rate 
+ 
Notes: This table presents the leverage ratios, determinants of target leverage. Below we show the 
codes used in Compustat database for financial information.  Book leverage: [(Long term debt 
(DLTT) + Debt in current liabilities (DLC)/ Total assets (AT)]; Market leverage: [Long term debt 
(DLTT) + Debt in current liabilities  (DLC)/ Price fiscal year close (PRCC)* Common shares 
outstanding (CSHO)]; Size: [ Natural logarithm of total assets (ln (AT))]; Tangibility: [Property, 
plant and equipment (PPENT)/ Total assets (AT)]; Growth opportunity: [Price fiscal year close 
(PRCC)* Common shares outstanding (CSHO)/ Total assets (AT)]; Profitability: [Earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) / Total assets (TA)];  Depreciation shield:[Depreciation expenses (DP) /Total 
assets (AT) ]; R&D_Dummy: equals 1 for missing Research and Development expenses (XRD).  
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Do leverage dynamics strengthen bankruptcy prediction? A 
comprehensive test  
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This paper comprehensively examines the effect of leverage deviation on 
measuring firms’ default risk. A logistic model is employed to estimate the 
explanatory power of leverage deviation together with information on accounting, 
market and corporate governance for default prediction over several horizons.  Our 
in-sample and out-of-sample tests suggest that taking into account leverage 
deviation enhances the capacity of measuring corporate borrowers’ default risk. 
Additionally, such benefit is persistent over various time horizons. 
 
 
JEL classification: G32; G33 
Keywords:  Leverage deviation, default risk, capital structure, z-score  












                                                 
* Please note, this paper presents an additional test conducted additionally to those reported in 
chapter four. However, due to the data unavailability of corporate governance variables to the main 
sample reported in chapter four of the thesis, this further study is conducted by using a different data 
set. Thus, this further work has been submitted to Applied Economic Letters and the paper is 
structured as per the journal’s requirements.  
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Traditional capital structure theories state that firms have target leverage and the 
decision on the target debt depends on a trade-off between the tax benefit of 
borrowing debt and the cost of financial distress and bankruptcy. New dynamic 
capital structure models show that firms dynamically rebalance their leverage 
towards the target leverage with varying speeds of adjustment (e.g., Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006). Thus, the leverage deviation (i.e., the difference between target 
leverage and actual leverage) provides useful information for financial institutions 
to recognize whether firms are over- or under-leveraged when they are assessed 
against the credit risk.  
A few studies show the importance of incorporating capital structure 
dynamics into credit risk modelling theories (see, for example, Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein, 2001; Dangl and Zechner, 2004; Hui et al., 2007; Lo et al., 2008; Löffler 
and Maurer, 2011). Although these studies have investigated the issue of leverage 
dynamics and default prediction, to our best knowledge, none has explicitly 
examined the default prediction considering comprehensive predictor information 
together with leverage dynamics. 31  To address the gap in the literature, we 
incorporate leverage dynamics with accounting, market and corporate governance 
information into default prediction. We also conduct both in-sample and out-of-
sample tests and examine the persistence of the leverage dynamics as a predictor 
variable over various time horizons.  
We employ a two-step approach for the study.  The target leverage is 
forecast in the first step.  In the second step, the leverage deviation is calculated 
based on the forecast target leverage in the first step. It is then used as a new variable 
for the regression analysis. Further evidence is shown on the role of leverage 
deviation for default prediction. It is found that defaults firms tend to have a higher 
leverage deviation, i.e., they are highly over-leveraged. Leverage deviation carries 
extra firm-specific risk information that is not subsumed by other information, thus 
                                                 
31 González-Aguado and Moral-Benito (2013) examine the issues of using single regression-based 
model selection. 
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enhancing the power of prediction. Additionally, prediction performances of 
leverage deviation are consistent over various time horizons.     
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Target leverage estimation 
We follow the standard partial adjustment approach to measure the target leverage. 
The typical target leverage estimation model can be written as: 
Lev*it = Xit + uit                 (1) 
Where we specify target leverage, Lev*it, as a function of firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors represented by Xit. Book leverage is used to measure target 
leverage.32 The model allows the target leverage ratio to vary across firms and over 
time. The leverage deviation is obtained as follows: 
LDevit-1 = Lev*it - Levit-1.                (2) 
Leverage deviation (LDevit-1) is the difference between the target leverage and 
lagged actual leverage of the ith firm for the tth period.  To measure the leverage 
deviation over various time horizons, we change the lag number order of the lagged 
actual leverage in Eq. (4.2) (e.g., Levit-2, Levit-3 …). Notably, we lock the target 
leverage of firm i at time t. accordingly, leverage deviation conveys the information 
on how far a firm is deviating from its optimal leverage. 
 
2.2. Default prediction  
We employ a conventional logistic regression model to predict default probability.33 
The model is presented as follows:  
              y*it+1= cont.+ β1Z-scoreit + β2DDit + β3CGSit + β4LDevit+ εit+1.            (8) 
y*it+1 is an unobservable latent variable. What we observe is a dummy variable yit+1, 
                                                 
32 We also estimate all the models by using market leverage, and the estimation results are similar. 
The results are available upon the request. 
33 We also perform the probit regression and the results are similar to the logit model. The results 
are available upon request. 
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defined as yit+1 = 1 if yit+1
* > 0 (i.e., company i defaults at time t+1) and yit+1 = 0 if 
otherwise (i.e., company i does not default at time t+1). Z-score is obtained by the 
original Altman (1968)’s Z-score model. DDit denotes distance to default;
34 CGSit 
denotes corporate governance score;35 and LDevit  denotes leverage deviation for 
measuring default risk. εit+1 denotes the error term. We also estimate Eq. (4.8) by 
regressing the dependent variable at time t+k, aligning with k time horizons, against 
explanatory variables at time t, where k=1, 2,..5. Based on Eq. (4.8), we develop 
two empirical models, Model 1 and Model 2. Model 1 includes Z-scoreit , DDit, and 
CGSit as explanatory variables only. Henceforth, Model 1 restricts β4 in Eq. (4.8) to 
be 0. Model 2 remains the same as Eq. (4.8) which integrates all four types of 
information. Note that we estimate Model 1 for comparison purposes (see Table A 
of Appendix for the variable definitions). 
 
2.3. Data 
Firms which were encountering bankruptcy or liquidation events, as defined by the 
Compustat database over the period 2000–2015, are selected as default firms in this 
study. For each default firm, we select a firm of similar size (defined by the value 
of total assets) in the same industry. The default and non-default firms are chosen 
by referring to the first two digits of the SIC-code for the sampling process.  We 
exclude financial (SIC code: 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code: 4900-4999) firms 
and firms with the leverage levels outside the range between 0 and 1. All the other 
financial variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. The 
variables for Z-score, DD, and the determinant variables for target leverage are 
collected from the Compustat/CRSP database as panel data over five years on a 
quarterly basis.36 Corporate governance variables are collected through company 
proxy statements. Depending on the data availability, 73 default firms are taken for 
                                                 
34 Merton (1974) introduces the distance to default. DD is calculated by using average market price 
of equity divided by the volatility of equity using daily data on quarterly basis. 
35 CGS is developed by following the S&P’s governance framework (2002), which covers ownership 
concentration, shareholder rights, financial transparency and board effectiveness. 
36 See Flannery and Rangan (2006) for the definitions of the target leverage variables. 
Chapter 4: Capital Structure adjustments and  




the sample. Then, by matching the sample, 73 companies are selected as non-default 
ones.  Accordingly, we collect 3280 firm-quarter observations for the sample.  
 
3. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents the leverage deviation comparison among default versus non-
default firms. Accordingly, default firms tend to be over-leveraged given a negative 
mean of leverage deviation (-0.037). The difference in mean leverage deviation is 
significant between default and non-default firms.   
Table 1: Leverage deviation comparison 
 Default Non-default Difference   
(Default – Non-Default) 
Leverage deviation -0.037 0.003 -3.036*** 
Notes: This table presents the comparison of mean leverage deviation between default and non-
default firms by using Eq. (2). The *** represents significance at the 1% level. 
 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of Model 1 and Model 2, based upon Eq. (4.8) 
for a one-year prediction horizon.  We find that all three variables in Model 1 have 
significantly negative effects on default probability. The results suggest that default 
firms are characterized by low Z-score, distance to default and corporate 
governance score. The results of Model 2 show that leverage deviation has a 
significantly positive effect on default probability. It is suggested that leverage 
deviation increases default risk. The R2 of Model 1 is 28.25 percent whereas that of 
Model 2 is 30.34 percent. A lower Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) value of 
Model 2 is found. T values present in parentheses. The results suggest that taking 
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Table 2: Regression results for default prediction  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 2.419 (11.36)*** 2.867 (12.16)*** 
Z-score -0.539 (-20.74)*** -0.669 (-20.90)*** 
DD -0.030 (-7.54)*** -0.027 (-6.86)*** 
CGS -0.236 (-6.84)*** -0.262 (-7.09)*** 
LDev  2.155 (8.35)*** 
   
Pseudo R2 0.2825 0.3034 
AIC 2841.64 2501.41 
Notes: This table presents the estimation results of Eq. (3). The model is estimated based on the logit 
regression. The explanatory variables are Z-score, DD (Distance to default), CGS (Corporate 
governance score) and LDev (leverage deviation).  Figures in parenthesis are t-values. Pseudo R2 
denotes the explanatory power of the models. AIC denotes Akaike Information Criterion.  *** 
denotes significance at the 1% level.  
 
Table 3 reports the models’ (Model 1 and 2) accuracy measured by using the area 
under the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve (AUC) for multiple 
prediction horizons ranging from one to five years. AUC measures the correct 
classification rate of default and non-default firms. Accordingly, Panel A presents 
the accuracy ratios for the in-sample test: Panel B reports the results for the out-of-
sample test. For 1-year prediction for default, Model 2 of Panel A has 84.85 percent 
accuracy, compared to lower accuracy of 83.88 percent for Model 1.  The prediction 
performances for longer prediction horizons show a rapid decline, which is 
consistent with the literature (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008). The prediction 
performances for the five-year horizon are 75.99 percent and 76.68 percent for 
Models 1 and 2, respectively. For any horizon, the accuracy of Model 2 outperforms 
that of Model 1. The result is consistent with Löffler and Maurer (2011) who find 
leverage deviation has an incremental contribution to prediction of performance. 
The predictive power of leverage deviation, together with three other predictor 
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Table 3: Accuracy ratio comparison  
Prediction horizon 1-Year  2-Year  3-Year  4-Year  5-Year  
Panel A: In-sample test 
Model 1 83.88% 81.37% 79.07% 77.09% 75.79% 
Model 2 84.85% 82.77% 80.43% 77.36% 76.68% 
Panel B: Out-of-sample test 
Model 1 82.59% 76.86% 73.62% 73.62% 72.84% 
Model 2 83.00% 78.31% 75.53% 74.81% 75.19% 
Notes: This table summarizes the prediction accuracy measured by the area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve over a five-year prediction horizon for in-sample (Panel A) 
and out-of-sample analyses (Panel B).  
 
To examine the out-of-sample prediction, we randomly withhold 20 percent of the 
sample. The data is used for forecasting defaults. The residual sample is used to 
estimate Models 1 and 2. We then use model estimates to predict the default events 
for multiple horizons. The results of the out-of-sample accuracy ratios in Panel B 
are similar to in-sample results in Panel A. Therefore, the advantage of 
incorporating leverage deviation for default prediction is further confirmed.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
New capital structure models suggest that firms dynamically rebalance their 
leverage towards the target leverage. Before firms achieve their target leverage, 
they are either recognized as under-leveraged or over-leveraged. It is posited that 
leverage dynamics significantly predict the company’s default event. In this paper, 
we address the issue of whether leverage deviation strengthens the default 
prediction. Our in-sample and out-of-sample tests show that default firms are highly 
over-leveraged and the default prediction is advantaged by including leverage 
deviation together with information of accounting, finance, and corporate 
governance.  The leverage deviation provides persistent performance across 
multiple predicting horizons in default risk assessment. Hence, the importance of 
capital structure for credit risk modelling cannot be ignored.  
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Table A: Definitions for variables 
Variable Measurement 
Leverage variables  
Book leverage Book value of debt divided by total assets 
Market leverage Book value of debt divided by market value of total 
assets 
Target leverage determinants 
Size Natural logarithm of Total assets 
Tangibility Fixed assets divided by total assets 
Growth opportunity Market value of total assets divided by book value of 
total assets 
Profitability Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total 
assets 
Depreciation Shields Depreciation expenses divided by total assets 
R&D_Dummy  
 
Dummy variable equal 1 if R&D expenses are 
missing, 0 otherwise 
Industry median debt Median market industry debt ration using first two 
digits of SIC  
GDP  Annual GDP growth rate 
Commercial paper spread Annualized 3-moth commercial paper rate over 3-
month Treasury bill rate 
Default predictor information 
ZS Atman Z-score (1968) is calculated as follows; 
ZS= 1.2*working capital to total assets+ 1.4* 
Retained earnings to total assets + 3.3*sales to total 
assets + 0.6* Market value of equity to book value of 
total debt + Sales to total assets 
DD Distance to default is calculated by using average 
market price of equity divided by the volatility of 
equity using daily data on quarterly basis. 
CGS Corporate governance score is calculated by using 
four sub-indices of ownership concentration, 
shareholder rights and relations, financial 
transparency and board effectiveness.  
LDev Leverage deviation; the difference between the target 
leverage and actual leverage 
This table presents the leverage ratios, determinants of target leverage. We below show the codes 
used in Compustat database for financial information.  Book leverage: [(Long term debt (DLTT) + 
Debt in current liabilities (DLC)/ Total assets (AT)]; Market leverage: [Long term debt (DLTT) + 
Debt in current liabilities  (DLC)/ Price fiscal year close (PRCC)* Common shares outstanding 
(CSHO)]; Size: [ Natural logarithm of total assets (ln (AT))]; Tangibility: [Property, plant and 
equipment (PPENT)/ Total assets (AT)]; Growth opportunity: [Price fiscal year close (PRCC)* 
Common shares outstanding (CSHO)/ Total assets (AT)]; Profitability: [Earnings before interest and 
tax (EBIT) / Total assets (TA)];  Depreciation shield:[Depreciation expenses (DP) /Total assets 
(AT) ]; R&D_Dummy: 1 equal for missing Research and Development expenses (XRD)




 Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The research findings of this PhD thesis contribute to the knowledge of credit risk 
management and corporate finance. This research investigates the importance of 
corporate governance in measuring default risk at the individual and portfolio levels. 
It also examines the heterogeneity of capital structure adjustments between default 
and non-default firms. 
The second chapter of this thesis provides evidence of the advantages of 
combining different predictor information for improving predictive accuracy. It 
highlights the importance of comprehensive application of corporate governance 
information to measure default risk at the individual level, the utility of combining 
different types of predictor information (accounting, share market and corporate 
governance information) and the effectiveness of different predictor information in 
the developed and emerging markets’ contexts.  
The third chapter reveals the results of one of the first studies to examine 
the importance of considering firm-specific corporate governance information in 
recognizing non-uniform default correlations among firms. The fourth chapter finds 
that capital structure adjustments and leverage dynamics differ between default and 
non-default firms and those dynamics can be successfully incorporated into default 
prediction models.  
The main findings from this thesis are:  
(i) the comprehensive application of corporate governance information is 
necessary for default prediction;  
(ii) the combination of accounting, share market and corporate governance 
information improves default prediction,  
(iii) financial information has higher prediction ability in matured markets 
whereas non-financial information plays a significant role for 
predicting corporate defaults in emerging markets, 




(iv) firms with weak corporate governance in terms of ownership 
concentration, low board effectiveness, low financial transparency, and 
high shareholder rights increases default correlation, 
(v) default firms tend to have higher speed of leverage adjustment 
compared to non-default firms and firms have different degrees of SOA 
over long horizons, and 
(vi) leverage deviation when applied with accounting, share market and 
corporate governance information further strengthens default prediction 
and it is persistent in the long run.  
The details of these findings are set out in Sections 5.1 to 5.3. Contributions to 
knowledge and implications of the results of this research contained in Section 5.4. 
Section 5.5. explains the limitations of this research and suggests future research 
opportunities. 
 
5.1  Main findings of Chapter 2 (Essay one) 
Given the importance and the role played by the predictor information in measuring 
default risk, Chapter 2 divides the predictor information into three main categories, 
namely accounting, share market and corporate governance. The chapter consists 
of two research papers. The first paper, entitled “Corporate governance and default 
prediction:  reality test,” investigates corporate governance information 
comprehensively in a default prediction model. By following Standard and Poor’s 
(2002) governance framework, the corporate governance information is categorized 
into four dimensions, that is, ownership structure and influence, shareholder rights 
and relations, financial transparency and disclosures, and board effectiveness. 
Although Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) adopt Standard and Poor’s (2002) 
governance framework to test the effect of corporate governance on credit rating, 
this chapter shows the importance of the comprehensive application of corporate 
governance information on default prediction for a first time. The importance is 
attributed to the difference between credit ratings and default probability when 
identifying credit losses. The chapter also shows that the extant literature, that 
applies corporate governance within their research scope, is mainly limited to 
ownership concentration and board characteristics variables. Therefore, the 




research for this thesis reported in Chapter 2 is different from the previous studies 
that employ governance information for default prediction.  
Moreover, the novelty of the research in this chapter is that it combines 
accounting, share market and corporate governance information for the quoted 
companies in the US to test two types of information, that is financial (accounting 
and market) and non-financial information which are not mutually exclusive. 
Previous studies show the limitations of using pure accounting and market 
information for default prediction and also the advantage of combining accounting 
and market information in a single predictor model. However, this study presents 
the argument that both accounting and market information represents financial 
information and it is important to capture the non-financial information in the 
default prediction model. Thus, it is of academic interest to use corporate 
governance as alternative non-financial information for default prediction. It is 
tested whether non-financial corporate governance information provides an 
incremental contribution to the financial information-based model. 
The binary logistic model is employed to estimate the major results by using 
3280 US firm-quarter observations over the period of 2000-2015. The results 
clearly indicate that the comprehensive application of corporate governance 
information is necessary for default prediction. In order to test the incremental 
contribution of the non-financial information, five models are developed, that is, 
Model 1 (Accounting-based approach), Model 2 (Market-based approach), Model 
3 (corporate governance-based approach), Model 4 (accounting and market-based 
approach) and Model 5 (integrated model, using accounting, market and 
governance information). The findings are unambiguous that the integrated model 
with financial and non-financial information yields the highest prediction accuracy 
compared to all the models. The prediction accuracy is measured through the 
accuracy ratios under Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) and Cumulative 
Accuracy Profile (CAP) curves. Overall, this research suggests that default firms 
are characterized by concentrated ownership, lower shareholder rights and relations, 
lower financial transparency and lower board effectiveness than non-default firms. 
Moreover, this study stresses the importance of including comprehensive 
governance information in addition to financial information for improved default 
prediction. 




The second paper presented in Chapter 2, is titled “Financial versus non-
financial information for default prediction: Evidence from Sri Lanka and the USA.” 
It explores whether the prediction performances of financial and non-financial 
information are different between mature and emerging markets. The results of the 
U.S.(mature market) are compared with Sri Lanka (emerging market) after applying 
the same methodology with some modifications to match the emerging market 
context. Sri Lanka is selected as a representative secondary emerging market for 
the comparison purpose. 
The rationale for the comparison is based on the institutional and market 
differences between mature and emerging markets. This thesis argues that if 
markets are efficient, the effectiveness of financial information should be high for 
default prediction, then these markets should highly rely on financial information. 
On the other hand, this thesis argues that if the market is not efficient, a higher 
weight should be given to non-financial information.  Although it appears that the 
extant literature has not explicitly examined this issue, this research shows that 
financial information is more relevant for U.S. firms and non-financial corporate 
governance information appears to be more relevant for the emerging market. This 
study uses 730 firm-year observations from Sri Lanka, in the model based 
estimations. The performance of the five models described earlier is measured by 
using the ROC curve, CAP curve, Gini rank coefficient, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
and Pseudo R2. 
Overall, the results suggest that corporate governance information is useful 
in default prediction in both Sri Lanka and the US. Further, this study finds that 
ownership variables have less prediction ability in Sri Lanka and the relative 
prediction performance of accounting, market and governance information differs 
between the two markets. Accounting information provides higher prediction 
accuracy for a mature market (U.S.), followed by the market and corporate 
governance information. However, non-financial corporate governance information 
has a higher prediction ability than financial information in an emerging market 
such as Sri Lanka.  




5.2.  Main findings of Chapter 3 (Essay two) 
Chapter three consists of one research paper titled “Corporate governance and 
default prediction” that explores whether corporate governance affects default 
correlation among firms. The extant literature establishes three main reasons for 
default correlations: cyclical, contagion and learning from defaults (Das et al., 
2007). This thesis contributes to the literature by extending the reasoning behind 
these three sources of default correlation by using the firm-specific corporate 
governance information. Following Lucas (1995), this research uses a standard 
binomial approach to measure default correlation of 160 and 675 default and non-
default firms over the period 2000-2015. The Standard and Poor’s governance 
framework (2002) is again applied to define the governance dimensions: ownership 
structure and influence, board effectiveness, financial transparency and disclosures, 
and shareholder rights. The firms are categorized, first, on the basis of credit quality 
(high, medium and low) by using Altman Z-score (1968).  Then good and poor 
corporate governance are classified using the governance indices based on the four 
governance dimensions of Standard and Poor’s governance framework (2002). 
 This thesis argues that default correlation varies with firms’ corporate 
governance quality. In particular, different ownership structures, board 
effectiveness, financial transparency, and shareholder rights affect joint default risk 
among firms due to contagion and cyclical effects as proposed by Das et al. (2007). 
With regards to ownership structure and influence, given the mixed findings of the 
literature, it is argued that different ownership structures affect differently on 
default correlation. The literature shows that ownership concentration can bring 
better monitoring and positively affect a firm’s value. By contrast, some studies 
reported in the literature find a negative effect of concentrated ownership, as 
concentrated shareholders focus on personal benefits at the expense of minority 
shareholders and debtholders, which in turn may create financial issues and lead to 
poor credit quality. An effective board is necessary to face the external 
environmental shocks. Thus, having less effective board increases the default 
correlation in a situation of external environmental shocks. This thesis argues that 
low financial transparency increases managerialism, and thus leads to poor credit 
quality. Therefore, the default correlation is increased due to the effect of contagion 
among firms with low financial transparency.  




The issue of shareholder rights presents additional complexity when interpreting 
the results. On one hand, this thesis argues that having strong shareholder rights can 
help to reduce managerial opportunism and to enhance the quality of financial 
reporting (e.g., Healy and Wahlen, 1999). On the other hand, this thesis also argues 
that having strong shareholder rights can increase unnecessary influence on 
management and corporate controls thereby creates risks to bondholders and 
minority shareholders.  
Overall, the results of this research show that concentrated ownership, low 
financial transparency, low board effectiveness, and higher shareholder rights in a 
single portfolio increase the joint default risk among firms. Further, the effects of 
poor corporate governance are more pronounced during a financial crisis period, 
than during a non-crisis period.  
 
5.3.  Main findings of Chapter 4 (Essay three) 
Chapter 4 consists of two research papers. One paper entitled, “Heterogeneity in 
capital structure adjustment revisited: Default versus non-default firms and short 
versus long time horizon” investigates an important and contemporary issue in the 
capital structure literature, that is, heterogeneity of speed of adjustment in the 
contexts of default events and different time horizons. Previous research has 
examined the heterogeneity of speed of adjustment across financial conditions such 
as financial constraints (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003), financially distress (Gilson, 
1997) and financial deficit (Byoun, 2008). By contrast, this paper selects default 
firms that have gone through bankruptcy and liquidation and hence employs a 
realized default sample. This paper is distinguished from the previous research as it 
chooses samples from firms based on credit losses. It is assumed that default firms 
are likely to incur permanent losses whereas in the previously tested samples, firms 
suffer losses due to the downgrading of credit ratings. The novelty of this study is 
presented below.   
Although a few studies consider the speed of adjustments and its long-run 
behaviour, this thesis examines the degrees of leverage adjustments over various 
time horizons. Flannery and Rangan (2006) find that firms accomplish the leverage 
target about one third each year. However, this thesis argues that a firm’s leverage 




movements come with different speeds across a particular time horizon.  To 
investigate this phenomenon, this research measures two forms of the speed of 
leverage adjustments - cumulative and marginal.  
  For the testing, 568 default and 2840 non-default firms from 2000 to 2015 
US data are selected. The fixed panel regression model is used to test for 6,203 and 
51,371 firm-year observations for default and non-default subsamples, respectively, 
over the period from 1975 to 2015. It is found that default firms have a higher speed 
of adjustment than non-default firms. A firm, in general, takes multiple years to 
complete its target leverage.  The adjustment speed is low for the short adjusting 
horizon and high for the long horizon. Further, the marginal speed of adjustment is 
smaller at the beginning of a horizon and larger at the end of the time horizon.  
 The paper titled “Do leverage dynamics strengthen bankruptcy prediction? 
A comprehensive test” is also included in Chapter 4.  While a few studies have 
investigated the issue of leverage dynamics and default prediction, this research 
examines the predictor information comprehensively in a single predictor model. 
In particular, this thesis explores the incremental contribution of leverage deviation 
when added to the previously tested accounting, market and governance 
information (see the first paper in Chapter 2) using 3280 US firm-quarter 
observations over the period 2000-2015. This analysis uses two steps to derive the 
results. In the first step, the study estimates the target leverage by using panel fixed 
effect model and finds the leverage deviation over five years before the default 
events. In the second step, the study adds leverage deviation to the accounting, 
market and governance variables as predictor information.  A binary logistic model 
is used to estimate the results and the prediction accuracy is measured by the ROC 
and CAP curves. The findings of this analysis clearly show that leverage dynamics 
provides significant information about corporate defaults in addition to the 
information of accounting, market and corporate governance. The performance is 
persistent in the long run.  
 
5.4.  Research contributions and policy implications 
This study makes a number of academic and practical contributions. The first essay 
contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the extant 




literature on credit risk modelling by incorporating corporate governance 
information comprehensively in a default prediction model. Following Standard & 
Poor’s (2002) governance framework’s dimensions, it applies corporate 
governance information comprehensively to assess the default risk of corporate 
borrowers. Second, it contributes to the literature as it incorporates financial and 
non-financial information in a single default predictor model for better prediction 
performance. Third, knowledge is expanded through examining the roles of 
financial and non-financial information between a mature and an emerging market 
perspective. This comparison reveals ways in which the model’s performance 
differs when applied to a mature market and an emerging market. The analysis in 
the first essay therefore enrichens the conclusions reached by prior research efforts.  
The second essay contributes to the credit risk literature by extending the 
empirical analysis to default correlation. This essay examines the effect of corporate 
governance on default correlation. Studies on default correlation provide three 
reasons for default correlation. Such as cyclical correlation, contagion effect and 
learning from defaults (Das et al., 2007). Thus, this paper extends the cyclical and 
contagion reasons by considering corporate governance information for clustering 
defaults among firms. This is the first study to examine the effect of corporate 
governance on default correlation, thus generating new insights to add to the 
knowledge relating to this issue.   
The third essay contributes to the literature on corporate finance in several 
ways. First, it focuses on the speed of capital structure adjustment which is a 
growing area of interest in the capital structure literature. Second, it links the capital 
structure literature with the credit risk literature by addressing the importance of a 
comprehensive application of predictor information together with capital structure 
dynamics for default risk prediction. In this context, the development of a default 
prediction model with new dimensions can contribute to the banking sector’s ability 
to proactively predict corporate defaults. The findings of the first part of the third 
essay invites financial institutions to extend their consideration of factors relating 
to default firms’ behaviour. Moreover, the findings enrich the extant literature on 
capital structure.  
From a policy-making perspective, this thesis guides the banks towards 
better credit risk modelling. As per the Basel II accord, sophisticated banks have 




the freedom to use their internal credit rating systems and credit risk models to 
determine their capital requirements to cover the credit risk exposures.37 Therefore, 
it is assumed that banks have their unique internal rating systems and credit risk 
models and the application of the predictor information is different among the 
bankers. This thesis emphasises the importance of paying more attention to 
corporate governance information comprehensively not only about individual credit 
risk management but also about portfolio credit management. Moreover, the thesis 
directs financial institutions and corporate management to consider different time 
horizons relating to capital structure dynamics, that is, it is beneficial to observe the 
capital structure dynamics in both short and long runs before granting a loan to 
corporate customers. In summary, the research supporting this thesis provides 
different insights into the area of credit risk management. It improves the general 
understanding of the corporate governance information as effective predictor 
information. Additionally, corporate governance information is found to be a 
significant source of default correlation. Also, the inclusion of leverage dynamics 
provides additional improvements for default prediction models. 
 
5.5.  Limitations and directions for future research 
Defaults are infrequent, and the default firms have different dynamic characteristics 
as compared to those of healthy firms.  These distinguishing characteristics require 
financial institutions to carefully use default prediction models in order to avoid 
credit losses. Thus, the research questions addressed in this thesis help financial 
institutions to modify their default prediction models in a more efficient way. 
However, this research is subject to some limitations. This research pays attention 
only to the predictor information. Therefore, applying different default prediction 
models that have not been tested in this research would add different dimensions 
for future studies. Given the importance of financial and non-financial information, 
it would be enlightening to consider enhanced Altman’s Z-score model including 
                                                 
37 Basel committee on banking supervision (Basel) introduces Basel II (1999) to measure the capital 
requirements for credit risk exposures. There are two approaches for this purpose. First approach is 
standardized approach where banks can use the models that are already developed by the Basel 
committee. The second approach is internal-rating based approach. The large financial institutions 
can develop their internal rating and credit risk models. 




both financial and non-financial types of information. Examining more countries 
representing mature and emerging markets could be another fruitful direction for 
comparison studies.  
 Additionally, in the thesis, the sample selection is based on the firms 
encountering bankruptcy and liquidation.  Therefore, it would be interesting to 
choose a sample with default firms directly obtained from the databases held by 
financial institutions to test the models suggested by the study. Further, it is of 
academic and practical interest to examine whether these models can be extended 
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Appendix 6: Supplementary information for chapters 
 
1. Chapter two 
The following tables relate to the footnotes included in paper one and two. Table 
A1 relates to the note number 23 of paper one (page 2682 of the first paper in 
chapter two) and Table A2 relates to note number 18 (page 12 of the second paper 
in chapter two). 
 

















Model 1 72.97% 73.12% 68.00% 68.13% 60.56% 59.63% 
Model 2 54.63% 53.77% 46.08% 46.21% 39.74% 38.84% 
Model 3 41.87% 40.18% 39.50% 39.41% 42.22% 41.76% 
Model 4  76.13% 75.82% 71.16% 71.01% 66.14% 65.04% 
Model 5 82.05% 81.96% 79.02% 78.76% 78.40% 77.27% 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of accuracy ratio as performance measure of bankruptcy 














Table A2: Logistic regression results of the alternative models for Sri Lanka 
Governance Variables Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Ownership structure 
and influence 
Intercept 0.172 (1.54) 6.679***(7.12) 1.711***(3.09) 7.954***(7.31) 10.726*** (7.86) 
INST (%)   
 
0.002 (0.54)  0.007 (1.44) 
DIRECTOR (%)  
 
-0.005 (-1.08)  -0.004 (-0.79) 
NUM_SHARE  
 
-0.32 (-0.54)  -0.100 (-1.420) 
BLOCK  
 
0.302 (0.89)  0.494 (1.17) 









-0.858***(-2.80)  -0.313 (-0.92) 
AUD_OP  
 
0.046 (0.21)  -0.311 (-1.25) 
Board structure and 
effectiveness 
BOARD SIZE  
 
0.028 (0.53)  0.185***(2.87) 
CEO DUALITY  
 
0.050 (0.23)  -0.336 (-1.31) 
IND_DIRE  
 
0.062 (0.99)  0.016 (0.22) 
OUT_DIRE  
 
-0.363***(-5.94)  -0.460***(-6.39) 
Financial variables WCTA -0.289***(-3.28) 
 
 -0.238***(-2.85) -1.190 **(-2.10) 
MVEBTD -0.001 (-0.20) 
 
 0.012*(1.86) 0.006 (0.78) 
STA -0.065 (-1.190) 
 
 -0.016 (-0.30) -0.008 (-0.14) 
RETA -0.794***(-5.11) 
 
 -0.631***(-4.24) -0.628***(-3.79) 
EBITTA 0.189 (1.59) 
 
 0.229**(2.04) 0.104 (0.83) 
CASHMTA -1.185*(-1.93) 
 
 -2.233***(-3.51) -2.282***(-3.47) 
LTDTA 0.471**(2.65)   0.335*(1.85) 0.404**(2.20) 
TDTA 0.156**(2.11)   0.168**(2.21) 0.141*(1.76) 
CFTA -1.271**(-2.28)   -1.104**(-1.99) -1.453**(-2.30) 
CFCL -0.188**(-2.43)   -0.182**(-2.42) -0.136*(-1.73) 
CFTD -0.031(-1.07)   -0.038 (-1.29) -0.028 (-0.91) 
SHARE PRICE  -0.409***(-3.07)  -0.123 (-0.81) -0.057 (-0.33) 
STOCK_VOL 
 
0.875(1.40)  0.758 (1.17) 0.884 (1.28) 
RELATIVE SIZE 
 
-0.697***(-6.57)  -0.880***(-7.11) -1.147***(-7.31) 
EXCESS RETURN 
 








 0.09 0.07 0.14 0.16 0.28 
Likelihood ratio   92.28*** 73.38*** 133.21*** 158.14*** 281.41*** 
Notes: This table presents the results of the logistic regression for five alternative models. 730 firm-year observations. 1= if the company is default and 0 otherwise. The goodness of fit of 
the models are measured by using Pseudo R2, Likelihood ratio χ2 and Wald χ2. Wald χ2 measures whether the corporate governance information explains the variation of the default probability 
compared to the accounting and market information-based model. Model 1: Default risk= f (Accounting), Model 2: Default risk= f (Market), Model3: Default risk= f (Corporate governance), 
Model 4: Default risk= f (Accounting and Market), Model 5: Default risk= f (Accounting, Market and Corporate governance) **Denotes significance at the 5% level; ***Denotes significance at 







2. Chapter four 
The following tables relate to the footnotes included in chapter four. Table A3 
relates to the note number 30 of chapter four (page 131).  Table A4 relates to the 
note number 32 of Chapter four (see page 144). Table A5 relates to note number 33 
of chapter four (page 144). 
 
Table A3: Speed of adjustment towards target leverage with alternative 
models 
Dependent variable  
Leverage(t) 









Panel A: Default 
Levit-1 0.656*** 0.582*** 0.705*** 0.636*** 
SOA 0.344 0.418 0.295 0.364 
T-stat./Z-stat. 30.17 24.38 15.63 13.31 
R2     
Year fixed effect   Yes Yes 
AR(1) test (𝜌-value) 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (𝜌-value) 0.87 0.58 
Hansen test of over-identification (𝜌-value) 1.00 1.00 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (𝜌-value) 0.07 0.55 
   
Panel A: Non-default 
Levit-1 0.757*** 0.650*** 0.714*** 0.638*** 
SOA 0.243 0.350 0.286 0.362 
T-stat 86.23 68.96 30.04 27.65 
R2     
Year fixed effect   Yes Yes 
AR(1) test (𝜌-value) 0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (𝜌-value) 0.86 0.78 
Hansen test of over-identification (𝜌-value) 0.96 0.96 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity (𝜌-value) 0.12 0.75 
Notes: This table presents the regression results for the dynamic partial adjustment model of leverage 
adjustment given by Eq. (6) using tobit and system GMM models. For system GMM model, we 
used leverage lagged by two periods as the instrumental variables suggested by Anderson-Hsiao. 
GMM model is tested by using two step estimator. AR (1) and AR (2) are tests for first and second-
order correlation in the first differenced residuals under the null hypothesis that no serial correlation. 
Hansen test of over-identification test the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The Diff-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity (𝜌-value) test the null hypothesis that instruments used in the model are 






coefficient is significant at 1% level. The SOA value is calculated by using the estimation results 
for the lagged leverage, i.e., subtracting the coefficient by 1. The coefficient of the firm specific and 
macroeconomic variables are not reported for brevity. 
 
Table A4: In-sample accuracy ratio comparison using market leverage 
deviation 
Prediction horizon 1-Year  2-Year  3-Year  4-Year  5-Year  
Model 1 83.88% 81.37% 79.07% 77.09% 75.79% 
Model 2 85.36% 82.99% 80.81% 78.64% 77.15% 
Notes: This table summarizes the prediction accuracy measured by the area under the Receiver 
Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve over a five-year prediction horizon for in-sample (Panel A) 
and out-of-sample analyses (Panel B). Model 1: Default risk= f (Z-score, Distance to default, 
corporate governance score). Model 2: Default risk= f (Z-score, Distance to default, corporate 
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LR Chi 1109.55 744.63 460.66 230.68 97.71 
Pseudo R2 0.281 0.263 0.222 0.176 0.156 
AUC 0.845 0.827 0.804 0.773 0.766 
 



















































LR Chi 1220.89 841.75 532.84 296.32 120.81 
Pseudo R2 0.309 0.267 0.228 0.195 0.165 
AUC 0.853 0.829 0.808 0.786 0.771 
Notes: This table presents the results estimated by using equation 4. The model estimated is based 
on probit regression to predict the default probability by using two explanatory variables. Such as 
leverage deviation (LevDev) defined as the difference between the target leverage estimated from 
equation 2 (chapter four) and the actual leverage and Altman Z-score values. The table provides the 
coefficient estimates and t-values in parenthesis with *** indicating significant level at 1%. The 
explanatory power of the models and the prediction performances of the models by using area under 
the Receiver Operating Curve (ROC) values are also given.  
 
 
